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ABSTRACT

THE ETHICAL BALANCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND POPULATION HEALTH
INTERESTS TO EFFECTIVELY MANAGE PANDEMICS AND EPIDEMICS

By
John Mary Mooka Kamweri
May 2013

Dissertation Supervised by Professor Gerard Magill, Ph.D.
There is no overlapping criterion providing a basis for attaining balance between
individual and population oriented ethical concerns generated in the pandemic and the
epidemic interventions. The shortfall leads to competing individual and population
interests that hamper the effective management of pandemics and epidemics. The
libertarian model focuses on advancing individual rights. The epidemiological model
focuses upon population health. The social justice model focuses on a broader
perspective than individual rights and population health to include universal human
rights.
This dissertation suggests a Mixed Interests Ethics Model (MIEM) to ethically
negotiate a balance between the individual and population interests in pandemics and
epidemics. MIEM involves a combination of models (libertarian, epidemiological, and
iv

social justice) that shed light on substantive ethical principles of each model (e.g.
autonomy, solidarity, and common good); which in turn require procedural standards (i.e.
necessity, reasonableness, proportionality, and harm avoidance) to negotiate between the
principles when they conflict.
The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights provides a
hermeneutical context for applying MIEM in so far as it places MIEM within the context
of promoting rights (individual and human) by considering the general ethical tension
between individual and universal rights as explained by the UNESCO Declaration.
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1. Chapter One
Amelioration of Individual Rights in the Influenza Pandemic Intervention

Introduction
The most problematic public health ethical issue in responses to bioterrorism and
pandemics has been identified by scholars, such as Lawrence O. Gostin and colleagues,
as the tension between the individual and population interests (common good).1
Individual health preferences are traditionally well defended in the libertarian-oriented
model. Conversely, the epidemiological model is framed on the need to promote and
protect population health, and safety. The ethical guide to effectively manage pandemics
needs to be based on a criterion that balances between individual and population interests.

A. The Emergence of Influenza Pandemic and Prevention Initiatives
(i) H5N1 Influenza Pandemic and the Population Good
Following the influenza A subtype H5N1 (bird flu) of 2004, the World Health
Organization cautioned of a possible mutation of the virus, and, outbreak of a highly
pathogenic influenza A pandemic H5N1 virus that could spread between humans. Public
health authorities estimate that morbidity and mortality in the United States, within 12-16
weeks, could reach 50 million requiring outpatient care, 2 million requiring
hospitalization, and, 500,000 deaths.2
A pandemic refers to a disease outbreak affecting the populations of several
countries, or continents. The influenza pandemic occurs when a new influenza virus
emerges for which people have little or no immunity and for which there is no vaccine.3
1

Since 2003, several governments, worldwide, have undertaken the initiative to put into
place influenza pandemic preparedness plans. Even prior to the anticipation of H5N1, in
United States, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) had issued the 2001 draft Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA) to guide disaster preparedness.4
The MSEHPA was drafted to enhance government regulative powers in matters of
public health preparedness, surveillance, management of property, protection of persons,
and communication.5 There was a feeling among some policymakers that the existing
laws could not adequately provide the necessary authority needed for effective
intervention in those five key public health areas. Moreover, states lacked the necessary
public health infrastructure for management of pandemics and bioterrorism threats. The
experts advanced the Model Act as necessary to strengthen states with the comprehensive
powers needed to effectively manage disastrous disease outbreak, while respecting
individual rights and freedoms.6 They justified government exercise of compulsory
powers on the basis of the protection and defense of the common good of safety and
health.
The MSEHPA encountered significant criticism for endorsing broad government
coercive powers to promote and protect population wellbeing, while subordinating
individual preferences.7 Some of the most contentious issues revolve around articles V
and VI requiring the use of government regulative powers to carry out mandatory
vaccinations, quarantine, involuntary treatment, confiscation of private property, and
criminalization of non-compliant individuals.8 For instance, Article VI, Section 602 (b)
states:
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The Public health authority may isolate or quarantine, pursuant to Section 604,
any person whose refusal of medical examination or testing results in uncertainty
regarding whether he or she has been exposed or is infected with a contagious or
possible contagious disease or otherwise poses a danger to the public.9
With a pending threat of human-to-human H5N1 in 2004, several states adopted a
version of the MSEHPA. The State of Pennsylvania, for instance, introduced a draft titled
Influenza Pandemic Response Plan (IPRP) in 2005. The IPRP contains an ordinance
mandating the governor to declare an emergency for purposes of protecting the health
and safety of the Pennsylvania population. The proposed intervention includes possible
mandatory measures such as involuntary vaccine, quarantine, and isolation.10
The MSEHPA and the IPRP commit to the epidemiological goal of managing disease
in populations by utilizing government efficiency and coercive powers to prevail over
individual interests so as to do surveillance, effectively plan, coordinate, manage
property, and protect populations.11 This public health paternalism is justified on the basis
of protecting the population good of safety and health. Safety and health, in this tradition,
constitute community or group compelling interests deserving of protection by health
authority over competing individual choices.12
The MSEHPA ignited a debate among scholars and health providers concerning
priorities between population and individual interests. Authors of the MSEHPA and
scholars in the communitarian tradition have since generated considerable amount of
literature in defense of the population-good oriented approach. Of foremost relevance is
Lawrence O. Gostin and colleagues who explain the fundamental ethical problem of
population health as the balancing of the tension between the individual interests and the
3

common good of health and safety of the population.13 Gostin articulates the problem
that:
Despite its success in many states, the Model Act has become a lightning rod for
criticism from both ends of the political spectrum. Civil libertarians object to the
diminution of personal freedoms and conservatives object to the diminution of
free enterprise and property rights. In short, the Model Act galvanized public
debate around the appropriate balance between personal right and common
goods.14
Gostin argues that the issue of government compulsory powers over individuals
should not focus on whether they are relevant but whether there is balance to safeguard
individual rights. He sees the rejection of substantial government presence into people’s
social lives as symptomatic of a paradigm shift in American values towards
individualistic oriented personal freedoms since the early beginning of the 21st Century.15
Gostin and peers support a legal and ethical framework that utilizes government
compulsory powers in circumstances where there is credible belief that the individual will
cause undue risk to population health.16
(ii) Protection of Individual Rights
Some experts while unopposed to the need for government regulative powers
consider the MSEHPA-sanctioned powers as too broad and invasive of individual rights.
As observed by Ken Wing, the language of some provisions such as that in Article III
takes paternalism to new levels. The article requires mandatory reporting, by providers,
of “all potential cause of public health emergencies – within 24 hours.”17 Wing cautions
that “Every doctor and every pharmacist would become an enforcement arm of the public
4

health authority.”18 He is concerned with the protection of confidentiality and privacy
rights.
Individual rights advocates countered the population-oriented epidemiological model
with the defense of individual autonomy and a right to self-determination.19 George
Annas, probably the most pronounced critic of the MSEHPA, agrees that government has
responsibility to plan, coordinate, and communicate with the public but should not
compromise civil liberties. He points to state coercive measures to quarantine, to provide
mandatory vaccinations and to impose involuntary treatment as unhelpful for purposes of
effective intervention policy. In his view, measures that aim at identifying and treating
those who have been exposed to the infectious disease are more effective than targeting
the public for quarantine.20
Griffin Trotter is an outspoken critic of the notion of common good and the
subsequent intrusive broad regulative public health measures. He rejects the idea that the
moral problem in mass casualty medicine is achieving the balance between individual
interests and the common good. Trotter refers to what others call common good as
subsets of individual interest and frames the moral problem of public heath intervention
as balancing security and liberty. He does not accept the identification of the common
good with community interests (corporate interests) that are distinct from those of the
individual.21 For Trotter, the tension is between opposing groups of individual interests.
Following this argument, he understands the balancing of the tension in terms of
facilitating consensus in deliberative democracy. He advances the modus vivendi theory
of permission or consent (generated from the procedural principle) to balance power and
facilitate compromise.22
5

Trotter shifts the intervention methodology from a defense of corporate social goals
to the democratic deliberative procedure that commit to the prima facie norms of
avoiding coercion and prioritizing liberty and autonomy. However, majority permission
grounded in deliberative democratic procedures provides no firm basis for ensuring just
outcomes since in mass casualty medical scientific facts and experience are raw data.
Knowledge, which is the primary tool of interpretation in democratic deliberative
procedures, is in short supply here. The critics of Trotter point out that ethical decision
are primarily sourced from established substantive values, scientific knowledge, and
experience.23
(iii) Compatibility of Individual Rights with Population Good.
Drawing from this intervention discourse, of strengthening public health powers
rather than focusing on deliberative procedures, neither the individual-oriented libertarian
model nor the population-oriented epidemiological model singularly provides
comprehensive ethical resources for the effective management of pandemics. Dan
Beauchamp states that in one version of the democratic theory the individual interests
override any restrictions government seeks to impose on the individual apart from
avoidance of harm to others.24 Accordingly, the role of government is “the protection of
every individual’s private rights.”25
Reversely, the epidemiological model aligns with a view of democracy that condones
government regulative powers, as necessary for “protecting and promoting both private
and group interests.”26 Dan Beauchamp elucidates that, in United States, this view of
community interests originates from the constitutional tradition. The common citizenship,
constituting of divergent views and interests, is presumed to share “sets of loyalties and
6

obligations to support the ends of the political community.”27 Public health and safety are
considered valuable ends meriting societal commitment.
The most common example elucidating the commitment to population good is the
1905 case of Rev. Jacobson of Massachusetts. Jacobson refused to comply with the
vaccination law and subsequent penalties following a mandatory vaccination measure by
the board of health of the city of Cambridge to contain smallpox. The public health
authority imposed the measure as necessary for public health and safety. Jacobson
claimed the compulsory vaccination law by the state was an invasion of his liberty since
it was arbitrary, oppressive and an assault to his person. He further claimed that the law
was “… hostile to the inherent right of every freeman to care for his body and health in
such way as to him seems best.”28 The Supreme Court determined that there are
circumstances where the individual may be legitimately restrained.29
However, despite the unanimity regarding the need to contain individual preferences,
apparently none in the epidemiological approach holds Hobbesian totalitarian views of
absolute supremacy of the state over the individual. Hobbes regarded individuals as
intrinsically selfish and egoistic. In this case, the state is justified to impose its absolute
will on the individuals to prevent chaos.30
Likewise libertarian approaches do not advocate for anarchy despite the emphasis on
individual autonomy; at least not in the sense of Robert Paul Wolff’s radical individual
autonomy that is incompatible with state authority.31 According to Wolff, individual
moral autonomy as it relates to state authority is the refusal to be ruled. Subsequently he
considers anarchy as the only doctrine consistent with autonomy.32 However, all
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libertarian approaches share a sturdy commitment to democratic deliberative procedures
as an expression of the individual’s autonomous will.
This dissertation negotiates the ethical balance of individual and population interests
by considering illustrative substantive principles, as follows: autonomy generated by the
libertarian model, and, solidarity generated by the population oriented epidemiological
model. But providing depth to this deliberation requires a thorough analysis of the
underlying moral and political philosophy fueling the tension between the libertarian and
epidemiological approaches.

B. Ethical Challenges and Analysis of the Prevention Models.
(i) The Epidemiological model: Rationing Dilemmas and Coercion
The influenza pandemic intervention highlights the tension between libertarian and
epidemiological models due to: (1) acute shortages and rationing dilemma that involve
deprivation and prioritization; (2) use of coercive measures, such as mandatory
vaccination, that are protective of population health but invasive of individual rights.
The Influenza pandemic outbreak could create new complex challenges such as
sudden increase in mortality and morbidity, overwhelming patient surge at health
facilities, increased workload for individual staff, and shortages of medical supplies. The
need to intervene for containment and treatment could lead to the states mandating the
exercise of intrusive powers like isolation, quarantine and civil confinement, which could
disrupt civil liberties. Other measures such as prioritization, triage, concerns with staff
safety, and suspension of treatment of some non-Influenza pandemic related illnesses
could also created a challenge to the ethical duty-to-care.33
8

In clinical practice, the primary ethical responsibility of the health provider is to
implement the informed autonomous decision of a competent patient. Tom Beauchamp
and colleagues define personal autonomy as, at a minimum, “self-rule that is free from
both controlling interference by others and from limitation, such as inadequate
understanding that prevent meaningful choice.” Courts have often attested to the right to
self-determination in medical decisions of a person of adult years.34 This right associated
with the legal doctrine of informed consent is based on the principle of bodily integrity.
In 1981, the Supreme Court of United States observed that:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restrain or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.35
The right to refuse medical treatment is held as a constitutionally protected liberty
guaranteed under due process clause of the 14th amendment of the U.S. constitution. Due
process requires that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. In clinical practice, the specification of the informed consent process
requires the patient’s access to information, the patient’s understanding, and the patient’s
voluntary choices. Intrusive involuntary measures during a pandemic influenza will
present providers in the clinical settings with a new contrasting ethical paradigm for
deliberations and deliverance of health care.
The epidemiological model justifies use of government regulative powers to prevent
harm, maximize utility, and produce benefits for the good of the health of the population.
Because of the focus on populations the epidemiological model utilizes utilitarian,
9

egalitarian, and communitarian ethical theories, and generates ethical principles such as
solidarity. For instance, based on this framework, population health authorities have
developed the Critical Care Triage protocol as an ethical basis for utility and equal access
to scarce community resources during the influenza pandemic.36
The Critical Care Triage aims at maximizing benefits for a larger number of patients
in an overwhelmed critical care system. The assumption is that determining norms of
distribution within the system of prioritization and triage offers groups of the same tiers
equal access to health resources. The Critical Care Triage protocol involves four main
criteria on the basis of which: (1) some are included who will benefit; (2) those with poor
prognosis are excluded; (3) a ceiling is set on the amount of resources based on the
minimum qualification for survival; and, (4) a prioritization pool is established.37
The Critical Care Triage is a blend of triage protocols that allocate time and
resources. Iserson and Pesik identify four triage models that allocate according to: time,
resources, first-come basis, and, social value. When the priority is treating the most
serious, it is time that is allocated. Resources are allocated when they are critically
limited and only patients with best prognosis need to be considered.38
The Critical Care Triage also adopted the color code futures of the already existing
triage protocols as well as the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA) score
system. The SOFA score system was created by the European Society of Intensive Care
Medicine in 1994 (and further revised in 1996) as predictor of prognosis in critical organ
dysfunction.39 In recent times, the SOFA score system has been expanded as a predictor
of mortality and morbidity in critically ill patients.40
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The most controversial aspect of the Critical Care Triage, as regards the individual
versus population tension, is that it appears to ignore individual preferences and allocates
critical time and resources in accordance with a social rotary (triage protocol). Secondly,
the Critical Care Triage subordinates individual choices to collective societal wellbeing.
However some scholars have advanced and defended the substantive and procedural
values within the Critical Care Triage as fair trade-off tools.
(ii) Substantive and Procedural Values.
Within the epidemiological model, the Critical Care Triage has become widely
accepted as a fair distributive justice policy for rationing limited resources in a pandemic
outbreak.41 The ethical justification for the Critical Care Triage protocol was derived
from substantive and procedural values set by the working group of the Toronto Joint
Center for Bioethics.
In the document Stand on Guard for Thee, the authors identified ten substantive
values (individual autonomy, protection of the public from harm, proportionality,
privacy, duty to provide care, reciprocity, equity, trust, solidarity and stewardship) and
five procedural values (reasonableness, openness and transparency, inclusiveness,
responsiveness and accountability). This approach permits measures such as quarantine
that restrict basic freedoms of mobility, assembly, and privacy. These strategies are
considered necessary in the absence of flu vaccines and medication to control pandemic
influenza and protect populations.42
Alison K Thompson sheds light on how a combination of these commonly accepted
ethical principles and procedural elements translate into practical application in decision
making during the influenza pandemic. Learning from insights acquired in the Canadian
11

experience dealing with the 2003 near-pandemic SARS Thompson and colleagues
developed ethical guidance based on substantive values such as stewardship, and,
procedural values such as accountability.43 The guidance was intended to be illustrative
of how “the (principles) ethical framework can be used to identify key ethical aspects of
decision- making.”44 For instance, the values of solidarity and protecting the public from
harm would require a procedural process that ensures that society provides care for all the
ill during a pandemic.45
The population collective interest in health and safety is well defended in the
communitarian tradition. Michael Walzer and Dan Beauchamp point to the population
common good of safety and health as the overarching principle of public health ethics.
For these experts, the basis for common good ethos is the political community as
expounded in the social contract theory. They emphasize the values of cooperation,
egalitarian membership, and, social beneficence.46
Communitarians such as Michael Walzer defend the importance of membership in a
political community and the shared commitment to common good. Walzer supports a
constitutional tradition, in the United States, where by “the public or the people were
presumed to have interests, held in common, in self-protection or preservation from
threats of all kinds to their welfare.”47 The regulative powers flow from this view of
democracy that construes the role of government as protecting and promoting both
private and group interests.48 This commitment involves communal provision of needs
for survival based on proportionality and equality. These views are compatible with the
epidemiological model which generates principles such as solidarity.
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The Critical Care Triage framework has a theoretical basis also in John Rawls’s
egalitarian ethical theory of “justice as fairness.” Justice, according to Rawls, proceeds
from fairness. In Rawls theory of “Justice as fairness,” a just society is constitutive of the
distributive principles of equal liberties, fair equality of opportunities, and difference
principle, that govern the distribution of the primary goods of liberties, opportunities,
income, and wealth.49 These primary social goods constitute the common good which
Rawls defines as conditions and objectives that are similar to everyone’s advantage.50
As articulated by Normans Daniels, justice in allocation of health resources is based
on “fair equality of opportunities” 51 Norman argues that the equal opportunity principle
also requires public health initiatives aimed at promoting normal functions for all.52
When the Ethics Subcommittee to the Director, Center for Disease Control and
Prevention deliberated on decisions to distribute vaccines and antiviral medication during
a severe pandemic, they prioritized “the principle of preserving the functioning of
society.”53 In this case, for instance, the scarce resources may not be made available to
individuals with high risk complications since the goal is to restore health for groups.54
With its commitment to ethical principles such as solidarity the Critical Care Triage
should be seen as grounded not only in egalitarian and communitarian, but also in the
utilitarian approach. Generally utilitarianism seeks the greatest good for the greatest
number. Rule utilitarianism requires that rules that promote the greatest good for the
greatest number ought to be adopted. For act utilitarianism, the emphasis is put on actions
that promote the greatest good for the greatest number.
One utilitarian view of public health justifies policies and programs that maximize
public health gains.55 Subsequently, the state is a means for providing for the aggregate
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welfare. This notion of maximizing net benefits is founded on the principle of utility or
the greatest happiness principle. In classic utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill, “actions are
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness.”56 In modern utilitarianism the utility principle means that one
ought to produce the maximal balance of good consequences over bad consequences.”57
For utilitarian, government regulative powers are means for attaining the public good.
The Ventilator Document Workgroup of the Ethics Subcommittee of the Advisory
Committee to the Director of CDC, proposed the principle of maximizing net benefits in
decisions regarding priorities in ventilator distribution. Precisely, because the goal is to
maximize net benefits, the subcommittee recommended that the specification of the
principle should consider maximizing the number of lives saved, maximizing years of life
saved, and maximizing adjusted years of lives saved.58
However, as observed by Powers and Faden, systems that equate justice with priority
setting based on quality and length of time need to be embraced cautiously. These
systems, for instance, aim at maximizing the allocation of primary goods based on age,
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), or cost effective analysis. Yet the focus on
aggregate welfare ignores the underlying morally unacceptable or obligatory conditions
that distribute benefits and burdens.59 Conditions such as poverty or economic inequality
have direct consequences for the health of certain sections of the population.
An outstanding example of the application of a utilitarian decent minimum health
care provision is the 1994 Oregon Health Plan. Faced with scarcity of resources, Oregon
set a goal of prioritizing resources (instead of people) to provide a decent minimum of
health care services to all citizens with a family income below the federal poverty
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levels.60 The Oregon Health Service Commission (OHSC) adopted a utilitarian approach
that maximizes resources based on quality of well-being after treatment and cost
effectiveness analysis.
A Priority list of treatment was ranked in accordance to the cost-utility analysis, also
known as Quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) that give primacy to the principle of the
greatest health benefits for the money expended.61 Consequently tooth-capping, for
instance, was ranked as a top funding priority over incapacitating hernias and
tonsillectomies. Subsequently, criticism forced the health authority in Oregon to abandon
the approach based on cost-effective analysis and to adopt prioritization based on clinical
effectiveness and social values.62
(iii) Libertarian Model: Autonomy and Public Deliberation
Conversely, libertarian oriented arguments reject moral justifications based on the
norm of population good since the conditions for producing benefit, preventing harm,
and, maximizing utility, do not necessarily focus on a commitment to liberty and
autonomy. What others characterize as common good, libertarians construe as subsets of
individual interests.63 The moral claims of the libertarian model are individual oriented
and focus on individual rights of self-determination, government protection of
individual’s basic rights, and, the norm of non-interference, as well as commitment to
free market principles.64 The model generates ethical principles such as autonomy.
The libertarian model has foundation in the libertarian philosophers such as Nozick,
Engelhardt, and Lomasky.65 In his ‘theory of entitlement’, Robert Nozick defends
absolute ownership of property and liberal individualism in a free market society. Justice
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in holdings is only in accord with free market procedures of acquisition of property,
transfer of property and providing rectification.66
Because pandemics affect population health, individual preferences cannot
adequately provide basis for prioritizing social goals and effective intervention of
pandemics. Reversely the epidemiological approach that utilizes government efficiency
and coercive measures to protect the common good of health subordinates individual
rights. Accordingly, broad government coercive powers undermine the public’s
cooperation and trust.67
To ameliorate individual rights in mass casualty intervention, libertarian oriented
scholars have suggested deliberative democratic procedures to commit to the prima facie
norms of avoiding coercion and prioritizing liberty and autonomy.68 In agreement with
Engelhardt, Trotter considers the principle of permission or consent (Modus Vivendi)
generated from deliberative procedural principle as the only legitimate principle of social
justice. Accordingly, health care providers need to prioritize those values that “have been
approved in public deliberation.”69
If we admit, however, the maxima that advance public permission is the only
acceptable moral standard in public health emergence, the implication is that the
circumstances and contexts in which a future pandemic will occur are well known to us.
Yet, public health strategies evolve as health practitioners encounter emerging facts and
new circumstances in a pandemics outbreak.
(iv) Trust in Government Intervention
More critically however, broad government regulative powers remain suspect for
some good reasons. Trust in government intervention to determine and promote the
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population ‘common good’ of safety and health suffered a major setback in the first half
of the 20th Century. The American social programs to “breed better citizenry through
science”- eugenics, led to involuntary sterilization of the vulnerable poor people.70
Scientists, mental health professionals, and, expert physicians determined that the poor
were to blame for distributing genes for ‘feeblemindedness’. Health professionals attested
that these genes were responsible for vice, crime and misery perpetuated by the poor.
Armed with its theory of social degeneration, the eugenic movement in Western
Europe and North America sought to increase the frequency of ‘social good” genes in the
population and decrease that of “bad genes.”71 By 1920 two dozen States in United States
had enacted sterilization laws to promote negative eugenics. These laws generated public
welfare actions based on prejudice, bias and segregation against classes and races. In
1924, for instance, Carrie Buck an eighteen years old woman was involuntarily sterilized
at Lynchburg Hospital in accordance to the Virginia eugenic sterilization statute for no
other reason but being epileptic and ‘feebleminded’. Dr. Ray Nelsons established that the
last of the four thousand sterilizations at Lynchburg Hospital took place as recent as
1972.72
Principlism as an ethical guide to research and clinical bioethics emerged in the
second half of the 20st Century as a backlash against involuntary medical abuses directed
at individuals. The story of the Tuskegee syphilis study by public health authority became
public in 1972. In a study that begun in 1932, the Public Health Service authorities in
Macon County, Alabama, subjected about six hundred black men to an involuntary and
inhumane syphilis experimentation.73 The research subjects were never told that they
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were afflicted with syphilis. Inconceivably, they were deliberately left untreated even
though penicillin became available to health authorities.
In a related incident, the 2010 revelation that the United States government led the
Guatemala syphilis experimentation makes the trust element in government-sanctioned
involuntary public health measures even more suspect. From 1946 to 1948 Dr. John C.
Cutler and colleagues infected nearly 700 vulnerable Guatemalans with syphilis and other
venereal diseases in an involuntary experimentation. The infection process involved
inoculation with live syphilis bacteria or by paying syphilis-infected prostitutes to sleep
with prisoners. The unethical experimentation was funded through the National Institute
of Health.74
The National Commission’s Belmont Report of 1979 determined that the Tuskegee
syphilis experimentation was unethical. The Commission recommended three general
principles for the conduct of medical research involving human subjects, namely, respect
for persons, beneficence, and justice.75 In the practical application, the three general
principles translate into a requirement for informed consent, risk-benefit assessment, and
just selection of the subjects for research.
From these three general ethical principles underlying the conduct of medical
research involving human subjects, Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress outlined
four basic principles of bioethics. The principles are autonomy, beneficence, nonmalefince and justice.76 These four bioethics principles form the basis for ethics
reflection in clinical medicine since the last quarter of the 20st Century. However these
principles as useful as they are, have proved inadequate to the purpose of addressing
population health intervention.
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A more articulate precursor to the ongoing ethical debate regarding balancing the
tension between the individual and populations has come from legal scholars interested in
the interconnectedness of ethics and law in public health policy. In a treatise, Public
Health Law and Ethics: A Reader, edited by Lawrence O. Gostin, several legal scholars
draw on legal and ethical sources to expound on the decisive factors in population health
practice.77 Additionally, a universal law framework for global health intervention has
been advanced by organizations such as UNAIDS to provide forum for discussing the
delineation of human rights in public health policy and intervention.78
C. An Evaluation of the Legal Framework.
(i) Constitutional Provisions and Common Law
The dominant contemporary western political conception of the nature of a person
and his place in the order of being revolves around the narrow notion of government as
the single locus of power and the individual as the sole bearer of rights. As explained by
Frohnen and Grasso, the realms of intermediary communities and institutions are
increasingly losing their claim and exercise of the socially integrative rights of their own.
Understood as objects for possession rather than social habits, rights have come to be
viewed more in terms of individual claims against government and the individual against
individual. As a result, the court system being an instrument of the state has emerged as
the most effective place for vindicating one’s rights.79
Not surprising, when the Center for Disease Control in United States wanted to
strengthen public health infrastructure following the September 11th terrorist attack it
looked to the legal expertise of the Center for Law and Public’s Health at Georgetown
and John Hopkins Universities to draft the Model State Emergency Health Power Act
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(MSEHPA). Thereafter, several states enacted the version of the Model Act in
anticipation of a possible outbreak of influenza pandemic.
The MSEHPA utilizes a legal framework to reinforce government regulatory powers
that protect population health (such as planning, surveillance, management of resources,
and protection of persons). As suggested by Dan E. Beauchamp the basis for government
regulative powers is the constitutional tradition.80 In this constitutional framework
population wellbeing is safeguarded within the police power doctrine of the 10th
amendment and justified on the principle of population self-defense.
Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbon v. Ogden (1824) stipulated the boundaries of
state police power as forming a portion of:
…that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the
territory of the state, not surrendered to the general government: all which can
advantageously be exercised by States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine
laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal
commerce of States, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, are
component parts of this mass.”81
The question addressed by the Court pertained to the boundaries between Congressional
powers over inter-state commerce and those powers retained by states as sovereign
governments before the ratification of the Constitution.
The state police power was defined even more broadly by Chief Justice Shaw in
Commonwealth v. Alger (1851) as:
The power we allude to is rather the police power, the power vested in the
legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain and establish all manner of
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wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good
and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subject of the same.82
Cyrus Alger had erected and maintained a wharf over and beyond the boundaries
permitted in the Massachusetts’ statutes. Subsequently, States’ broad authority to
safeguard the safety, health, and morals of the community is presumed to be adequately
protected in the police power.83
A combination of the legal and ethical discourse regarding balancing individual
liberty rights and the good of the population in the epidemiological framework tends to
start with the landmark Supreme Court case Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905). Mr.
Jacobson refused to obey an ordinance by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
providing for mandatory vaccination for smallpox. He alleged the unconstitutionality of
the ordinance for violating the “due process, equal protection, and the privileges and
immunity clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”84
The Court interpreted that “the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United
States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each
person to be, at all times and in all circumstances wholly freed from restraint.”85 Based
“upon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity,” an individual may be
restrained for the common good.86 The Court stated that “a community has the right to
protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.”87
Police power allows states to broadly regulate matters affecting the health, safety, and
general welfare of the public.”88 However the Court further explicated that the
government’s intrusive actions over the individual are limited by the constitutionally
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protected privilege of procedural justice - due process. The opportunity to be heard before
deprivation of life, liberty, or property by adjudication is a fundamental requisite of the
due processes clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.89
According to Lawrence Gostin, there are broadly two different kinds of restraint on
police power. The first is substantive in nature (substantive due process and equal
protection). It requires the government to provide an increasingly strong justification
(good reason) for intrusion on individual liberty interest.90 Illness per se does not suffice
as adequate reason for use of police powers to deprive liberty rights. As ruled in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center (1985), the restraint should be subject to three levels
of scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or minimum rationality.91
The importance of the individual interest at stake determines the measure of the level
of scrutiny. When for instance a statute clarifies by race, alienage, national origin and
gender, those laws need to be subjected to strict scrutiny. The laws are likely to be
deemed as reflective of prejudice and antipathy against certain classes of people over
others. At stake are people’s substantive constitutional rights and the rights to be treated
equally by law.92
In some cases however, the Equal Protection Clause requires only a rational basis
scrutiny to pursue a sufficient state interest. For instance, laws pertaining to the treatment
of those who have not experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment such as the
aged in United States are likely to be subjected to a minimum rationality scrutiny.93
In Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia (1976), the Court applied a rational
scrutiny to the analysis of the Massachusetts statute mandating the retirement of
uniformed state police officer upon attaining the 50th birthday. The statute was interpreted
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as not interfering with the exercise of a fundamental right since government employment
per se is not a fundamental right. The statute does not disadvantage a suspect class since
a class of police officers over age fifty is not deemed suspect. Robert Murgia had claimed
that his forced retirement at age 50 denied him equal protection in violation of the
Fourteen Amendment of the Constitution.94
The second kind of restraint is procedural in nature (procedural due process). The
requirement is that government not only provide good reason but also “fair hearing
before depriving individuals of important liberty or property interests.”95 Procedural due
process requires a consideration of: “ the private interests that will be affected by the
official action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interests through the
procedures used; and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and consideration of the government interests …”96
In Greene v. Edwards (1980), the Supreme Court of Appeal of West Virginia ruled
that the public health authority did not afford procedural due process to William Arthur
Greene before confining him involuntarily for TB control measures in Pinecrest Hospital,
pursuant to the West Virginia Tuberculosis Control Act. The court enumerated Greene’s
rights under the procedural due process safeguard as follows: “an adequate written notice
detailing the grounds and underlying facts on which commitment is sought; the right to
counsel; the right to present to cross-examine, to confront and present a witnesses; the
standard of proof to warrant commitment to be clear, cogent and convincing evidence;
and, the right to verbatim transcript of the proceeding for purposes of appeal.” 97
This legal framework provides a context for the ethical discourse in this dissertation
regarding the usefulness of substantive principles, such as autonomy and the common
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good, and, procedural standards to negotiate balance between safeguarding personal
liberties and population wellbeing. According to Gostin, the United States Supreme Court
in the Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) case established the four constitutional
limitations (standards) imposed on the regulative powers of public health authorities over
individuals’ constitutionally protected preferences.
The constitutional limitations are public health necessity, reasonable means,
proportionality, and harm avoidance.98 The application of these standards by courts to
negotiate between conflicting interests in legal matters has enormous implications for the
moral discourse to seek criteria balancing conflicting individual and population health
interests.
In the ethical deliberation, necessity, reasonableness, proportionality, and harm
avoidance are generally agreed upon standards to negotiate conflict between the
principles in concrete cases. Public health necessity refers to the exercise of coercive
powers only where necessary to prevent unavoidable harm. Reasonable refers to
measures that ameliorate a health threat and not a blatant invasion of rights.
Proportionality refers to benefits outweighing burdens. Harm avoidance refers to respect
for the principle of bodily integrity and personal security.99
The case of Jew Ho v. Williamson (1900) is an example of the use of unreasonable
means. The Circuit Court of the Northern District of California ruled that the quarantine
to contain a bubonic plague which was enforced only against persons of Chinese race and
nationality, and not against persons of other races, was not reasonable regulation to
accomplish the purpose sought. The Court ordered the discontinuation of the quarantine
on the basis that it was “unreasonable, unjust, and oppressive, and therefore contrary to
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the laws limiting the police powers of the state and municipality in the matter.”100 The
law was found to be discriminatory and administered “with an evil eye and unequal
hand.”101 Though bubonic plague or resulting death had not occurred in all blocks,
quarantine was imposed upon the whole district making the entire population within the
district vulnerable to the epidemic.
State coercive public health measures infringe upon individual liberties, but, the
infringement may be necessary or unnecessary. In 1966, the New York State enacted a
compulsory vaccination law on the grounds that it was necessary to protect those
individuals most susceptible to communicable diseases such as polio. Since the cost of
polio treatment was beyond the financial capability of families with limited incomes, the
imposition of mandatory vaccination was necessary for the individual who would be
afflicted and the taxpayer shouldering the financial burden.102
However, coercive policies may be effective but unnecessary for purposes of
attaining the sought public health goal. For instance, providing incentives for people to
voluntarily accept to be vaccinated makes coercive measures unnecessary. Seeking the
least infringement alternative is a more plausible moral consideration.
The application of the standard of proportionality refers to a legitimate exercise of
police powers in a manner by which the burdens of the public health infringement on the
individual do not outweigh the benefits. The judiciary has repeatedly interpreted the
imposition of public health measures whose burdens (harm) outweigh the benefits as
disproportionate and illegitimate exercise of police powers. For instance, though the
judiciary has consistently upheld the constitutional legality of statutes that require the
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vaccination of children before admission to public schools, exemptions are granted in
cases of medical contraindication to immunization.
In cases where benefits outweigh the harm, courts often rule in favor of government
compelling interests. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association (1987), the
Supreme Court ruled that the toxicological testing contemplated by the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) on its employees to ensure the safety of the travelers and
employees themselves was not an undue infringement on the justifiable expectations of
the employees’ privacy.103 The government’s compelling interests to protect the
population against the growing number of train accidents, evidently resulting from
alcohol and drug abuse by rail-road employees was regarded as outweighing the privacy
concerns of the employees.
The case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) is the commonly given example of use of
public health powers to punish (cause harm) rather than promoting wellbeing. San
Francisco public health authorities passed an ordinance requiring a permit from the board
of supervisors to operate a laundry in a wooden building. This was justifiable on safety
grounds. However, Chinese laundry owners were denied permits while only one out of
about eighty non-Chinese applicants was denied a permit. At the time the ordinance was
passed most wooden laundries were owned by Chinese persons. The court found the
action of the City of San Francisco authority as discriminatory and intended to segregate
against an ethnic group.104
(ii) Universal Law framework
Not all legal and public health experts agree with tenets of the aforementioned legal
framework based on the constitutional tradition of the public good of health to produce
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health benefits, prevent harm, and maximize utility over competing individual
preferences. In his critique of the MSEHPA, George Annas emphatically dismisses the
effectiveness of trade-offs between civil rights and public health measure. In his view,
mandatory vaccination, treatment, or criminalization of dissenting behavior “undermined
public trust in public health authority.”105
Some experts argue that pandemic interventions involve ethical problems that require
a global mandate as provided within the universal legal framework of human rights.
Moreover for those who emphasize civil and political rights, the epidemiological
approach that focuses on health and safety is indifferent to the diminution of individual
and human rights in emergency health interventions.106 Health is conceived as not merely
the absence of illness and disease but as encompassing other societal factors that are root
causes of all diseases. For instance, factors such as hunger, poverty, wars, discrimination,
and, violation of civil rights, interfere with the health of individuals and populations.107
This social justice trajectory has resulted in a new way of defining population health
intervention.
George Annas understood the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as an occasion to explore and link health promotion and
treatment of diseases with human rights strategies.108 He construes the goal of human
rights and the goal of public health as one and the same, namely, “to provide the
conditions under which people can flourish.”109 Therefore, the agenda for human rights
should be broadened to include making “basic health care available to everyone and to
prevent diseases and injury and to promote health worldwide.” 110 Annas further
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proposed use of the language and concepts of human rights to propel individuals and
nongovernmental organizations to advocacy for promotion of human rights in health care.
The legitimacy and justification for application of human rights in public health
policy lies in their adoption by nations. The treaty provisions stipulate a universal right to
health and a number of nations have included a right to health care in their
constitutions.111 In the preamble of the Constitution of the World Health Organization
(WHO), this right to health is defined as a “state of complete physical, mental, and social
well-being and not merely the absence of a disease or infirmity.”112
In this context, the responsibility for protection and promotion of public health
extends beyond governments to individuals and to non-governmental organizations.
Consequently, human rights advocacy has become the foremost preferred means of
enforcing compliance with human rights goals. Yet the absence of a clear conceptual
clarity of the meaning and scope of the right to health makes the practical implementation
and the judicial interpretation turbid.
The universal rights framework is gaining prominence with the realization that purely
individualistic rights as promoted in the libertarian model are less accommodating of
competing social interests. The alternative epidemiological model justifies population
health intervention in terms of primary social goods, such as focusing on access and
equal opportunities, and less attentive to a vision of human nature and experience as
understood in the social justice paradigm.113 The moral weight of human rights is
defended on the basis that they are prior to institutions and they impose duties collative to
rights.114
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Frohnen and Bruce have observed that scholars need to pay attention to the analysis
of rights since they are “poorly understood,” yet, “widely discussed.”115 The danger with
the (human) right approach, as Stephen Holland observes, is merely restating the core
dilemma of public health – which is – the conflict between the individual and
community.116 For instance, in population health when one asserts and pursues the right
to autonomy he is confronted with a competing right of the common good.
To enhance respect for rights while abridging the tension between individual and
population interest in the management of pandemics, the United Nations Education,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) advanced the use of a bioethics
principles’ framework. For instance article 27 of the declaration specifically requires the
balancing of the application of principles in certain circumstances (such as a pandemic)
posing a serious threat to public health, and, or the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.117 Article 26 acknowledges the interrelation and complementary nature of
principles. Innovatively, the Declaration recommends commitment to the spirit of
professionalism, honesty, integrity and transparency in the application of principles.118
However the guidance to states on how to limit the application of conflicting
principles is short of specifics to effect practical change. The standard is states’ laws,
including laws consistent with international human rights, enacted in the interest of
public safety and health wellbeing of the populations.119 Yet, as demonstrated in the case
of pandemic interventions in United States, state laws are always contestable based on
whether they are oriented towards safeguarding the interests of the individual or those of
populations. But what is of uttermost relevance in the UNESCO guidance is the
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principles-based approach that offers ground for interpretation and negotiation between
conflicting principles.
Bioethics principles provide a way to extricate balance from various seemingly
incompatible foundational moral theories underlying the pandemic intervention ethical
discourse. The aforementioned utilitarianism, egalitarianism, communitarian, and,
libertarianism ethical theories have basis in the philosophical moral systems of
deontology and consequentialism. These moral philosophy approaches respond to the
question of right and wrong from sharply contrasting view points. Adopting the
principles approach accords health policy-makers with a heuristic methodology, as
presented by Beauchamp and Childress, that is “a dialectic process of interpretation,
specification, and balancing,” using mid-level principles to resolve complex dilemmas.120
Principles are specified for a context to take into account “feasibility, efficiency, cultural
pluralism, political procedures, uncertainty about risks, noncompliance by patients, (or),
moral dilemmas.”121
Deontology refers to an approach that considers moral value as depending on the
nature of the action itself. In this case, it is obligatory to perform or to avoid some actions
due to their intrinsic nature that makes them right or wrong. Duties and rules are essential
to the advance of this approach. Reversely, consequetialism looks to consequences or
effects of actions to determine moral value.122 This distinction is relevant to the question
of the moral justification of decisions and actions in a pandemic intervention. For
instance, the utilitarian or consequentialist argument for mandatory quarantine to restrict
a few people and bring about the greater good of health for the greater number may be
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unpersuasive to a libertarian-deontologist more concerned with personal intrinsic rights
of personal dignity and self determination.
In bioethics, the principles approach is seen as overlapping between moral and ethical
theories. Unlike abstract moral philosophy theories, principlism is focused on applied
ethics by making moral principles suitably specific and practical to resolving problems.
Tom Beauchamp and Walters define an ethical principle as “a fundamental standard of
conduct from which many other moral standards and judgments draw support for their
defense and standing.”123 Beauchamp and Childress do not consider principlism to be
foundationalist in the sense libertarianism and utilitarianism are understood as
comprehensive moral theories.
In public health discourse, scholars who have adopted principlism have moved
beyond the four biomedical principles to include even those outside the health field.124
Ross Upsher who argued that clinical ethics is not an appropriate model for ethical
reasoning in public health proposed a different set of principles. Because of its focus on
populations, Upshur argues that public health requires the principles of harm avoidance,
least restrictive means, reciprocity, and transparence.125 The UNESCO’s Bioethics
Committee took it to a new level in 2003 by drawing fifteen fundamental principles to set
a global minimum moral standard for bioethical conduct. The adoption of these principles
by member states gives the declaration moral authority and reason for commitment.126
The principles approach provides a way to initiate trade-offs between conflicting
principle so as to harmonize individual and population choices. As proposed by James F.
Childress and colleagues, meaning and scope comprise the two dimensions of moral
considerations. By determining and interpreting the meaning and scope of conflicting
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substantive principles, we can establish which aspects increase or decrease conflict
among them and which considerations yield to others.127
Explicating on the tension between the individual and population interest, as
expounded in this chapter, this dissertation suggests Mixed Interests Ethics Model to
negotiate the ethical balance of individual and population interests by considering
illustrative substantive principles of autonomy generated by the libertarian model, and,
solidarity generated by the population oriented epidemiological model. The amelioration
of individual rights in the pandemic intervention requires trade-offs between the
conflicting substantive principles.
Engaging the libertarian and the epidemiological models to negotiate balance between
individual and population involves the related principles and standards. Principles
address substantive issues, and standards address procedural issues. The principles
require interpretation of the scope and meaning to harmonize the moral commitment to
the individual and population. The standards ensure that the moral commitment is
retained as the scope of the principle is being rendered partially compatible.
For instance the meaning and range of the scope of the substantive principle of
autonomy involves consent, voluntariness, and privacy.128 The meaning and scope of
substantive principle of solidarity involve equity, collaboration, communication, and
coordination.129 Negotiating between conflicting principles require a commitment to the
commonly accepted procedural standards of public necessity, reasonableness,
proportionality and harm avoidance.
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D. Summary
This chapter discusses the tension between individual and population interests that
hinder the effective management of epidemics. The epidemiological model traditionally
gives primacy to the health of populations and involves the use of coercive powers that
limit individual rights. The libertarian model focuses on individual preferences to
ameliorate individual rights in the influenza pandemic interventions.
The divergent moral theories that inform the epidemiological and the libertarian
approaches do not clearly effectuate practical ethical solutions to bridge the divide
between individual interests and population interests. Moral theories, however, as
sustained in the epidemiological and libertarian models, translate into substantive
principles and procedural standards on the basis of which overlapping criteria of Mixed
Interests Ethics Model (MIEM) can be based to negotiate balance between individual and
population interests in the pandemic.
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2. Chapter Two
Amelioration of Human Rights in HIV/AIDS Epidemics Intervention

Introduction
The mastery of the epidemiological intervention of HIV/AIDS since the 1980s has
been gradual and so has been the articulation of the ethical dilemmas. The transformation
began with civil liberties activists introducing the notions of privacy, confidentiality, and
anti-coercion, into the epidemiological vision of infectious disease prevention. As
prophylactics, antiretroviral therapies, and research options, became available, the debate
focused on equity, access, and the issues of discrimination.1 In recent times there has
been a shift from preoccupation with the notion of population health as a primary good to
a focus on the overall wellbeing of persons as subjects of human rights meriting respect
and protection. The social justice vision accrues from the interrelation nature of
HIV/AIDS that transcends individualist preferences and state capabilities.
In the heterogeneous global community of HIV/AIDS prevention, the integrative
socio-cultural and institutional rights and values, that are only partially incorporated in
the epidemiological model but largely ignored in the libertarian model, permeate all
aspects of decision-making and policy development. Yet the prospect for the effective
management of HIV/AIDS is diminished by the often incongruent interpretation of
human rights, disagreements over standards, and poor management of conflicting rights.
These conditions do not enable the diminution of the tension between individual and
population interests in HIV/AIDS intervention. The shortfall explains the cause for the
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rising prevalence rate of heterosexually transmitted HIV in Uganda after years of
remarkable success in reducing the HIV prevalence rate.

A. The Story of Uganda’s ABC Approach and the PEPFAR Initiative
(i) An overview of the history of HIV/AIDS epidemics in Uganda
Uganda is praised for successfully reducing the HIV prevalence rate from 18% in
1992 to 6.2% in 2002 by committing to an epidemiological model that utilized behavior
change and science.2 The Abstain, Be faithful and use a Condom, known as the ABC
strategy focused on core family values of monogamous marriages, fidelity, abstinence for
the unmarried, and delay of sex debut for teenagers. Condom use was encouraged in
circumstances where one is unable to AB.3 But this story is incomplete absent a
background narrative of the context and circumstances that made the nation embrace the
ABC approach.
It was a double tragedy when HIV/AIDS first emerged in Uganda in the early 1980s.
As an epidemic disease, HIV/AIDS created a drastic surge in morbidity and mortality.
Scientific tools were inadequate for purposes of intervention, prevention, and treatment.
The social problems created by HIV/AIDS were equally devastating to individuals and
communities largely dependent on family unity and social coherence as safety-nets for
cultural and economic stability. HIV/AIDS was mostly infecting people with intimate
mutual relationships who were dependent on each other such as couples, fiancées, workmates, schoolmates, and neighbors. Suspicions of witchcraft and stigma prevailed in the
absence of satisfactory scientific explanations.4
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Shockingly, the HIV/AIDS prevalence peaked to an estimated 15 percent in 1991.5
By 1989, there was already an enormous devastating AIDS impact upon families and
households in central and southern Uganda. Health authorities estimated that 12.6 percent
of all the children under 15 in Rakai District were orphans.6 In 2002, over 60 percent of
the entire population of Rakai District was below 19 years of age. Inconceivably, the
district had lost most of its adult population to AIDS related death. This was barely two
decade since the first AIDS cases in Uganda were diagnosed in 1982 as “a mysterious
disease” that had infected seventeen fishermen in Rakai District in southern Uganda.7 By
2004, Uganda with an approximate population of 24.7 million had the national AIDS
related death toll estimated at about 900,000.8
Since communities lacked adequate scientific knowledge and tools to undertake
meaningful intervention they engaged the socio-cultural sex ethos discourse as a strategy
to combat HIV/AIDS. As Tony Barnett and Piers Blaikie observed, it was a strategy to
deal with risky sexual behaviors in a risky environment characterized by civil disruption
and economic disparities.9 The connection of risky environment to a risky behavior is
uniquely relevant for purposes of understanding the choice for the behavioral change
approach in Uganda HIV/AIDS intervention. For unlike in the West where high risk
environment referred to homosexuality, blood transmission, and intravenous drug-use as
the epidemiological typology modes of HIV/AIDS transmission, the infection context in
Uganda involved heterosexual relationships and mother-to-child transmission.10
In this case, risky societal values and cultural practices such as, polygamy, ritual
circumcision, and widow inheritance were reassessed and examined in the light of the
surging epidemic. Other practices hitherto considered inappropriate but tolerated such as
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extramarital sex, casual multiple sex, transaction sex, and, intergenerational sex were
subjected to the scrutiny of the public ethos system.11 Parents who lost teenager children
through AIDS ardently counseled living children about risky sexual behavior of men and
women in the neighborhood.
In Ugandan cultural setup, the individual’s wellbeing is a collective responsibility of
the family and the community. The established tradition of core moral values provided
the justification for re-examining the meaning and purpose of sexuality, marriage,
faithfulness, family and parenting to promote the individual’s health and the common
good. In this sense the common good constituted of the notions of good health, and
economic and socio-cultural stability. The political unrest and the weak economy that
affected livelihoods had resulted in limited family support and increased individual risks
in morals and health. Most experts concur that the political and economic environment of
the 1970s and 1980s created risky conditions that enhanced the rapid spread of
HIV/AIDS in Uganda.12
The political instability which begun with a brutal dictator Idi Amin in the 1970s, was
characterized by corrupt governments, a broken economy, collapsed foreign trade, moral
lapse, and, overt violations of human rights. In 1972, Idi Amin expelled the Asians whose
investments and entrepreneurship formed the back-born of Uganda’s economy. Likewise
he deposed cultural leaders, thereby weakening the powers and abilities of communities
to provide supervised economic, cultural and moral guidance to individuals and
families.13
The civil conflicts and wars between 1979 to1987 plunged the country into deplorable
poverty. Uganda’s HIV literature attributes the increase in polygamous marriages,
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transactional sex, multi partner sex, and transgender sex, to the poverty factor.14 Some
wealthy married men took advantage of the poverty of teenage girls to engage them in
intergenerational sex for monetary favors. Wealthier women also did likewise with
teenage boys. Some women resorted to prostitution in towns along highways to boost
their incomes. Highway truck drivers involved in commercial sex activities rapidly
spread HIV/AIDS across towns in the 1980s.15
Besides, the wars displaced many families whose incomes depended on subsistencefarming on family land. The disruption affected livelihoods. A majority of the families
lived on less than a dollar a day. Inflation rose to over 100 percent. HIV/AIDS could not
have come at a worse time when even low income job-opportunities were scarce.
Families were forced to cut down on food provisions and also withdraw children from
schools to save cash for medical expenses.16 By 1987, it was evident to Ugandan that
HIV/AIDS required a holistic social-cultural approach in addition to scientific measures.
The very first public effort to combat the spread of HIV was an informal message to
individuals and communities to “zero-graze (or zero-grazing).” The term was
metaphorically used to encourage limiting sexual activities to one person (lover) or be
abstinent until one identifies a non-infected person (abstain). In a society where customs
and taboos limit the use of explicit sexual language in public, the notion of zero grazing
captured the imagination of the community, and, allowed broader latitude for public
expression and conversation of sexual matters.17
In Uganda folk cultures (given diverse tribes) where euphemisms and metaphors are
in common usage in daily casual conversations and music, it is not surprising that foreign
researchers attribute the genesis of zero-grazing term to diverse sources. For Robert, the
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source is Yoweri Museveni whose Hima pastoral people have a practice of tethering a
cow on a peg to restrict roaming allover in good grazing field, thereby resulting in
circular grazed area (zero of the zero-grazing).18 For those familiar with the Heifer
Project, introduced in Uganda in 1982, zero grazing originates in the practice of
improving the health and milk yield of a donated special breed cow by feeding it indoors
rather than letting it graze unrestrained outdoor. As Epstein found out, zero grazing
meant avoiding indiscriminate and uncontained sexual relations.19
The zero-grazing message of engaging carefully in sexual relationships was
disseminated in informal and formal public gathering including churches.20 However, not
all campaign efforts presented the HIV/AIDS awareness message in positive manner.
John Mary Waligo, a Catholic priest scholar, pointed out that some moralists, including
some religious leaders and self-righteous people considered HIV/AIDS to be a
punishment from God for the ‘pervasive’ sexual behavior of the victims. For these
moralists, AIDS was a disease for prostitutes, fornicators and those who engaged in
extramarital sex. AIDS had provided an opportunity for them “to preach against sexual
unfaithfulness, marriage infidelity, promiscuity, and sexual liberalism.”21
The practice by indigenous traditional healers of attributing HIV/AIDS to witchcraft
aggravated the discrimination and stigmatization of the affected individuals and families.
The indigenous religious-spiritual tradition in Uganda assumed that ill-health is caused
by either natural or unnatural causes. Since communities were unable to identify the
natural cause of HIV/AIDS, traditional healers simply attributed AIDS to witchcraft.
Some of the traditional healers used the occasion to enrich themselves at the expense of
the vulnerable and stigmatized AIDS patients who were desperate for a cure. Because of
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witchcraft suspicions, conflicts emerged in families, work places, and villages.22 This
resulted in further stigmatization and poor provision of community support, counseling,
and palliative care.
The negativity began to change to positive messages when prominent Ugandans such
as artists, clerics, medics, educators, and political leaders began to speak out and lead the
HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns through education and a call for change of lifestyle. In
1989, the most inspirational Ugandan musician of the time Philly Bongole Lutaaya
became the first known Ugandan artist with AIDS who embarked on a nationwide
HIV/AIDS awareness campaign calling on the youth particularly those in schools to pay
attention to the danger of HIV/AIDS and change their sex lifestyles.23 Many more
individuals and local social organizations followed suit using music, mass media,
homilies in churches, and local community meetings calling on individuals to take
personal responsibility in combating the spread of a disease they called siliimu.24 AIDS
was named siliimu (slim) because of making the patients abnormally slim or skinny.25
Two years earlier in 1987, the AIDS Support Organization (TASO) had been founded
by Dr. Noelina Kaleeba and fifteen other colleagues, to help people with AIDS “live
positively and die with dignity.” Dr. Kaleeba’s husband had died of AIDS. TASO was
established to empower HIV/AIDS patients to cultivate self-esteem, hope, respect for life,
protection of their communities, and, care for oneself.26 The Organization also created
social awareness for compassionate care, mutual support, and elimination of
stigmatization and discrimination of people with AIDS. In 1986, the Ugandan First Lady,
Janet Museveni and colleagues founded the Uganda Women’s Effort to Save Orphans
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(UWESO). The organization was to offer childcare support, child counseling and
income-generating activities for orphans.27
By the end of 2003, there were at least 750 registered community based organizations
(NGOs/CBOs) in Uganda caring for HIV/AIDS patients and affected communities.28 The
earliest most significant mobilization and education effort came from faith-based
organizations. In 1989, the Catholic Bishops of Uganda used the language of Catholic
social teaching to confront the interrelated realities of HIV/AIDS, poverty, and ignorance.
The Bishops initiated HIV/AIDS care support programs in churches (parishes), schools,
and hospitals to aid the affected individuals and their families. One of the earliest
successful endeavors was the establishment of HIV/AIDS homecare special programs. In
the context of mutual cooperation and solidarity the bishops called for the strengthening
of moral and family values.29
The Anglican Church in Uganda also developed and extensively implemented
HIV/AIDS education and support programs. The 1990 AIDS education pilot project by
the Islamic Medical Association of Uganda (IMAU) was selected by UNAIDS as a “Best
Practice Case Study.”30 The IMAU program was a massive effort to equip religious
leaders and lay communities with HIV/AIDS knowledge and capacity for behavior
change. Yet the contribution of faith-based values and moral vision associated with the
decline of HIV prevalence rate in Uganda has been minimally recognized in public health
commentaries. In the international press, commentators who gauge the contribution of
faith institutions solely based on the anti condom and abstinence policies cast faith-based
involvement as obstructive to the cause of HIV prevention.31
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(ii) The ABC Approach
To gain perspective of the success of combating the spread of HIV/AIDS in Uganda,
the story of President Yoweri Museveni has to be told. When Museveni came to power in
1986, he adopted the ABC approach and made the fight against HIV/AIDS a priority
public policy. The government proactively coordinated a wide array of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), community based organizations (CBOs) and activists to promote
policies and programs designed to influence behavior change involving abstinence, being
faithful (monogamy), and condom use (ABC).32 In 1986 the president asked the Ministry
of Health to set up the HIV/AIDS Control Program – the first of its kind in Sub-Saharan
Africa. In 1992 he established the Uganda AIDS Commission which oversaw the creation
of the National Strategic Framework to ensure focused and harmonized response to
HIV.33
The ABC strategy was implemented through social mobilization and empowerment
of communities to engage a comprehensive behavior change approach and support
government initiated epidemic intervention programs. To strengthen behavior change
approaches, the government used broad intervention strategies such as education of the
masses through widespread media campaign, schools, faith based organizations,
government ministries, government agencies, employers, employees, and community
based organizations. Radio programs and advertisement, including billboards, were used
to disseminate information about HIV/AIDS and the ABC strategy.34
The goal of educating the public was to provide knowledge of the manner of
infection, prevention, and eliminate stigmatization and discrimination against HIV
seropositive people. The government made a commitment to address the risky behavior
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and the risky social-political environment both of which had created conducive
conditions for the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS. The government stabilized the hitherto
volatile political situation and improved the rights of vulnerable populations as it
launched a massive campaign to combat HIV/AIDS.35
The economy in the 1990 grew at an average of 6.9 percent per annum as compared
to the economic stagnation of early 1980s. At the same time Uganda’s per capital income
growth averaged about 3.2 percent.36 Many family members were able to reunite and
reconstruct their homes and family. More importantly freedom of speech was enhanced
in 1990 when the government stopped its control of the mass media. The action resulted
in an increase in the number of radio and television stations that provided broader forum
for investigating and discussing moral and cultural traditional practices impacting the
spread of HIV.
Access to health facilities improved with the government’s investment in health care.
For instance in 1995, about 8 percent of the population lived more than 10kms away from
a health facility of any kind. But by 2001, 49 percent of the population had access to a
health care facility within a distance of 5kms. There was also improvement in sanitation
and healthier diet and lives. Access to safe water increased from twenty four percent in
1992 to 60 percent in 2002.37 Certainly the social-political and economic environment
had turned around from being highly risky to being favorable for behavior change.
The second aspect of the government’s ABC strategy was to support scientific
approaches of prevention, detection and treatment. Through the public media and school
programs the government actively promoted the use of condoms. For instance condom
use increased among sexually active men in 1995 from 9 percent to 15 percent in 2000.38
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The government also heavily invested resources in health care through universities,
research centers and regional hospitals to improve HIV/AIDS interventions in areas of
testing, treatment and vaccination research. With the help of International organizations
and foreign aid, the effort led to remarkable improvement in safe blood supplies,
provision of antiretroviral therapy, prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV,
and treatment of tuberculosis and other related opportunistic diseases.39
Uganda successfully reduced the prevalence rates of HIV from an average of 18
percent between the early 1990s to 6.2 percent by 2002.40 The decline in HIV infection is
attributed to an increase in sex abstinence, monogamy and condom use. The claim is
supported by evidence from data from Uganda’s Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)
conducted in 1988, 1995 and 2000.41 Further evidence is available in the national-level
findings by two Global Programs on AIDS (GPA) survey of 1989 and 1995.42 These
sources investigated changes that occurred in abstinence, monogamy and condom use
during the late 1980s when HIV levels were declining and the early 1990s when the
reduced levels of infection appear to have been sustained.43
The data from these sources was analyzed by researchers from the Alan Guttmacher
Institute in 2003 who came to the same conclusion that “positive behavior change in all
three areas of ABC, abstinence, being faithful (monogamy) and condom use have
contributed to the decline of HIV in Uganda to sustain a lower level.”44 The report by
Sunshield Singh and colleagues elaborates on the reasons for the decline. In the case of
abstinence, “fewer Ugandans reported having sex at young ages in 1995 to 2000 than in
the late 1980s.”45 Among women aged 15-17 the proportion of those who had ever had
sex decreased from 50 percent in 1988 to 46 percent in 1995 and 34 percent in 2000. The
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same trend of decline was also observed among those aged 18-19 though on a much
smaller scale. Declines in the proportions of men aged 15-17 who had ever had sex were
observed between the 1989 and 2000. However, overall among sexually experienced
unmarried men, the decline was just over half in 2000 as compared to 1995 when the
proportion was nearly three-quarters.46
The values of monogamy, and, be faithful meant that less sexual partners led to less
exposure to HIV. Data from Uganda in 1989 and 1995 as reported by the Joint Program
on HIV/AIDS (UNAID) and the World Health Organization attests to this assumption.47
The number of men with one or more casual partners declined from 35 percent to 15
percent and for women from 16 percent to 6 percent. There was a decline in multiple
partnerships in both sexually active unmarried men and women. Among women the
decline was from 31 percent in 1989, to 15 percent in 1995 and from 59 percent to 26
percent among men.48
Susheela’s report demonstrates that between 1989 and 1995 there was a decline in the
proportions of women and men, both married and unmarried, who had multiple sexual
partners. The decline in HIV infection rates between 1987 and 2000 has been linked to
less exposure to HIV, partly caused by less exposure to sexual intercourse with multiple
partners. On condom use the report conclude that “current or recent use of condoms rose
among all sexually active women and men, especially among those in young agegroup.”49 There was an increase from 3 percent in 1995 to 6 percent in 2000 overall in
proportion, among sexually active women who reported condom use for any reason,
including pregnancy prevention. The condom use increase among sexually active women
of age 15-17 was from 6 percent to 25 percent. Among sexually active men the use of
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condoms increased from 9 percent in 1995 to 15 percent in 2000. The increase among
men aged 15-17 was from 16 percent to 55 percent.50
While condom use played some role, much of the HIV decline is attributable to
behavior change since condoms were not easily available until the mid-1990. Moreover a
government ban on condom advertisement was lifted in 1994 when already evidence of
HIV reduction was noticeable.51 Moreover by the year 2000, only 8 percent of the
population in Uganda used condoms on a regular basis.52 However there is a narrative
allegedly sustained in UNAID until as recent as 2006 that overemphasized the success of
condom use over the impact of behavior change (pattern reduction and fidelity) in the
decline of HIV rates in Uganda.53
According to Helen Epstein the reasons for neglect of partner-reduction campaigns
such as zero-grazing had more to do with western donor-countries preferences than facts
in the field. Epstein states that the year 1996 when UNAID was established vast
international health bureaucracies that had been established in 1970s, were receiving
funds from wealthier western donor-countries to strengthen programs that market and
distribute contraceptive in developing countries. So the strategy that was identified by
public health authorities, when HIV begun to spread, was programs and commodities
such as condoms, HIV testing kits, and STD services that could easily be paid for by the
donor countries and easily delivered by these organizations.54
This dynamics, according to Epstein, explain why Maxine Ankrah’s 1989 important
research which established that partner reduction and fidelity were the major contributing
factors to Uganda’s HIV, was overlooked by UNAID experts. Michel Carael, by then
head of the UNAID’s evaluation-and-monitoring unit, analyzed Ankrah’s report and
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another WHO commissioned “Kinsey-survey’ report on Uganda sexual behavior and
concluded that condom use was responsible for the reduction of HIV preference rate in
Uganda.55 But researchers Rand Stoneburner and colleagues later viewed the same report
and concurred with Ankrah that the reason for HIV decline had more to do with
substantial partner reduction and fidelity.56
Edward Green accused the international global program of bias against behavior
change approaches (abstinence, faithfulness, and monogamy) and paying lip service to
the ABC strategy in favor of spending resources on condom promotion, and other
treatable sexually transmitted infections.57 Green attributes the reluctance to engage in
effective AIDS prevention strategy to the era of sexual revolution. When AIDS appeared,
availability of contraceptives and reproductive liberties had jettisoned the western society
to greater sexual freedom. The tradition norms and values that informed sexual behavior
were being eroded and replaced by the new values that “full sexual expression was health
for both straight and gay.”58
In spite of the aforementioned moral quandaries, it is a well-documented fact that
Uganda through the ABC approach achieved a significant drop in HIV prevalence rate
from early 1900s to 2002. The behavioral change approach of abstinence, be faithful
(monogamy), and use of condoms helped scale down the HIV prevalence rates. The
reasons for behavior change is attributed to the commitment of the local communities, the
families, prominent individuals and the government to courageously address the risky
behaviors in a risky environment and to the use of social ethos tools to combat
HIV/AIDS.59 Understood in this perspective, the ABC approach is compatible with the
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definition of public health by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) that: “Public health is what
we as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be health.”60
(iii) The Relevance of the ABC to PEPFAR
In 2003 when President Bush launched the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR) initiative to assist developing countries combat HIV/AIDS he selected
the Uganda ABC strategy as the model to be emulated by the PEPFAR funded programs
in the sub-Saharan Africa. According to the Office of the U.S. Global Aids Coordinator,
the initially five-year program allocated $15 billion to help fifteen mostly sub-Saharan
African nations, including Uganda, to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. The
initiative was renewed in 2008 and the funds tripled to $48 billion for another extended
five years.61
By 2007, Uganda had approximately received $635 million of the PEPFAR funds to
combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. The aid made it possible for the country to
successfully reduce mother-to-child (PMTCT) HIV transmission by providing services to
681,200 pregnant women, provide anti-retroviral treatment to 106,000 individuals,
palliative/basic health care and support, and, increased prevention programs in support of
behavioral change and use of scientific preventive tools.62 The PEPFAR policy also
included a requirement that 33% of the funds for HIV prevention be used on abstinenceonly programs. Another provision excluded prostitutes from benefiting from the funds.63
Surprisingly, one area that did not record further improvement despite the availability
of funds is the prevention of heterosexual transmission of HIV/AIDS. The results of the
2008 evaluation indicated adult HIV prevalence rate had risen to 6.4 percent.64 Definitely
this confirmed the fears that Uganda HIV experts had begun to express that HIV
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prevalence rates had stabilized at an unacceptable high rate of between 6.1 percent and
6.5 percent and possibly increasing.65 Between 2009 and 2011, the prevalence rate was
between 6.5 and 7 per cent.66
There is hardly consensus in the international community regarding reasons for the
regress in the prevention of heterosexual transmission of HIV in Uganda after a decade of
remarkable success. Some Ugandan health professionals attributed the problem to
complacence due to the introduction of anti-retroviral medication. This meant that most
people become indifferent to the sex behavior-change message as they exclusively
committed to scientific interventions. But several scholars have established a connection
between the apathy towards the ABC strategy with the debate in the International
Community about the relevance or irrelevance of condoms. This trend seemingly
explains the cause for the rising HIV prevalence rate in Uganda. 67
The often disagreeable condom debate in global ethics is framed as the tension
between those who are pro abstinence but anti-condom, and, those who are pro-condom
but anti-abstinence.68 In reference to United States influence, the pro-abstinence and anticondom are categorized as the US-based social conservatives who use the ABC mantra to
justify the promotion of their “long-standing agenda regarding people’s sexual behavior
and the kind of sex education they should receive.”69 Critics such as Jonathan Cohen and
Tony Tate see the defense of abstinence and faithfulness as incompatible with the goal of
advancing sex freedoms of the unmarried, gay and transgender people.70
Reversely, some experts worry of critics who use the ABC debate as a platform for
apportioning inordinate credit to condoms while denigrating the importance of behavioral
change. In 2003, Edward Green argued that the international AIDS program
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disproportionately favored and allocated most resources to condom promotion over
behavioral change.71 Subsequently, it took UNAID more than a decade to come to terms
with Uganda’s informed claim that behavior partner reduction was the main reason for
HIV reduction. The official position of UNAID up until 2004 was to highlight condom
use as having played the leading role in Uganda’s HIV prevalence rate reduction.72
The condom controversy was linked to the PEPFAR funds even before the
congressional approval. President Bush’s administration and most Republican Congress
representatives put more emphasis on promotion of abstinence in the PEPFAR program.
The Democratic counterparts preferred a condom prioritization policy.73 The competing
views in congress were reflective of the debate among the American public on whether
condom use or persuasion to abstain from sex until marriage was the most effective
method to prevent HIV among the American teenagers.74 Critics claimed that studies
showed that abstinence-until marriage programs indicated “no long-term success in
delaying sexual initiation or reducing behavior changes among participants.”75
The condom versus abstinence-only debate in United States was framed, by journalist
Steve Sternberg as “a clash between science and ideology.”76 He explained that ever
since AIDS emerged in the 1980s, the AIDS-prevention policy in United States always
provoked a political stormy debate.77 It was not a coincidence therefore that soon after
Uganda received the PEPFAR funds in 2004, a debate begun to ensure in the
international community as to whether Uganda’s ABC approach was the best method to
combat HIV/AIDS.78 Competing ethical claims dissected the ABC. While some
advocated for “C” excluding “A” and “B”, for others it was nothing but AB.79
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Just as the MSEHPA became “a lightning rod for criticism”80 in the pandemics
planning, so did the ABC become the pivotal ethical issue generating disagreement
between pro-abstinence and pro-condoms activists. Gradually, the relevance of the ABC
epidemiological strategy came to be construed by some as a discrimination problem
rather than a legitimate community-safety issue as was held by others. The abstinence (or
abstinence-only) strategy and policies that hindered accessibility to condoms were
viewed as obstacles to the effective control of HIV/AIDS. Eventually, with the increased
awareness of the importance of human rights in public health interventions (yet, with
obscure interpretation of human rights) the PEPFAR funds provided an opportunity for
civil societies, faith-based institutions, and politicians to advance uncompromising
maxims regarding the ABC approach.81
The pro-abstinence advocates comprised of those who admitted to some partial
effectiveness of condoms to those who were strictly anti-condoms. Some faith-based
institutions considered condom-use sinful and immoral. A prominent Ugandan preacher
and HIV/AIDS activist, Pastor Martin Ssempa is one of the leading advocates for
abstinence-only policy in Uganda. Using his Makerere University Community Church as
a platform, Ssempa repeatedly blasted those in the international community promoting
condom-use in Uganda.82
As Director of the Global Center for Uganda’s ABC Strategy, Ssempa took his anticondom fight to a global platform. In a letter addressed to Steven Lewis, the then UN
secretary general’s special envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa, Ssempa demanded that Lewis
be fired for his advocacy for condom-use in Africa.83 Ssempa claimed:
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He (Lewis) is using the entire body of the UN for his personal agenda of
“condomize” the developing nations. Why he has the audacity to fight the only
nation which has demonstrated success in reducing HIV/AIDS is utterly beyond
me… (Lewis) is fabricating lies to further attack Uganda’s ABC strategy.84
Lewis had allegedly blamed the US PEPFAR program for causing the (lack of) condom
crisis in Uganda.85
Ssempa was emboldened by support from other abstinence-only advocates such as
Uganda’s First Lady Janet Museveni. In 2006, Mrs. Museveni initiated a No Apology
Abstinence Training Curriculum in seven districts of Uganda. Reportedly, in the first
three months of the initiative, 13,500 students signed for a four months training program
to commit to abstinence.86 Earlier on in 2003, Mrs. Museveni had presented a memo to
the US Congress in support of an abstinence policy for HIV prevention in Uganda. 87
Condom use as was debated in the global community advanced two incompatible
views. One group blamed policies that prioritized the use of condoms and disregarded the
effectiveness of behavioral change.88 The pro-abstinence and faithfulness (fidelity)
alleged that condoms were ineffective since HIV virus seeps through the porous condom.
Additionally the promotion of condoms aided the spread of immorality in society.89
There are those however who admit to some role for condoms in so far as their use comes
second to behavior change and are the best intervention given circumstances such as
commercial sex workers and some settings involving students.90
For other ethics commentators and health policy makers, the new rise in HIV
prevalence rate was attributable to the (alleged) government’s policy of abandoning
condom use and reverting to abstinence policies. These critics repeatedly assailed the
52

PEPFAR program, under President Bush, for what they perceived as a promotion of the
abstinence-only policy at the expense of condom use. The most direct criticism came
from the Human Rights Watch report issued in 2005. The authors, Cohen and Tate
asserted that “Uganda was redirecting its HIV prevention strategy from scientifically
proven and effective strategies (such as condoms-use) towards ideologically driven
programs that focuses primarily on promoting sexual abstinence until marriage.”91
These experts asserted that “there is scanty evidence that abstinence contributed
significantly to the reported decline in HIV prevalence in Uganda in the 1990s.”92 They
argued that partner reduction in casual sex as was practiced in the zero-grazing campaign
strategies of the 1990s was largely responsible for HIV reduction than abstinence.93
Following this conclusion, Cohen and Tate pilled skepticism on the whole idea of the
effectiveness of the Uganda ABC strategy, categorizing it as a “uniquely American
invention.”94 They claimed that many HIV/AIDS experts in Uganda attested to their
ignorance of the alphabetic sound bite of ABC until branded so by the United States
government.95
Cohen and Tate came to the conclusion that “Uganda’s anti-AIDS effort in the 1990s
cannot be reduced to a particular government intervention such as abstinence-only or
ABC.” The authors characterize ABC’s promoting of institutions such as marriage and
discouraging condoms and sex (for its own sake) as obstacles to “the realization of
internationally recognized human rights, including the right to information, the right to
the highest attainable standard of health, and ultimately the rights to life.”96
The connection of the ABC and PEPFAR to human rights gained further attention
when a section of women human rights advocates pointed out that the condom discourse
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masked underlying human rights issues of discrimination and stigmatization based on
gender inequality and discrimination.97 These critics argued that women in developing
countries lack power, autonomy, and wellbeing, and, are unable to negotiate sex options
or condom use due to gender subordination.98 Linda Fuller argues that:
ABC can only be a viable prevention option for women and girls if implemented
as one component of a package of interventions aimed at addressing deep-rooted
gender imbalances. These would include, among others, advocacy for the
empowerment of women and promotion of women and girls’ rights.99
The shift from the epidemiological oriented ABC approach increasingly became
inevitable as advocates questioned the justification for the use of government powers and
donor resources to promote societal norms that burden women, and sustained
discrimination based on gender and sex orientation.100 This perspective was clearly in
line with the new paradigm in the international community that characterized HIV/AIDS
as a human rights issue. This change is succinctly articulated by Daniel Whelan:
Many HIV prevention initiatives continue to be formulated within a traditional
public health framework – a framework that lacks the tools necessary to address
the determinants of societal vulnerability to HIV/AIDS. In order to more
adequately address these challenges of vulnerability, a human rights approach has
been developed. This approach is now understood to be the central insights,
opening new pathways for effective prevention and impact alleviation policies
and programs.101

54

Consequently, human rights are understood as the new language of wellbeing in the
context of which the underlying societal conditions of disease, disability and death should
be analyzed.102
According to Jonathan Mann and colleagues, health and human rights approaches
complement each other for the advance of human wellbeing. These scholars point to the
HIV/AIDS epidemics as illustrative of how individual and population vulnerability to
diseases and disability is connected to the respect of human rights.103 Experts attest to the
fact that public-health initiatives are more likely to succeed when they consider human
rights than when they neglect human rights. But it is unclear how this compatibility
translates into effective practical HIV prevention policy, particularly when rights conflict.
In 1996 UNAIDS incorporated human rights into its overall strategic plan of
combating HIV/AIDS. The human rights approach was deemed necessary to counter the
trend that fueled the spread of HIV/AIDS through societal and structural factors of
poverty, discrimination, and women subordination.104 Susan Timberlake stated that
UNAIDS drew the link between vulnerability and human rights from examining the
relationship between HIV/AIDS and (nations’) laws, policies, marital relations, family,
property relations, migration, sex work, homosexuality, and drug use.105
To move the initiative forward UNAIDS proposed further action and articulation of
general and ethical principles to guide policy formulation and professional conduct in
HIV-related initiatives. Those actions relate to ethical issues of “wellbeing and
beneficence, equity and distributive justice, autonomy and respect for persons,
confidentiality and informed consent, and the duty to treat.”106 However UNAIDS did not
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offer a succinct articulation of the criteria for balancing conflicting rights as required in
article 29 of the UDHR.
As Uganda continues to lose its grip on the epidemiological oriented ABC approach
amidst the rising HIV prevalence rate, there seems to be no comprehensive ethical guide
integrating the epidemiological model with the social justice model in HIV/AIDS
prevention.107 The divide regarding conflicting rights was evident in the
counteraccusation between Dr. Zainab Akol, the coordinator of the national Aids Control
Program, and, Mr. Godfrey Tumwesigye of the Human Rights Network Uganda
(HURINET). When interpreting the cause of the high prevalence rate of about 7 percent
in November 2011, Dr. Akol attributed it (partially) to “the uncoordinated response to the
epidemic by pro-gay and lesbian civil liberties.”108 She explained that:
They are spoiling our response to HIV/AIDS. They are derailing us by dragging
us to human rights issues of homosexuals. We in the ministry do not want to
know your sexual orientation. We treat everyone so long as that person is sick.109
Akol further claimed that Uganda had missed a $270 million AIDS grant from the
Global Fund because of the civil society’s lobbying. But Tumwesigye countered that all
HURINET needed was for the Ministry of Health to “streamline lesbian, gay, biosexual,
and transgender (LGBT) in HIV/AIDS activities.”110 The Global Fund’s report attributed
the refusal to provide the grant mainly on Uganda’s failure to disburse a significant
amount of money from the Round 7 grant. The second reason further stipulated in article
4.10 of the Independent Appeal Panel states that “the panel found that the TRP’s
(Technical Review Panel) concerns regarding enhancing social and gender equity and
human rights and their implications on the soundness of approach as determined by the
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TRP were founded.”111 Though this document does not elaborate on the TPR’s human
rights reference, the statement provides the hint that corroborates Dr. Akol’s claim.
The exchange between Akol and Tumwesigye was symptomatic of the ethical
quandary resulting from the application of rights-based approaches in an incoherent and
non-robust manner. At issue here is the tension between the lifesaving-centered approach
that is reticent about gay rights, and, a monolithic human rights vision that regards
disease control as subordinate to the cause of advancing gay rights. Tumwesigye’s
priorities resonated with the complaint made by Human Rights Watch (HRW) to the
United States Congregational caucus regarding Uganda’s alleged support for
homophobia. Of concern were the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
people.
Human Rights Watch demanded from the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator the
names of all Ugandan organizations that had received funding under the PEPFAR grants.
The purpose was to identify organizations that received the PEPFAR funds and yet
promote discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, or promotion of
abstinence-only policy.112 This methodology of naming and shaming, often used by
Human Rights Watch, identifies a priority right and the right-violators so as to remedy
and protect the vulnerable subjects.113 Cohen and Tate employed this approach in 2005
when naming Mrs. Janet Museveni, Pastor Martin Ssempa, Youth Forum, and, Family
Life Network, as Uganda’s PEPFAR funded individuals and organization supporting the
abstinence-only agenda while disregarding the human rights of individuals.114
But this confrontational approach met an equally uncompromising counter response
from some Ugandan legislators who decided to counter gay rights activism. A bill drafted
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by an anti-homosexuality parliamentarian in Uganda, allegedly supported by American
Evangelical groups, sought to strengthen an old ant-homosexuality law imposed by the
British colonial government.115 Bahati’s bill included provisions for several forms of
punishment for aggravated homosexual activities. The bill recommended a death penalty
for HIV positive same-sex act with minors. One clause proposed imprisonment not only
for convicted homosexuals but also for those who fail to report such activities. Bahati
advanced this bill also “to strengthen the nation’s capacity to deal with emerging
international threats to the traditional heterosexual families.”116
The move to severely punish gay activities infuriated and galvanized local and
international gay rights advocates who sought the intervention of western governments to
impose punitive action including cutting donor HIV/AIDS funds to Uganda.117 The
government of Sweden warned it was to cut aid to Uganda. United States threatened to
expel Uganda from the trade pact – the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) if
the bill was to be enacted into law. The toughest stance came from Britain. At the 2011
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (Chogm) in Australia, the Prime Minister
David Cameron threatened to withhold some aid from governments that do not reform
anti-gay legislation.118
In December 2011 the United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, announced
that her government had adopted a policy of attaching foreign aid to fighting
discrimination against gay people abroad.119 Secretary Clinton stated that “Gay rights are
human rights and human rights are gay rights.”120 Accordingly, in the presidential
memorandum President Obama directed all Federal Agencies to promote the rights of
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lesbian, gay, bio-sexual, and transgender persons overseas.121 The president emphasized
that “no country should deny people their rights because of who they love.”122
The basis for respect of the human rights of gay and other sex minorities is implied in
article seven of the UDHR which maintains the right of every person to equal protection
against any discrimination and incitement against such discrimination. This right to nondiscrimination is founded on the prima facie principle of the inherent dignity of each and
every person. Article one of the UDHR states that “all human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights.”123 This enunciation spells out the basis for the legitimacy of
interventions to protect the human rights of sexual minorities.
However, the – aid for gay rights promotion – policy appears to be based on a narrow
and monolithic vision of human rights as articulated in “gay rights are human rights and
human rights are gay rights.”124 Such value statement does not appear to be firmly
anchored in the substantive ethical principle of the inviolability of human dignity, and
subsequently, could generate more inconsistence than coherence. Besides, while
discrimination based on sex orientation violates human rights, the imposition of policies
in form of absolute maxims does not cast democratic credentials of developed nations in
good light. The democratic credentials of the global civil society, as observed by Matt
Baillie Smith, is in the ability to facilitate dialogue and debate, which is good for idea of
global justice and equity.125
The intervention policy such as aid-for-gay rights promotion founded on an
incoherent conceptual framework is counterproductive since the ramification is the
deprivation of lifesaving aid to the poor and the HIV/AIDS victims. For instance when
the Global Fund withheld the round 10 grant to Uganda, Dr. Akol revealed the aid was
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urgently needed to put 100,000 more (HIV seropositives) people on lifesaving ARV.126
Moreover, the growing trend of developed nations to rely on coercion to foster the
cooperation of poor nations in HIV/AIDS intervention is contrary to principle of mutual
collaboration for the common good. It is a well argued conclusion in bioethics and
population health that coercion diminishes rather than enhance trust in health
interventions.
Frederic Reamer reminds us of Socrates’ recognition of the “importance of moral
inquiry” and of a “systematic examination of the moral features of life.”127 As the role of
public health increasingly stretch beyond the defense of epidemic disease
(epidemiological model) to the protection of human rights (social justice model), the need
grows for guarding against polarizing moral stances. Ethicists ought to adopt a strategy
that strikes balance by engaging in critical interpretation of human rights and guarded
application of the standards of moral justification.

B. The Epidemiological Model and the Social Justice Model
(i) The Epidemiological Model in HIV/AIDS Intervention
Epidemiology is concerned with understanding and altering factors that determine
population patterns of health and disease. Since the early days of the HIV/AIDS
epidemics experts emphasized the importance of intervention strategies of monitoring,
prevention, and treatment based on typology of HIV transmission patterns among various
populations and regions of the world.128 These classifications of patterns of transmission
based on groups at-risk have tended to change overtime due to the changing socio-
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political and cultural contexts. But basically, epidemiologists focus their attention on the
phenomenon of the interaction of virus and the human population.129
Following this epidemiological model Peter Piot identified several epidemiological
factors accounting for HIV prevalence variable in different parts of the world. The list
included virogical (HIV-1 subtype variations, levels of viremia), genital factors (STDs,
absence of male circumcision, dry sex), sexual behavior (rate of partner change, mixing
sexual partners, types of sexual intercourse, early sex debut, levels of condom-use),
demographic variables (proportionality of sexual active age, male-to-female ratio,
proportionality of urban to rural populations, migration patterns), economic and political
factors (poverty, war and social conflicts, performance of health care systems, response
to the epidemics).130
However, the challenge for epidemiologists remains the issue of understanding the
interplay between biological factors and the socio-cultural experiences that shapes public
health.131 The National Research Council (NRC) of the United States National Academy
of Science was aware of this challenge in 1996 when they developed the HIV
intervention framework incorporating individual, societal, infrastructural, and structure
underpinnings. The epidemiological factors pertaining to individuals involved biological
and behavioral aspects.132 Societal factors entailed risk behavior such as high prostitution
rates, multiple partners by men, and, gender discrimination and subordination.
Infrastructural factors were poor communication, poor access to STD treatment, and,
inaccessibility to condoms. Structural factors involved underdevelopment, poverty, civil
unrest, and, low respect of human rights.133
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More relevant to the question of PEPFAR and ABC debate is Frederic Reamer’s
observation that the first response to HIV /AIDS in United States was “to consider the
role of public health as a defense against the threat of epidemic disease.”134 The initial
approach was to deal with HIV prevention in terms of changing the sexual and drug-use
behavior of risk groups. The risk groups targeted for public health actions were
homosexual, bisexual men, and the intravenous drug users.135 The measures included
screening, testing, reporting, restricting intravenous drug use, and, closure of gay
bathhouses.
But this categorization turned out to be morally problematic as homosexual men were
targeted and blamed for the spread of HIV. One particular intervention that highlighted
the tension between civil liberties and the public health goal of communal protection was
the closure of gay bathhouses. When the Director of public health in San Francisco,
Mervyn Silverman, ordered the closure of the fourteen gay bathhouses, he reasoned that
these facilities provided the environment that encouraged and facilitated multiple unsafe
sexual activities contributing to the rapid spread of the new epidemic.136 Objecting to the
counteraccusation that these broad measures were an affront on legally protected private
behaviors of gay individuals, Silverman argued that the bathhouses were not fostering
gay liberation but public hazards.137
As Reamer observed, the dominant ideological voice from the gay community was
not of cooperation but radical individualism that was libertarian-oriented. They were
determined to defend “the right of adults to conduct their sexual lives free of state
interference, even in the face of decisions that could lead to illness and death.”138 This
position was articulated by Neil Schram, president of a gay health professional
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organization – the American Association of Physicians for Human Rights, who advised
that each individual is responsible for himself, and, the public health professionals had no
role enforcing behavioral norms.
For Thomas Stoddard, enforcing behavior change was a civil liberties issue. At stake
were the principles of sexual privacy and equal protection of the law.139 However some
gay medical professionals recommended compromise measures and limited restrictions to
cab the health threat posed by the bathhouses. This approach sought for a balance
between the traditional role of public health to protect populations against an epidemic
disease and the newly articulated civil liberties.140
(ii) The Evolving Phases of HIV Moral Discourse
Ronald Bayer identifies three phases of the evolution of ethical discourse in
HIV/AIDS intervention in the United States. In the early 1980s when there was limited
therapeutic options, prevention strategies involved coercive state measure.141 During this
phase emphasis was put on behavioral change. But there was also a growing commitment
to civil liberties to guard against government intrusion in people’s private lives.142 The
compromise came with the 1986 voluntarism consensus when competing parties settled
on education, voluntary HIV testing, and confidentiality as a strategy to replacing state
coercion. Surprisingly, however, discrimination still remained a critical issue.
The second phase which Ronald Bayer calls “the resurgence of public health
traditionalism” started to occur from the mid-1989 when health professionals introduced
antiviral therapies and clinical prophylaxes with potential to lower viral load and
consequently reduce infectiousness and AIDS incidents.143 Support grew for mandatory
screening of infants at high risk of HIV infection, and, the routine screening of HIV
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pregnant mothers to prevent transmission of HIV to offspring.144 As resistance eroded the
Center for Disease Control (CDC) advised in 1999, and later recommended in 2000, that
all U.S.A states conduct confidential name-based reporting of HIV infection cases to
provide for better follow up.145
In 1989, when the legislators in the state of New Jersey voted in favor of named
reporting of HIV seropositive cases several other states begun to require contact reporting
in at least some circumstances.146 Twenty states enacted statutes treating the intentional
transmission of HIV as a felony or a misdemeanor.147 As of 1999, thirty-one states had
enacted legislations criminalizing nondisclosure of HIV status in certain situations.148
The Presidential Commission on HIV Epidemics (1988) endorsed the criminalization of
the knowing transmission of HIV.
This era of therapeutic promises is characterized by two notable occurrences: the
resurgence of public health value over commitment to civil liberties149, and, the rise of
HIV/AIDS advocacy alliances.150 For instance the antiretroviral medication zivovudine
(AZT) that had been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1987
became available for use by AIDS patients. With the development of subsequent
HIV/AIDS cocktail, public health measures such as HIV antibody testing that had been
suspect due to privacy and confidentiality issues were now being considered for all
persons at risk. Moreover, technological advances had made testing easier for the public.
The medical development of the years preceding 1989 brought the promise of
effectiveness of early HIV intervention.151 Resultantly AIDS activism grew with bold
demand that government actively fund AIDS research and programs. Community-based
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AIDS service organizations became larger and well organized to provide education and
counseling to persons with AIDS.152
Gay activists and civil liberties alliances against name-reporting of the seropositive
contacts began to unravel in favor of a disease control approach.153 For effective followup, the standard procedure in venereal disease control was contact tracing. This measure
was also seen as an ethical duty to warn and protect those who would be exposed to the
disease infection. The attempt in the early 1880s to co-opt HIV named-reporting standard
into the HIV control measures had encountered rigid resistance from gay activists and
civil libertarians.154 The approach was interpreted as an intrusion in the protected privacy
and confidentiality interests of individuals.
The third phase beginning mid-1990s developed from the demand for equity in
accessing HIV therapies. The AZT, for instance, was very expensive for low-income
people.155 The best chance for the poor to access therapeutic intervention was
participation in research. Yet women, persons of color, and drug users were underenrolled in research. As regards women the inequity was partially based on a perceived
need to protect the fetus or fertility.156 Until 1993, the federal government rarely funded
HIV studies in women. Consequently, the unique vulnerability and manifestation of HIV
infection in women was poorly understood by medical professions resulting in failure to
diagnose and treat HIV victims.157 Women coalitions protested the underrepresentation of
women in research thereby excluding them from accessing HIV research and
experimental drugs. They framed the issues as a violation of the justice principle of
equity and fairness.158
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Women’s advocacy rejected protectionalism (research as hazardous to women) and
categorized it as an injustice that denied women the benefits of scientific knowledge
necessary to advance women’s health and wellbeing. They complained of missing out on
diagnosis, monitoring and free study medication.159 This new development resulted in the
understanding of research as a benefit to be accessed and not as hazards deserving of
protection. This meant a shift from the traditional research policy that focused on
scientific rigor and protection of subjects from undue risks to the understanding of justice
in research broadly as prioritizing collective benefits (social beneficence) for
populations.160
In 1994 the National Institute of Health issued guidelines on the inclusion of women
and minorities in clinical research.161 These guidelines and subsequent federal
involvement indicated a shift from overemphasis on traditional clinical research ethical
principle and benchmarks of risk protection of subjects to the promotion of access to
clinical research.162 This new way of comprehending participation in research as a benefit
to be accessed and not as harmful endeavor deserving of protection increased women’s
prospects for access to therapeutic measures, but also raised a whole lot of new sets of
conflicts regarding the evaluation of risks to the individual and societal benefits in
medical research.
The 1990s generated a wave of advocacy alliances targeting inaction or exploitation
of vulnerable populations in HIV intervention. The demands pertained to inequities and
lack of access to HIV research and resources as a matter of justice. For instance, in 1994,
the International Working Group on Microbicide (IWGW) was established with the
initiative of the World Health Organization’s global program on AIDS. The purpose was
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to ensure close coordination of a number of separate research programs targeting
microbicides development for women use.163 By 2002, the alliance consortium for the
development of microbicides comprised of developers from thirty-four biopharmaceutical
companies, scientists from twenty-six nonprofit research institutions, and representatives
from twenty health research and advocacy groups.164
One important key arm of the Global Campaign for Microbicides is the Global
Advocacy for Microbicides. This international advocacy movement has foundation in the
July 2000 Rockefeller Foundation international meeting for scientists, research
organizations, advocacy groups, pharmaceuticals representatives, and donors who
gathered to find ways to accelerate the development and availability of safe, effective and
accessible microbicides. The Advocacy working group that held its first meeting in 2001
in Warrenton, Virginia involved sixty advocates from twenty-eight countries.
The group mapped out a five-years working plan to raise awareness for microbicides,
accelerate product development, access to, and use of topical microbicides.165 The
rationale for education and advocacy was “to create political will and momentum
necessary to propel the scientific enterprise forward – whether through highlighting the
urgency of the task at hand, educating those in position to make a difference, or
fomenting political pressure for change.”166 The advocacy component of the microbicides
development should not be seen as unrelated to the development in global health, in the
late 1990s, that sought to add advocacy skills and tools to public health voices seeking
the improvement of “respect for human rights in particular communities or nations.”167
By 2000, HIV/AIDS advocacy had become a formidable means for minority groups
to influence policy and access to HIV/AIDS resources. Definitely, civil liberties, gay
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rights, and women’s rights advocacy had become active players alongside epidemiologist
in the initiative to combat the spread of HIV. Cathie Lyons points out that the HIV/AIDS
activists became “a social and political force affecting every decision-making process,
structure and institution which had a role to play in the HIV/AIDS crisis.168 They thought
to champion critical issues of “funding, prevention education, access to experimental
drugs, community-based care, insurance, discrimination, and other human rights
issues.169
If one agrees with Bayer’s three phases of the HIV/AIDS moral discourse, then, the
fourth phase is the period following the year 2000 which could be characterized as the
phase of the social justice model. Social epidemiologist acknowledged the inadequacy of
the epidemiological model to address the social ills rooted in the social structures that
impact negatively on the health of population.170 HIV advocacy brought to the attention
of health providers the necessity of addressing issues of social inequality associated with
class, gender, sexual identity, and economic disparities.171 To broaden the notion of
population wellbeing, scholars such Madison Powers and Ruth Fadden argued that Social
justice is the moral foundation of public health.172
(iii) The Social Justice model
The social justice model regards the social justice theory as the foundational moral
justification for the social institution of public health. This approach considers health as
one of the other essential dimensions of human wellbeing such as personal security, selfdetermination, and respect for the dignity of individual persons.173 Within this framework
differences occur regarding the task of social justice in population health intervention.
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For some it is to ‘secure a sufficiency of the dimensions of health for everyone.”174 For
others the task is to secure basic capabilities that are fundamental to human flourishing.175
Focusing on the conceptual notion of human flourishing, Jennifer Pram Ruger had
argued since 1997 for a social justice approach as a new foundational paradigm for
health.176 She expressed her dissatisfaction with the existing ethical theories that treat
health or a right to health as an inappropriate focal variable for accessing social justice or
rights. These theories embrace health care in terms of a right to certain health-care
services (utilities, community values, liberties, opportunities, resources, and primary
goods) as the appropriate variable.”177 She was critical to approaches that frame a claim
to health equity in terms of “health care demand for equality of access or entitlement to
health services,” and not in terms of health as functional wellbeing.178 As a result two
diverse approaches have emerged, one considers inequality in terms of “differential
access to care (services),” and the other as “differences in health (conditions or
functioning).”179
Following this distinction, Ruger argued that “health” ethics, policy and law, moved
towards the trajectory of “health care” (services) with two dichotomous paradigmatic
position of consequentialism and proceduralism. While consequentialists want to “access
health policies and laws by their consequences”, proceduralists emphasize the important
of fair procedures to achieve effective results.180 Ruger made the case that:
It is time for an imaginative new theoretical model, one that addresses these issues
and bridges the divide between procedures and consequences, between the
collective and the individual, between the personal freedom and the welfare,
equality and efficiency, science and economics.181
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For Ruger, a new vision based on human flourishing provides us with a health
“capability approach” as the most effective new foundational paradigm for health.
Ruger’s support for Amartya Sen’s capability approach stems from a commitment that
invokes social justice theory from Aristotelian point of view of human flourishing as the
end of all social activities.182 As applied to health inequality, capability relates to wellbeing in terms of a set of functions, and, personal freedom to achieve wellbeing.183 This
means, “…what human are able to do and be, and, what is possible for them, and, it
suggests that our social obligation involves enabling all to live flourishing lives.”184
The importance of Ruger’s exploration of the social justice framework lies in her
focus on the person (capabilities and wellbeing) in health intervention rather than on
health goods or “things.” Ruger’s eudaimonia vision of health and wellbeing is different
from consequentialist or a procedurist perspective. However, as Levy and Sidel observed,
the task of social justice is not so clear cut in global-health usage. Social justice
encompass a wide array of concepts such as: preventing human rights abuse (such as of
vulnerable populations), equitable distribution of societal goods and burdens (such as
equal access), justice as it conforms to moral principles (such as “all people are equal”),
equal participation (vision of society that is equitable), and, legal mechanisms promoting
safety and security of persons in different moral systems of divergent cultures.185
Levy and Sidel concluded that all these social justice concepts hold in common the
premise that all people have “inalienable rights.” This implies a definition of social
justice that comprises of the notions of equity and fairness in society.186 Levy and Sidel
approached this question of social justice by addressing the issue of social injustice that
“adversely affects the health of individuals and communities by creating conditions that
70

provide unequal opportunities for individuals and groups to meet their basic needs.”187
From this perspective, social injustices “violate fundamental human rights”.188 In one
way social injustice is “the denial or violation of economic, socio-cultural, political, civil,
or human rights of specific populations or groups in the society based on the perception
of their inferiority by those with more power or influence.”189 Another way of
considering the definition of social injustice is based on the definition of public health by
the Institute of medicine, as “what we, as a society, collectively do to assure the
conditions in which people can be health (policies and action).190
The human rights paradigm which regards human rights as the bedrock of social
justice191 treats population health intervention primarily as a human rights issue.
Accordingly, human rights are the language of wellbeing in the context of which the
underlying societal conditions of disease, disability and death should be analyzed.192
When Jonathan Mann became head of the World Health Organization’s AIDS program,
he made the language of human rights the preferred choice to guide the ethical discourse
in the global HIV programs. Mann was skeptical of public health’s (epidemiological
approach) competence to address ethical issues in the field of HIV/AIDS intervention.
Likewise, he considered bioethics not comprehensive enough to encompass the goals and
responsibilities of improving population wellbeing.193
This vision of human rights as linked to health policy has roots in “the right to the
highest attainable standard of health” which is referred to as the right to health in
international law. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines health as the “state of
complete physical, mental, and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or
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infirmity.”194 The AIDS epidemic since 1980s inspired a global commitment to health
policies that advance human rights and overall human wellbeing.
In HIV/AIDS, the social justice model emerged from the identification of human
rights violations rooted in socio-cultural-political factors such as homophobia, racism,
poverty, sex-orientation bias, and gender inequity. As discussed in the aforementioned
discrimination against gay communities and bias against women in the early days of HIV
in United States, a necessity arose to improve the needs of those marginalized and
socially disadvantaged as a condition for improving health and overall wellbeing. It is
from this perspective, therefore, that the Uganda ABC approach was targeted for
criticism for its perceived infringement on the human rights of minority groups.
Some human rights advocates regard the ABC and PEPFAR strategies, in so far as
they regulate individual behavior and sex choices, as prejudicial and discriminatory
against women and gay preferences.195 Subsequently, from these concerns derive civil
and political advocacy for sexual freedom and gender equity in HIV interventions.
Human rights advocates consistently demanded that the government of Uganda and the
PEPFAR patterns address a broader range of HIV/AIDS human rights related issues such
as non-discrimination and non-stigmatization based on gender and sex orientation
choices.196
The significance of introducing the social justice model in Uganda’s HIV/AIDS
intervention is that it introduced key futures of human wellbeing that extend beyond good
health to the respect of the dignity and rights of persons. By addressing other dimensions
of wellbeing, the social justice model ideally improves the prospects for good health as
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promoted in the epidemiological model. Additionally, the social justice model prevents
the diminution of individual rights as protected in the libertarian model.
However if there are lessons learned from the advocacy-driven cellulose sulfate
(Ushercell) clinical trial of 2007 in Uganda,197 the deployment of the social justice model
in infectious disease intervention (epidemiological model) requires rigorous negotiation
of ethical balance between group-oriented rights claim to access benefits with the
individual safety concerns. A justifiable ethical pathway should engage a critical
interpretation of the right-based main ethical concepts such as equity, participation, and
access, and, a careful examination of the application of the human rights standards.

C. Human Rights Advocacy in HIV/AIDS Intervention and the Cellulose Sulfate
Clinical Trial.
(i) The Cellulose Sulfate Microbicides (Ushercell) Clinical Trial
Probably the most recent case in medical research that evidence the tension and the
need to balance between protecting the safety of the individual and (specific population)
benefit in the social justice model is the failed 2007 cellulose sulfate (or Ushercell)
microbicides clinical trial.198 Microbicides connote a range of scientific products being
researched on and developed as inhibitors to enhance women’s ability to protect
themselves and their partners from HIV and sexually transmitted infections.199
In 2007 a cellulose sulfate (CS) gel clinical trial to prevent HIV was halted in Uganda
and other sites because more participants in the active product arm seroconverted than
those in the placebo. The $24m Phase III randomized, double-blinded, and placebo
controlled trial to assess the efficacy of a candidate micobicides 6% cellulose sulfate gel
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(Ushercell) was conducted in Uganda, South Africa, Benin, Burkina Faso, and India. The
Global Campaign for Microbicides involved the Contraceptive Research and
Development Program (CONRAD) of the Eastern Virginia Medical School to conduct
the clinical trial on 1425 HIV negative women. CONRAD halted the CS trial in January
2007 when the researchers established that the trial product increased women
vulnerability to HIV infection.200
The Global Campaign for Microbicides seeks the acceleration of microbicides
product development, access, and use. This campaign has its foundation in the 1997
symposium of women’s Health Advocates on Microbicides (WHAM) and the Population
Council. The members of WHAM disbanded by 1998 and formed the Global Campaign
for Microbicides.201 The advocacy was prompted by scientific evidence that shows that
women have greater biological susceptibility to HIV than men. Yet, early HIV research
initiatives committed scientific expertise and resources to protecting men’s health.202
While scientific tools such as condoms are largely available for men’s use, women’s
options are limited to negotiating with male partners who are at times reluctant to use
condoms. Coupled with the condom problem is women’s greater social vulnerability to
HIV exposure due to reduced personal autonomy and violence against women.203
The microbicides initiative is presented as requiring social advocacy to propel
scientific endeavors beyond the epidemiological harm-protection paradigm to a
commitment to social justice approaches relating to broader issues of women
wellbeing.204 Experts who put emphasis on protecting individual research participants
from harm tend to insist on scientific rigor as the measure for ethical research
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protocols.205 Those who prioritized access and broader social benefits for women commit
primarily to attaining social justice goals.206
Dr. Lut Van Damme of CONRAD and principal investigator of the phase III cellulose
sulfate clinical trial attest to the fact that CS underwent eleven safety and tolerance trials
prior to human use in phase III. According to Van Damme, in the prior Phase II clinical
trial of cellulose sulfate that involved 500 women in Africa, India, Belgium and United
States, there were no safety concerns that arose.207 Karen Honey writes that unlike
nonoxynol-9 that increased the rate of infection with HIV, cellulose sulfate (in phase II)
presented no indication of such problems.208
Between 1994 and 1996, a controlled trial of Nonoxynol-9 film was conducted on
1000 seronegative female commercial sex workers to establish whether Nonoxynol-9, an
approved spermicide, is also a microbicide.209 The clinical trial was halted in 2000 after it
was established that even a low dose N-9 gel, if used frequently causes sufficient virginal
irritation to increase a woman’s risk of HIV infection. A 50 percent higher rate of HIV
infection was recorded in the experimental arm than in the placebo.
Critics question the commitment to scientific rigor prior to the CS phase III clinical
trial. Wang Tao and others maintain that the stimulatory effect of low concentrations of
cellulose sulfate was not unfamiliar knowledge. Such data was available from
“independent libraries, including CONRAD.”210 Tao and colleagues suggest that the
importance of the data “seems to have been overlooked because the studies measured
viral accumulation rather than infection rate or used X4-tropic rather than R5-tropic test
virus.” 211
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Pedro Mesquita and colleagues were later to establish that cellulose sulfate has tissue
toxicity. Consequently, cellulose sulfate compromises the vaginal tissue layers that form
the first defense against HIV and may have increased vulnerability to HIV. In a
laboratory experiment at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, the researchers observed
that cellulose sulfate destroyed a protein desmoglein in the group of cadherins proteins
responsible for stitching cells together. The loss of the proteins results in “leaky”
tissues.212
The research scientists incubated uterine epithelial cells (or reconstructed vaginal
tissue) with one dose of cellulose sulfate. The experiment was repeated with one dose of
nonoxynol-9, PRO 2000, and tenofovir gel. They used transepithelial electric resistance
(TER) technique and confocal microscopy to monitor and evaluate tissue integrity and
cellular junction. Changes occurred in the structural protein as detected at the RNA and
protein levels. The scientists observed, through a confocal microscope, that cellulose
sulfate and N-9 selectively destroyed the protein desmoglein. By measuring the HIV p24
protein the researchers determined that there was viral translocation allowing diffusion of
virus across the epithelium.213
Mesquita and his team concluded that cellulose sulfate may have increased
susceptibility to HIV due to its toxicity to vaginal tissues resulting into the loss of the
protein secretory leukocyte inhibitor. According to these scientists, the critical gap in the
microbicides project design was the “lack of biomarkers predictive of efficacy and
safety.”214 It appears in the aggressive pursuit of social beneficence for women as a
demographically disadvantaged population, the risks to the individual women participants
were not adequately assessed. Much as participation and access are important for
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pursuance of social justice goals to benefit specific populations, scientific rigor and
validity are necessary for generating reliable data to safeguard individual safety and
dignity.
The cellulose sulfate clinical trial project was not unrelated to the movement in mid1980s in the United States when women’s coalitions raised the issue of women
underrepresentation in research as a matter of justice. Women’s advocacy rejected
protectionism (research as hazardous to women) and categorized it as an injustice that
denied women the benefits of research participation. They demanded for greater
participation in scientific research and access to experimental drugs. Exclusion of women
was construed as denying them the benefits of scientific knowledge necessary to advance
women’s health and wellbeing. Additionally, women missed out on the benefits of
diagnosis, monitoring, and free study medication.215
In developing countries women are further disadvantaged due to socio-cultural
vulnerability.216 In 1995, Lori Heise and colleagues argued that HIV prevention strategies
of condom use, partner reduction, and, treatment of recurring STDs in so called risk
groups was an inadequate approach to addressing women’s health needs in developing
countries. These experts argued that women’s poverty and powerlessness in sexual
choices should be countered with a commitment to addressing inequalities and the
development of technologies women can have control over.217
Categorizing access to scientific research participation as a social justice issue or
moral obligation was a leap into uncharted new ethical domain. But this development
emerged out of a broader trajectory in multinational research, starting in the 1880s, that
required a revision of the existing ethical principles to respond to the new legal,
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socioeconomic, and administrative challenges in low-resource countries.218 The effort to
generate guidance for international biomedical research involving human subjects
materialized in 1993 when the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Council for
International Organization of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) promulgated a joint ethical
guideline.219 The 2002 version of the CIOM followed suit as external sponsored clinical
trials increased in low-income developing countries and new issues and challenging
ethical questions arose.
The 1993 International Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human
Subjects and the subsequent revisions sought to provide guidance on the application of
ethical guidelines in the local circumstances particularly in low-income developing
nations. Researchers from external sponsors had encounters issues such as standard of
care and the use of comparators that fall short of the best current practice. The guidelines
also sought safeguard against the exploitative clinical trials in populations that cannot
afford the resulting new products, thereby, making the product available for use only by
the rich.
The link between the external sponsored clinical trials and the social justice issues of
poverty and exploitation of the underprivileged fitted into the broader narrative in the
global community that classified public health as a social justice issue. It was not
surprising therefore, that Global Advocacy for Microbicides became an important key
arm of the scientific endeavors of the Global Campaign for Microbicides. But conflicting
interests were in the offing in the absence of a succinct criterion on how the advocacy
was to balance between the requirement for scientific rigor to protect individuals and the
push for acceleration of experimental products as a right to benefit a specific population.
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By 2002 most ethics experts had concurred that scientific measures need to be
anchored in social justice vision to have a realistic chance of effectively managing
pandemics such as HIV/AIDS. Scientists were now to rely on advocacy groups to
channel scientific data and new products towards benefitting the poor and minorities. As
was defined in the global microbicide partnership, the role of advocacy was to “create the
political will and momentum necessary to propel scientific enterprise forward.”220
Advocacy was understood as the shaping or influencing the ideas and decisions that
inform policy and practices. Heise and colleagues stressed that, “the choice to focus on
access and use rather than product development is both deliberate and significant.”221
Subsequently, one of the questions the International Consultation of the Microbicides
was initially faced with was the possibility of moderating ethical standards in the interest
of science for the good of specific populations.222 The consensus was to prioritize the
need to protect individual subjects of research from potential risks. The experts
acknowledged however that “for those involved in clinical microbicide trials, the
distribution of benefits (as expression of social beneficence and justice) is perhaps an
even harder challenge.”223
Questions pertaining to balancing of scientific method with advocacy method are
complex. As cautioned by Lawrence Gostin and colleagues, advocacy method which is
pragmatic and goal oriented tend to foster a populist rather than a rigorous approach,
while science method arrives at conclusions by way of experimentation, proof, and
verification.224 The complexity is demonstrated in the conflicting approaches manifested
in the failed cellulose sulfate clinical trial. The 2005 Global Campaign for Microbicides
information literature stated that “Participation do not increase their (research
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participants) risk of becoming HIV infected as a result of being in the trial.”225 As it
turned out in 2007, participation in the cellulose sulfate microbicide candidate trial
indeed increased susceptibility to HIV.
The campaign to accelerate the microbicides scientific products may have diminished
the need in the pre-clinical safety evaluation of cellulose sulfate to vigorously exhaust
issues of predictive biomarkers of cellulose sulfate safety and efficacy. As was suggested
by Tao and colleagues in 2008, the works by Flexner et al (1991), and Meylan et al
(1994), that detailed the ability of sulfated polyanions to enhance HIV replication both in
vivo and in vitro, was not unfamiliar literature to researchers.226 The reason cellulose
sulfate candidate microbicide trial was expected to be scientifically rigorous was because
seronegative women were recruited in a non-therapeutic science project with potential
risks for seroconversions. Guideline 1 of the Declaration of Helsinki requires sound
scientific methods for research involving human subjects.227
Microbicides development is part of the global advocacy initiative to address the
problem of women vulnerability to HIV because of biological susceptibility and sexual
powerlessness. The issues morally obligates the global community to act urgently, yet,
based on an effective criteria that enables the balancing of conflicting interests between
individuals and populations, and, between specific populations. Linda Fuller, for
instance, identifies many culturally oppressive and HIV susceptible practices such as
abusive marriages, child marriages, polygamy, widow inheritance, and shameful sex
rituals.228 However, while these practices are accepted in many tribes in Africa there is no
justification for Fuller’s broad-brush indictment of the male gender in Africa.
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The depiction of marriage, for instance, in Africa as solely a form of enslavement and
conveyor for HIV transmission to women,229 ignores the reality of socio-cultural
interrelations of husband and wife, father and daughter, brother and sister, and, father-inlaw and daughters-in-law. Yet there is a prevailing vulnerability paradigm that treats
heterosexual men (particularly in Africa) as the irresponsible vector of HIV since
(allegedly) men deliberately engage in sex behavior and not women.230 This paradigm
carries along with it the real danger of complacency for women in combating HIV/AIDS
in Uganda since the implication is that risky behavior is a category for men’s sexual
activities. Only a balanced approach to HIV/AIDS prevention can render the effective
control of the epidemic.
(ii) Philosophical differences
When Jonathan Mann sought to generate ethical guidelines for population health
practice he looked to human rights for the provision of coherence and identity. To
separate population health ethics from the biomedical foundation of medical ethics Mann
proposed the separation of the language of disease, disability, and death from the
language of wellbeing that underpins the right response to the underlying social injustices
manifested in traditional mortality and morbidity condition.231 Mann and proponents of
the social justice model point to the universal acceptance of human rights to justify the
commitment of population health strategies to the shared common vision of inalienable
rights.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly on December 10, 1948, enunciated that “all human beings are born free and
equal in dignity.”232 Accordingly, everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
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forth in the Declaration without discrimination such as based on race, color, sex,
language, religion, or political. Equality of human dignity is the pivotal human rights
norm and principle upon which all other UDHR principles draw determinability for
inalienability. Though a consensus seem to have emerged among ethicists that human
rights play a central role in informing population health policy, there are philosophical
differences over the nature, the source, and the specification of human rights.
According to Jack Donnell, reductionists understand the nature of rights in terms of a
simple beneficiary theory. Rights language is interchangeable with duty language such
that rights-holders mean nothing more than “objects or passive recipients of benefits.”233
Correctly understood, rights entail obligations that are generally beneficial. Yet the
simple beneficiary theory “confuses what is right with what is a right.”234 Likewise,
another form of reductionism is manifested in legal positivism. Accordingly, what
constitute the claim of a right is “legal recognition and government protection.” On the
basis of this meaning, Rex Martin confuses civil rights with human rights by making a
claim that a society which lacks civil rights has no human rights. Donnell objects that
government may be the source of the rights of the citizen but certainly not the rights of
man.235
The human rights discourse is also complicated by competing specifications of
human rights principles. As observed by Markus Rothhaar, for instance, those who hold
the notion of “dying in dignity,” in support of euthanasia, regard pain and suffering as
contradictory to human dignity. Freely choosing ones death even with the help of others
is “the ultimate triumph of freedom and dignity over adverse circumstances of human
existence.”236 Conversely, the Christian tradition construes human dignity in terms of
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“inviolability of every human life including one’s own.”237 Moreover other ethicists such
as Ruth Macklin consider human dignity as a useless concept apart from meaning respect
for personal autonomy in terms of requirement for informed consent, voluntariness,
confidentiality, and non-discrimination.238
(iii) Interpretation of Human Rights
The 1966 agreement led to the merger of the two human rights treaties – the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).239 Yet even then, liberal
states such as the United States focused on civil and political rights while countries
founded on the notion of solidarity and government obligation to meet basic economic
and social needs prioritized economic, social, and cultural rights.240 These two sources
are relevant to the ethical discussion that theorizes the complementary nature of human
rights and public health to advance human wellbeing.241 Though in recent times it has
become agreeable that these aspects of human rights are indivisible and interrelated, this
has not always been the understanding.242
According to Gostin, ever since the language of human rights began to be used by
civil libertarians to confront stigma and discrimination against persons living with
HIV/AIDS,243 “most of the discussion of human rights has assumed that the field is
devoted to individual rights and liberties.”244 Based on this view of human rights,
advocates frame human rights as negative, stressing the right of individuals “to be free
from government interference”; and, the government’s responsibility to “refrain from
abuse and overreaching.”245 Civil libertarians tend to interpret human rights in terms of

83

individual possessions (rather than social habits) obligating the government to refrain
from restricting the individual.
The language of civil and political human rights, because of its universality and
emphasis on equality is attractive and accommodative of advocacy for freedoms against
discrimination and stigmatization in HIV/AIDS intervention.246 Gostin explicates that
while this view is correct, most scholars stress the equally important human rights
tradition of economic, social, and cultural rights. This perspective projects human rights
as positive and places “obligation on government to act for the common good.”247
Understanding this dual human rights traditions shades light on the tension between the
emphasis on socio-cultural rights and the commitment to non-discrimination and nonstigmatization in HIV/AIDS prevention in Uganda.
Elucidating on Sue Henry’s work on human rights, Kieran Donoghue observed that
beginning in the 1970s the global south challenged the Western attitude of relegating the
economic, cultural and social human rights to a secondary character. The initiative
culminated in the use of human rights language to explicate the concept of development,
though originally the key Western countries were not supportive of the 1986 UN
Declaration of the Rights to Development.248 In 2001, when the United Nations Secretary
General, Kofi Annan, proposed a new global fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria, the wealth nations pledged $1.7bn in its first year.249
The importance of promoting the economic, social and cultural human rights in
HIV/AIDS intervention rose out of the realization that it was a moral responsibility for
developed countries to aid poor nations as they combat the epidemic. Gavin Yamey and
William Rankin framed this issue as economic imbalance and a matter of justice. They
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argued that the gap between the aggregate national income of wealthier nations and those
of poor countries is disproportionate. They framed the moral obligation as:
Wealthier countries must take the lead in acting justly. The colonization of
regions now struggling with the rising HIV rates, like India and Africa, left
behind a legacy of exploitation and oppression and an ongoing power imbalance
between rich and poor countries.250
Yamey and Rankin further warned of a danger whereby donor nations may want to
advance their needs and not the needs of the poorest countries themselves.251 This
intuition explains the multiple standards for the application of human rights in HIV/AIDS
intervention in Uganda.
(iv) Standards of Moral Justification
In practical application, advocates seek the incorporation of human rights in public
health policy based on three distinct sets of standards. These are: legal mechanism,
conceptual frameworks, or, substantive ethical principles.252 The justification for using a
legal mechanism to foster human rights strategies in public health initiative is the
transformation of human rights into international law through the adoption, by nations, of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Although the UDHR was adopted
as a statement of aspiration, the legal obligation of governments derives from the various
formal treaties signed by individual countries and incorporated into domestic law.253
Several international and national monitoring bodies ensure compliance by
governments that ratified human rights. These governments are obligated to report
regularly to the monitoring bodies and demonstrate the level of engagement in respecting
and protecting those rights.254 Most relevant to this dissertations are four of the seven
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monitoring bodies listed by Gruskin and Bravenman: the Committee of the elimination of
Forms of Racial Discrimination (of the International Covenant on Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination); Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Treaty); Human Rights
Committee (of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Treaty); and,
Committee of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (of the
International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women).255
International treaties and their corresponding monitoring bodies are of invaluable
relevancy to international law for purposes of legitimizing legal obligations.
Subsequently, government representatives tend to draft human rights norms and
standards in political forums and accord them less flexibility than in ethical
frameworks.256 On the advocacy level, human rights advocates identify the utilization of
a legal mechanism standard to ensure governments compliance with human rights
obligations in public health intervention. This process targets the “jurisdictional
transformation of human rights concerns in infectious disease laws.”257
Japanese courts, for instance, used a legal mechanism framework based on universal
human rights law to mandate the compensation of former leprosy patients. The patients
were subjected to forced isolation (even when sulfone became available), sterilization,
forced labor, and arbitrary punishment based on a 1931 lifetime confinement law. The
law was repealed in 1996 and the confinement of the leprosy patients in the national
leprosaria was found to be a violation of human rights.258 Sase and Gruskin interpreted
the leprosy experience as setting precedent for the subsequent disease control laws in
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Japan that obligate the state to respect the human rights of patients. In HIV prevention the
laws relate to the abolishment of mandatory isolation, testing, and name reporting as
respect to for human rights. The subsequent amendments to the existing laws have
incorporated human rights concerns for appeal rights, shortened hospital stay,
independent review, and, abolishment of ban on unemployment.259
In South Africa activists used the language of human rights, and with judicial
intervention, to compel the government to ease restrictions on the use of nevirapine to
prevent the transition of HIV from mother-to-child. The Constitution Court of South
Africa ruled in 2002 that the government’s nevirapine policy violated the healthcare
rights of women and newborn in the South African Constitution.260 The success in South
Africa energized advocates to pursue the same legal strategies targeting the incorporation
of non-discrimination laws in constitutions or by initiating judicial interventions in some
countries. This approach most likely explains the resolve of gay or anti-gay advocacy
targeting the reform of the Uganda’s anti-homosexual law.
A legal mechanism as a tool for enforcing human rights may be helpful but
unnecessary since the validity and strength of human rights lies in its moral source and
not its legal justification. There is a narrow legal positivism that assumes that human
rights imply government recognition and protection by incorporation into constitutional
rights.261 According to Jack Donnelly, this vision of human rights is inconsistent with the
universality of human rights. While legal rights are “defined by their recognition in law,”
human rights are recognized by the universality of their moral force.262 It is more
important to foster genuine international collaboration and cooperation than seeking legal
enforcement of human rights.
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The second standard, as suggested by Grunskin and Braveman, is the use of
conceptual framework formulations based on human rights principles to initiate analysis
and advocacy for human rights in health policy.263 As argued by Angus Dawson,
frameworks provide the most plausible tools for abridging the gap between theory and
practice in public health ethics.264 However the complication here is that there is no
unanimity in ethical discourses concerning the primary role of frameworks in public
health ethics (or bioethics) application. Another complication is that in this work,
Grunskin and Braveman do not clearly articulate those human rights principles that
should constitute the conceptual frameworks formulations.
As observed by Mita Giacomini and colleagues, some formulations of ethical
frameworks in health policy documents often fail to anchor specific ethical concerns
around robust, coherent and meaningful substantive values of basic principles. Mita
Giacomini and colleagues studied several frameworks in Canadian health policy and
concluded that ethical frameworks can be incoherent and lacking secure foundational
theory and methodologies essential for robust ethics discourse.265 These experts
established that frameworks “vary substantially in justification, coherency, form, and
content.”266
In one vision, as suggested by Giacomini and Colleagues, an ethical framework must
be anchored in “coherence between terminal values (goals), procedural values (process),
and substantive values (criteria/principles).”267 The real strength of an ethical framework
is underpinned by legitimacy, transparency, and clarity as can be evaluated from its
genesis, content and purpose.268 But Mita Giacomini and colleagues argue that since
frameworks are constructed on a foundation of conventional ethics, they must be
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developed with attention to the role of tacit meaning and values underlying their ethical
theories and arguments.269
In another vision, as advanced by Angus Dawson, frameworks generally ought to be
pragmatic and focused on aiding day-to-day practical actions even if it means taking
certain theoretical considerations for granted.270 Dawson understands a framework as a
conceptual formulation (framing device) that makes relevant values explicit to guide or
frame decision-making.271 In his view, “a conception of public health ought to be the
foundation for public health ethics.”272 Subsequently, the starting point of public health
ethics is the notion of public health as a special type of social activity focused on a set of
aims, methods, actions, and outcomes. For instance the aims could be improving
population welfare or reducing inequalities. Actions may involve legal intervention,
education, and information.273
Understood from this consequentialist perspective, human rights advocates may
initiate the ethical discourse by focusing on any of the key element (intermediary maxim)
of the principle of equity such as availability, accessibility, and quality. Yet, the
underlying substantive value of the equity principle may be obscured when the
frameworks lack consistence between terminal, substantive, and procedural values.274 In
the frameworks studies by Giocomini and colleagues, even when a concept such as equity
was shared among different frameworks, the interpretation was divergent. In some
“equity” meant “access based on need”, in other “access based on ability to pay”, and yet
other, “participation and equity of health.”275
The third standard is the use of human rights principles to guide the design and
implementation of public health policies and programs in a manner that ameliorates
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overall socio-political-cultural wellbeing of all people.276 The relevancy of the principlesbased approach to linking human rights to global health was brought to light by Henk ten
Have and colleagues in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO). In the work The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics
and Human Rights: Background, Principles and Application, these experts elucidated the
UNECSO generated fundamental ethical principles that are universally adopted by many
countries. These basic principles underpin the human rights framework and seek to strike
a balance between the individualistic and communitarian moral perspectives.277
According to these experts the context for applying these principles are notions
(procedural values) such as professionalism, honesty, integrity and transparence.
Substantive principles and procedural values provide the crucial foundation for
defining, focusing, and deliberating on the context of any (human rights) framework.278
For, the strength of an ethic lies in the formulation that is robust in the moral justification,
coherence, and context. The relevancy of the basic principles of human rights framework
to this dissertation is that it provides an interpretive methodology that gives relevance to
principles in the balancing of individual and group interests that in turn improves
population health (epidemiological) and ameliorates human rights (social justice).279
The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UNESCO) addressed the
general ethical tension between individual and universal rights, and between competing
universal rights. Ten Have and Jean commend the innovative element of the declaration
that struck balance between individualists and communitarian moral perspectives. For
instance the declaration seeks balance between the principles of autonomy (Article 5) and
solidarity (Article 13) in a manner that clearly articulates the underlying human dignity
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and freedoms.280 Article 27 of the UNESCO document is consistent with Article 29 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the requirement that certain rights be restricted
for purposes of protecting the community.
Permissibility of restrictions is limited to the purpose of securing important societal
interests of public safety, protection of public health, and, the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others. Laws made by states providing for these purposes must be consistent
with international human rights laws.281 These provisions, for instance, are relevantly
connected to the Uganda HIV/AIDS prevention policies. The case of Cellulose Sulfate
microbicides studies highlights the need to balance between the principle of social
responsibility and health (Article 14) towards women, and, the principle of human
vulnerability and personal integrity (Article 8) of women.282 The case of the ABC
approach and PEPFAR points to the need to anchor the principle of non-discrimination
and non-stigmatization, within a framework that respects cultural diversity and pluralism
without infringing upon human dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms.
One substantive principle however that is implied but not specifically enunciated in
the UNESCO declaration, yet, clearly underlies all articles that stipulate the duties and
responsibilities of individual and groups to uphold human dignity and wellbeing is the
principle of the common good. More specifically, in case of a pandemic or epidemic, the
principle of the common good underlies the goal of striving for a right balance between
individualistic values, universal human values, and cultural differences, as stipulated in
the UNESCO declaration article 27 and the UDHR article 29. As defined in the Catholic
tradition, the “common good” is “the sum total of social conditions which allow people,
either as groups or as individuals to reach their fulfillment more fully and more easily.”283
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The principles-based approach has a long held association to the tradition in Catholic
social teaching regarding the dignity of the person, solidarity, and the common good. The
notions of the dignity of the person and the common good are intimately interrelated. In
this tradition, HIV/AIDS is primarily a justice and a rights issue rooted in social
relationships that either enhance the spread or alleviate the epidemic.284 Economic
exploitation and social disparities that generate poverty, racism, and gender
discrimination undermine the rights and responsibilities of individuals and communities
and impedes the containment of the AIDS crisis. The principle of the common good
offers a framework of analysis rooted in social justice that serves the good of all.285
The common good is a balancing principle between the individual’s invaluable values
to self and the inherent social responsibility to others. The recognition of the dignity of
the person is the condition upon which is rooted the respect of universal, inviolable, and
inalienable rights of persons. This vision of equality of persons is the cornerstone upon
which is based the exercise of greater solidarity for the promotion of structures and
relationship that serve the wellbeing of all.286 The principle of solidarity follows
necessarily from the principle of common good. As explained by Pope John Paul,
“solidarity is the firm and persevering determination to work for the common good…for
the good of all and for each person because we are all truly responsible for each other.”287
Though the UNESCO declaration avoids the wording “common good” but article 13 lists
solidarity as one of the basic principles underpinning human rights ends.
The UNESCO bioethics principles-based framework is gaining grounds in the
practical application of human rights guidance of public health policy in epidemics and
pandemics. This approach brings clarity to policy and human rights actions in population
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health intervention because it utilizes the proven methodology of bioethics principles in
individual medicine which address substantive issues, which in turn require interpretation
of the scope and meaning of substantive principles.
The use of substantive principles-based framework as demonstrated by the UNESCO
bioethics principles is suitably relevant for the practical application of human rights to
HIV/AID intervention in Uganda. However even though the UNECSO bioethics
principles provide for ethical robustness and coherence, the shortfall is the lack of
succinct criteria for balancing principles that conflict. This dissertation proposes Mixed
Interests Ethics Model as criteria to balance between conflicting principles. MIEM
innovatively anchors the ethical discourse of conflicting interests between individuals and
populations in a critical analysis of the substantive principle, procedural values, and,
appropriate ethical standards to provide for effective management of epidemics.
The MIEM strategy provides a heuristic context for articulating the goals, objectives,
and the moral justification in a manner that promotes cooperation and trust, and
ameliorates human rights more effectively than other approaches such as solely legal
positivism focused on coerced compliance and punishment. When for instance the
substantive principles of common good and individual autonomy conflict as in the case of
the cellulose sulfate microbicides clinical trial, clarity is established by a consideration of
the scope and meaning of each of these substantive principles in the given context.
For instance the meaning and scope of the substantive principle of common good
involves social relationships, interdependence, mutual concern, and responsibility.288 The
specification of the substantive principle of autonomy involves informed consent,
voluntariness, and privacy. The analytical interpretation of such conflicting principles
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within this framework provides clarity as to which areas of decisions or actions increase
or decrease conflict and consequently leads to effective population health intervention.289

D. Summary
This chapter explicates the broader question of rights as human rights, as raised in the
HIV epidemic intervention, and not as the narrow perspective of individualistic rights
discussed in the first chapter. The broader perspective of human rights requires the ethical
discourse that focuses beyond the epidemiological and the libertarian models to
addressing rights issues as discrimination and prejudice based on gender and sexorientation. Improving the respect for human rights strengthens the individual’s claim for
autonomy and freedoms, as well as society’s quest for the population goods of health and
safety. But this vision requires the balancing of conflicting rights.
As demonstrated in this chapter, the diverse philosophical visions and the multiple
interpretations of human rights principles, and, the application of competing human rights
standards complicate the diminution of the conflict between individual and the population
interests as well as between specific populations. The UNESCO bioethics-principles
strategy innovatively derives a set of values such as honesty, professionalism, integrity,
and transparence to provide the spirit that should guide the balancing between conflicting
principles. This hermeneutical context enables MIEM to derive clear criteria for
balancing between individual and population interests by negotiating between the
substantive principles, procedural values and application of standards to effectively
manage the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
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3. Chapter Three
Mixed Interests Ethics Model (MIEM)

Introduction
Probably the most prominent ethical question in proposed public health interventions,
as argued by Alan Cribb, is “how we ought to balance population health promotion with
the interest and freedoms of individuals.”1 Connectedly, the international community is in
the midst of a defining moment in the shaping of global bioethics and population health
ethics. With the reemergence of highly virulent microbes resulting in the HIV/AIDS
epidemic and a threat of influenza pandemic, a need has arisen to guarantee population
health and safety in pandemics and epidemics, while also safeguarding individual and
basic universal rights. Yet, there seems to be no overlapping consensus as to which
criterion best balances conflicting interests between the individual and the population
health.
The narrow focus of the traditional public health framework on the epidemiological
goals of health and safety do not adequately address individual and human rights
concerns. Likewise, libertarian overemphasis on autonomy and individual rights tend to
conflict with population health interests. The social justice perspective that prioritizes
human rights concerns in HIV/AIDS intervention does not appear to offer a definitive
answer since disagreements prevail over the nature and source of human rights, as well as
the application of diverse human rights standards.
One of the emerging trends in global bioethics and public health ethics formulation is
to develop a cross-cultural, principles-based bioethics that is interpretive and analytical in
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method. Explicating the UNESCO declaration on bioethics principles and human rights,
Henk ten Have and Michele S. Jean state that:
It provides a framework of general principles that is open to various
interpretations and applications in the context of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, leaving many specific issues and controversies open for further debate.2
The principles approach accounts for variations of ethics norms within any culture, as
well as plurality of values among faith groups, gender, race, and different classes of
people.3
The methodology of engaged normative interpretation and analysis has been made
popular, in contemporary times, through the principles-based approach in a systematic
application of the four biomedical principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence,
and justice to resolve actual bioethics problems. According to Tom Beauchamp and
James Childress, the principles-based approach was meant to function as “an analytical
framework that expresses the general values underlying rules in the common morality.”4
The introduction of the principles-based approach in population health ethics is
connected to the new understanding that “public health ethics is a new sub-discipline
within the broader field of bioethics.”5 Many ethics scholars agree that bioethics
principles are essential, and have withstood criticism to provide ethical benchmarks for
ethicists and clinicians.6 There are ethicists who envision global bioethics and public
health ethics as justified, within the cross-cultural paradigm, based on basic moral
principles that are universally accepted, such as those in the universal human rights
declaration.7
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Proponents of the principles trajectory in global health concur that the principles
approach can help to overcome the conflicting interests that arise in the application of
competing human rights claims. For instance, some ethicists suggest that the conflicting
principles, such as autonomy and solidarity as applied in the context of pandemics, and
epidemics can be balanced by adopting a spirit of professionalism, honesty, integrity, and
transparency. This set of criteria is proposed for guidance in policy decision-making
processes; ethics committees; assessment and management of risks; and transnational
practices.8
But the aforementioned criteria do not specify a succinct procedural standard to
benchmark practical decision-making and policy development. To abridge this shortfall,
this dissertation suggests Mixed Interest Ethics Model (MIEM) to balance between
individual and population interests, and to effectively manage pandemics and epidemics.
MIEM adopts the formulation of the principles-based approach as in the UNESCO
bioethics document, and involves generally accepted and proven clear procedural
standards, such as necessity, reasonableness, proportionality, and harm avoidance, to
negotiate between conflicting principles.

A. Analytical Identification of the Epidemiological, Libertarian, and Social Justice
Models
(i) Brief Overview of the Three Models
The strictest expression of individual interests synonymous with self-rule, is
embodied in libertarian ethics. Libertarian approaches maintain that the individual is the
basic unit of social analysis. According to David Boaz, libertarianism is characterized by
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commitment to individualism, individual rights, spontaneous order, limited government,
free markets, the rule of law, and natural harmony of interests.9 The autonomous
individual is the source of moral authority, and common actions derive justification from
permission or consent.10 Accordingly, moral obligation ensues from contracts or mutual
agreements between rational persons.
Subsequently, the consideration of distributive justice consists not in patterned
distributions based on merit, need, equality, or societal contribution, but “justice in
holdings” consists in the transferring of resources based on principles of justice in
acquisition and in transfer. In a free society, free market offers the neutral option among
persons’ desires since “it reflects and transmits widely scattered information via prices,
and coordinates persons’ activities.”11 Proponents of the free market, such as John C.
Goodman and Gerald Musgrave, argue that the American health care crisis is solvable by
resorting to a market system where individual patients, and not government bureaucracy,
take actions in the individual’s interest.12 What is required is the creation of incentives,
freedom of information, and choices in the healthcare insurance and hospital
marketplace.
Libertarians favor procedural principles, as in deliberative democracy, since the
approach allows for multitudinous opinions of individuals and ensures the realization of
individual autonomy on a collective scale.13 However, differences occur regarding the
best method of deliberation. Of notable relevance to this dissertation is the Modus
Vivendi theory that frames deliberation as “open-ended, problem-centered dialogue.”14
Subsequently there is no justification for broad government intrusion in individual
freedoms, privacy, and confidentiality. Libertarians favor limited government whose role
98

is to ensure the rule of law to protect civil liberties. For in the libertarian view, when civil
liberties prevail, trust in government endeavors and effectiveness is enhanced. Liberty is
understood as the absence of coercion, or any other form of forceful interference, from
other agents.
Griffin Trotter made the most elaborate argument for a libertarian model (which he
characterized in terms of pluralistic approach) in disaster population health intervention.15
He singled out government coercion as the most controversial aspect of public health
intervention for its intrusion into the interests of the autonomous individual, and for its
inadequacy to enhance trust and cooperation. To put the argument in perspective, Trotter
identified three general rationales used to justify coercive measure in public health
intervention. The most controversial, according to Trotter, is the use of coercion to
prevent self-harm. The second entails use of measures such as quarantine and isolation
with intent of preventing harm to other people. The third form of coercion involves the
appropriation of private property, or conscription of health workers, for purposes of
enhancing the health benefits of others.16
The only basis for government imposition of coercive powers, according to Trotter, is
procedural principles of public (democratic) deliberation and permission. The acceptable
strategy is one that balances power and facilitates compromise, as with the open-ended,
problem-centered dialogue characteristic of the modus vivendi theory.17 In mass casualty
medicine, an effective policy package does not come by way of “neat formulations of
substantive justice and other ethical principles,” but by compromises and mutual
concessions worked out by parties with different perspectives.18 So Trotter recommends
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that urgent ethical decisions during disasters should mostly “manifest values that have
been approved in public deliberation.”19
According to Trotter, the effectiveness of disaster intervention, such as in the
pandemics, ensues from public facilitation of compromise, and not from rational
consensus that embeds pre-fixed values regarding right, and the good, onto the discourse
structure.20 The appropriate agency to manage deliberation, decision ratification,
leadership, and enforcement, is a forum involving roles by appropriate individuals,
communities, and organizations. A commitment to the modus vivendi means being “lax
on rules of discourse, guarded about congeniality, and absolutely bereft of hope or
aspirations for a morally robust political canon.”21
Unlike the libertarian model that tends to be individual-centered, the focus of the
epidemiological model is to understand and alter societal patterns of disease.22 The
epidemiological model utilizes a population strategy that “seeks to control the
determinants of (morbidity and mortality) incidents in the population as a whole.”23
According to Jonathan Mann, the standard epidemiological techniques traditionally
sought by public health are the identification of risk factors associated with diseases,
disability, and premature death. Subsequently, information, education, and clinical-based
services were regarded as critical to changing individual behavior and improving the
overall goal of prevention.24
But changing, or mandating limits, to the behavior of individuals necessitates the
deployment of intrusive government regulative powers. Support for coercive government
measures increasingly gained momentum with the rise of the threat of bioterrorism, and
the naturally occurring pandemics and epidemics, such as influenza pandemic and
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HIV/AIDS. Population health policy makers deem it necessary to utilize government
regulative powers and efficiency to limit individual freedoms so as to safeguard the good
of population health and safety. To prevent infectious diseases from spreading in the
population, public health practices of surveillance, screening, case reporting, contact
tracing, mandatory treatment, isolation, and quarantine were included in the disaster
preparedness plans.25
The long held public health tradition in United States is to use both voluntary and
mandatory measures to control communicable diseases. There are several cases such as
“Typhoid Mary” that bring to light the moral complexity of these measures. Mary Mallon
was involuntarily committed to a life of isolation on North Brother Island, in New York,
for a total of 26 years, until her death in 1938, to prevent typhoid transmission.26
In another case, during the influenza pandemic of 1918, referred to as the Spanish
Flu, public health authorities imposed mandatory control measures that included
quarantine, isolation, prohibition against public gathering, and ordinances against
spitting, coughing, or sneezing in public.27 As recently as 2001, the initial Model State
Emergency Health Power Act (MSEHPA) designed for adoption by States in preparation
for public health emergencies included coercive measures, such as mandatory isolation
and quarantine, that impose restrictions on the freedom of the individual.28
In HIV/AIDS intervention, the traditional public health strategy of mandatory
screening, reporting, criminalizing, and warning those at risk began in the early 1980s. 29
The specific populations targeted for these mandatory measures were pregnant women,
infants at high risk, gay, and HIV positive people. The divide emerged between those
who favored the government’s coercive measure to produce good health (epidemiological
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model), and the civil libertarians who prioritized the values of privacy, confidentiality,
and limiting government interference with individual choices.30
Aside from the issue of Individual rights and freedoms, pandemics and epidemics
tend to create critical inadequacies and acute shortages of community health resources,
raising the problems of access and inequity. The use of government regulative powers to
selectively deprive certain individuals of societal goods by allocation and prioritization
strategies requires ethical justification. Having considered population health and safety as
social goods, ethicists and epidemiologists have traditionally turned to the ethical tools of
distributive justice to address issues of deprivation and inequity. Within the
epidemiological model ethicists utilize ethical theories such as utilitarianism,
libertarianism, contractarian, and communitarian for the justification of general principles
governing the distribution of opportunities, wealth, and rights.31
One version of individual liberty, based on John Stuart Mill, is founded on a
commitment to the utilitarian doctrine of happiness as the ultimate end of man’s moral
actions.32 Applying this utility principle, Stuart Mill argued that being in possession of a
right imposes an obligation on society to defend the individual’s right. Securing the
individual’s interests is a paramount need. Stuart Mill maintained that “to everyone’s
feelings, the most vital of all interests.”33 But another utilitarian version prioritizes the
collective societal net benefits. John Rawls explained that this version of utilitarianism
describes society as “rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are
arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed up over all the
individuals belonging to it.”34
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Yet there has also been renewed consideration of Kantian deontology regarding the
treatment of autonomous persons as ends-in-themselves, and not as means, and the
consideration of the autonomy of the will as the supreme principle of morality.35
Following a Kantian exposition of the autonomous individual, Robert Nozick developed
a vision of a free society where “diverse persons control different resources, and new
holdings arise out of the voluntary exchange and actions of persons.”36
Contractarian Rawls proceeds from an abstract notion of the original position to
conceive the notion of justice as fairness.37 From justice as fairness one infers the
principle of fair equality of opportunities. This egalitarian concept of justice requires that
“all primary social goods be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution would be
to everyone’s advantage.”38 In developing Rawls theory of justice as fairness, Norman
Daniels and colleagues interpret the principle of equal opportunities as involving the
promotion of “normal functioning for all” in health interventions.39
Ideally an ethical theory is meant to be comprehensive and consisting of a definitive
normative framework for resolving moral problems. But contemporary moral vision is
characteristically pluralistic, and no single ethical theory can convincingly claim
monopoly of a definitive source of moral value to adequately respond to all diverse moral
dilemmas.40 Unconvinced about the ability of any foundational ethical theory to generate
overlapping rational criterion to resolve ethical dilemmas in a pluralistic culture, Tom
Beauchamp and James Childress advanced the “non-foundational” common morality to
infer mid-level principles. Though, other proponents of the principles approach consider
common morality as alternative foundational moral thought.41
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In the fifth edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress,
commit to common morality as the ultimate source of moral norms. By common morality
these experts mean “a set of norms that all morally serious persons share.”42 These are
characterized as the most basic norms in moral life that bind all persons in all places.43
Beauchamp and Childress draw the example of human rights as a category that
“represents this universal core of morality in (recent) public discourse.”44 Henk ten Have,
a human rights proponent, explores the connection of common morality with interpretive
bioethics whereof, “ethics proceeds from empirical knowledge, viz. moral experience.” In
this sense, “moral experience is humanity’s way of understanding itself in moral terms,”
and ethics infers the “interpretation and explanation of this primordial understanding.”45
Henk ten Have finds Beauchamp and Childress argument interesting in so far as these
scholars make a distinction between particular morality, which “express norms unique to
particular cultures, groups, and individuals,” and universal norms which constitute “a set
of commonly shared principles and norms related to the objective of morality (i.e.
promoting human flourishing).”46 Ten Have elucidates that:
Common morality is not simply a morality among many others; its principles
represent at an abstract level the human experience that following them will
ameliorate the human condition. Therefore more important than a consensus is a
justification of principles (relating to the achievement of the objectives of
morality). Whether or not there is universal agreement on some principles (which
is a matter of empirical study), the question how principles of common morality
can be justified, however, is crucial (which is a matter of normative analysis).47
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Since moral judgments are not directly deducible from common morality, “a
continuous work of analysis, clarification, interpretation, specification, and balancing is
required in order to make a moral judgment on a specific case or problem.”48
Subsequently, ethical principles are considered as providing “a fundamental standard of
conduct from which many other standards and judgments draw support for their defense
and standing.”49 Principles are considered to be methodologically heuristic, yet
substantively robust, due to their basis in common morality that is universal and a
historical.50
Beauchamp and Childress adopted Rawls’ notion of reflective equilibrium to
underpin the legitimacy and usefulness of the mid-level principles for reasoning through
considered judgments to moral commitments.51 Rawls’ commitment to a Socratic
approach led him to “the study of principles which govern actions shaped by selfexamination.”52 Consequently, Rawls argues that our sense of justice requires a reexamination of our initially considered judgments upon our awareness of their regulative
principles. There may be a likelihood that our initially considered judgments were subject
to certain irregularities and distortions despite being rendered under favorable
circumstances.53
Accordingly, developing a system of ethics starts with broad considered judgments
(what is right or wrong) and drawing out a provision set of principles that reflect those
judgments. Ethical theory construction, or investigation, occurs in “a reflective testing of
moral principles, theoretical postulates, and other relevant moral beliefs to render them as
coherent as possible.”54 For Rawls, the best account of a person’s sense of justice is one
that matches his judgment in reflective equilibrium, not one that fits judgment prior to
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that exercise.55 In this sense Beauchamp and Childress construe the goal of reflective
equilibrium as “to match, prune, and adjust considered judgments in order to render them
coherent with the premise of our most general moral consideration.”56
The principles approach has gained prominence in the social justice model, in so far
as human rights are considered the surrogate, or bedrock, of social justice.57 The human
rights paradigm is made practical by generating substantive ethical principles. When the
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR) was
composed, the primary aim was to provide “a universal framework of principles and
procedures to guide States in the formulation of their legislation, policy or other
instruments in the field of bioethics.”58 The goal was to aid all people worldwide so they
would “benefit from the advances of science and technology within the framework of
respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and cultural diversity.”59
The UDBHR introduced a set of substantive principles such as: respect for human
dignity and human rights (article 3.1), benefit and harm (beneficence and nonmaleficence, article 4), autonomy and responsibility (article 5), informed consent (article
6), protection of persons unable to consent (article 7), respect for vulnerable persons
(article 7), privacy and confidentiality (article 8), equality, justice and equity (article 10),
and non-discrimination and non-stigmatization (article 11).
The other principles are solidarity and cooperation (article 13), social responsibility
and promotion of health (article 14), sharing and benefits (article 15), protection of future
generations (article 16), protection of the environment, and the biosphere and bioethical
issues (article 17). While some principles, such as autonomy, prioritize individual
interests, others such as solidarity give primacy to societal good. When society is
106

threatened, for instance by a pandemic, the UDBHR document recommends a balance via
the restriction of individual interests.60
Rather than giving preeminent status to general norms of organized sets of beliefs,
proponents of the principles approach view justification of moral thinking in terms of
reflective equilibrium and coherence. For Beauchamp and Childress, the plausibility of
the reflective approach is that it brings all conflicting interests into play, and aligns
diverse moral commitments into coherence so as to test the results against other moral
commitments.61 But as demonstrated in the aforementioned ABC and PEPFAR initiative,
as well as the microbicides CS clinical trial discourse, not all advocacy initiatives in
HIV/AIDS are committed to critical interpretation, analysis, and balancing of conflicting
interests. In the microbicides CS clinical trial, benefit to society appeared to override
concern for rigorous scientific study to ensure individual safety. From a moral philosophy
perspective, the choice was in favor of the utilitarian societal net benefit over Kantian
treatment of persons as ends-in-themselves.
One distinguishable form of incongruent interpretation and application of human
rights is narrow legal positivism. This type of reductionism gives primacy to the legal
enforcement of human rights over their moral strength.62 The possession of human rights
implies legal rights, and legal enforcement, regardless of competing moral
considerations.63 But as Jack Donnelly rightly argues, “the special function of human
rights almost requires that human rights be unenforceable.”64 Human rights are
distinctively self-liquidating such that rights-claims and enforcement comes into play
when the enjoyment of human rights is threatened or denied. This explains why framing
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HIV/AIDS prevention strategies in Uganda in terms of legal rights enforcement has not
provided an effective human rights remedy.
The narrow legal positivism trajectory is evidenced in the trend of criminalizing sexorientation behaviors in some countries as part of the HIV/AIDS prevention strategy.
Reversely, western donor countries coerce countries such as Uganda into enacting laws to
enforce the advancement and protection of the sexual preferences of specific
demographic populations, such as those of homosexuals.65 Absent from this conflict is a
consideration of procedural values of persuasion, negotiation, and a rational moral
dialogue across cultural barriers. Consequently, human rights principles, such as
autonomy and respect for the dignity of persons, do not mean anything other than mere
compliance with legal rights and their enforcement.
Though contemporary legal positivists recognize the moral force of human rights, it is
actually the legal recognition and enforcement that matters to them when it comes to the
question of justification.66 The source of the legal model of human rights is traditionally
linked to the framework of human rights as civil and political rights. Civil rights as a
human rights category arises in “the conflict between the citizen and governmental
tyranny.”67 According to Alan Rosenbaum, “these substantive rights are formal assurance
for the individual citizen against arbitrary government treatment.”68 Subsequently,
equality before the law and procedural due process provide the means for enforcing these
rights.69
In this view of human rights, the governance of human rights is by a system of rules,
or principles that can potentially be translated into law.70 According to James Fawcett,
“Here the focus of human rights is the elimination of arbitrary restraints on the
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individual.”71 The natural freedoms of the individual “may be limited only in the interest
of the public order in the wide sense, and by action of the community, to which he can be
said to have consented.”72 The individual “rises sovereign over the limited province of
the State,” since he is the “ultimate unit of all law” as regards the possession of these
inherent rights.73
When the yearning for a whole new global social cooperation emerged in the midtwentieth century, the vision of civil liberties was inadequately suitable for the task of a
collective goal of human flourishing. A complimentary paradigm was necessary to serve
the social, economic, and cultural purpose. The U.N. General Assembly reaffirmed the
interdependence and interconnectedness of the two Covenants: the civil and political
rights, and, the economic, social and cultural rights. However, a summary distinction
between the two Covenants characterized the civil and political rights as “legal” rights,
and, the economic, social, and cultural rights as “program” rights.74
Globally most human rights theorists now concur that human rights are indivisible in
the sense that civil and political rights mutually reinforce the economic, social, and
cultural rights and all derive from a single principle of fundamental human dignity.75 Yet
that recognition alone has not bridged the divide since civil liberty advocates continue to
prioritize legal rights and their enforcement, over social, cultural and economic
considerations in the pursuance of a global civil society. That thought trend appears to be
consistent with international policies that attach life-saving aid to the promotion and
enforcement of civil liberties in developing countries.76
The legal positivism model of human rights primarily entails emphasis on legal rights
and government action (recognition and protection).77 As observed by Lawrence Gostin,
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some human rights advocates have restricted the human rights discourse to the possession
of individual rights and civil liberties.78 In this context government must refrain from
abuse and overreaching. Respect for human rights means the individual’s right to be free
from government interference.79 George Annas acknowledges that despite the fact that
the United States adopted the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) not much progress (in the United States) has been made towards an
integrative vision with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).80
Connected with narrow legal positivism, is another form of reductionism whereby the
possession of human rights is reduced to merely beneficial obligations.81 Accordingly,
utility is right, and what is right is a right. Jack Donnelly considers this approach as
issuing from Jeremy Bentham’s simple beneficiary theory of rights. For Bentham, “being
the intended beneficiary of an obligation is a necessary and sufficient condition for the
possession of a right.”82 Donnelly objects to this characterization of rights and argues that
rights are “entrenched in a system of justifications and thereby substantially transformed,
given them priority, in ordinary circumstances over, for example, utilitarian calculations,
mere interests, or considerations of social policy.”83 As Donnelly’s argues, “the simple
beneficiary theory confuses what is right with having a right, and thus obscures the true
nature of rights.”84
But as liberal advocates increasingly concede to liberty-limiting principles such as the
harm principle, offence principle, and legal paternalism; they are becoming “mindful of
the need for a philosophical rethinking and clarification of the human rights
conception.”85 Moreover, according to Alan Rosenbaum, the differentiation of human
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rights into four distinct classifications, namely civil rights, political rights, social and
economic rights, and cultural rights has become standard feature in global human rights
perspective.86 For this reason, ethical tools such as substantive (human rights) ethical
principles and procedural standards are suitable for purposes of negotiating between
cross-cultural and interdependent aspects of human rights and population health.
(ii) A Combination of the Three Models
This dissertation suggests Mixed Interests Ethics Model (MIEM) as criterion to
negotiate a balance between conflicting individual and population interests generated by
libertarian, epidemiological, and, social justice models in pandemics and epidemics. The
combination of these models needs to be made practical by addressing related principles
and standards.
The principles address substantive issues; and standards address procedural issues to
negotiate conflict between the principles. Hence, both substantive and procedural
components are involved. These basic principles will vary from case to case. But this
dissertation illustrates a major principle aligned with each model, such as: libertarian
model and the principle of autonomy, epidemiological model and the principle of
solidarity, social justice model and the principle of common good.
The interpretation of substantive ethical principles concerns two interrelated aspects.
The first is a consideration of the meaning and range of scope of the substantive ethical
principle, so as to determine what interpretation increases or reduces conflict. The second
aspect is the determination of the strength of the principle, so as to identify considerations
that yield to others in case of conflict.87 Negotiating balance between conflicting
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principles, in concrete cases, necessitates the application of generally agreed upon
standards of necessity, reasonableness, proportionality, and harm avoidance.
Because MIEM seeks to respect and promote rights (individual and human), the
model functions within the general tension of individual and universal rights as explained
by the UDBHR. Insofar as the UNESCO declaration places MIEM within the context of
the general ethical tension between individual and universal rights, it provides a
hermeneutical context for applying MIEM.

B. Substantive Ethical Principles Deriving from the Intervention Models
Beauchamp and LeRoy Walters define a principle as “a fundamental standard of
conduct from which many other moral standards and judgments draw support for their
defense and standing.”88 Substantive ethical principles imply robust and meaningful
criteria, such as autonomy, justifying ethical decisions, and actions.89 It is in this sense
that the four biomedical principles by Beauchamp and Childress have demonstrated
moral worth and depth in clinical practice and research ethics. But ethicists have
determined that in public health, moral consideration additional principles, such as the
substantive principles of solidarity and common good, are of considerable significance.
(i) Autonomy
The substantive principle of individual autonomy implies sets of individual interests
in self-governance (determination), liberty rights, informed consent (knowledge,
comprehension, and voluntariness), freedoms of (decision-making and choice),
confidentiality, and privacy.90 In medicinal practice, autonomy has traditionally been
discussed in relation to paternalism.91 In research ethics, modern medical ethics codes
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and international ethical guidelines are formulated with a goal of deterring hazardous
research and the exploitation of individual human participants. The Nuremberg Code, the
Helsinki Declarations, the CIOMS-WHO, and other subsequent ethical codes, underlined
the need for voluntary consent and ethics review committees.92
The United States government, through multiple commissions, emphasized the ethical
obligation to adhere to safety standards in medical research involving human subjects,
and respect of the individual’s choices in medical practice.93 Most distinguishable is the
Belmont Report that heralded the birth of bioethics following the forty years of the
involuntary and inhumane Tuskegee Syphilis Study on black men in Alabama. The three
ethical principles from the Belmont Report were developed into four biomedical
principles by Beauchamp and Childress as autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and
justice. Of the four principles, critics point to autonomy as tending to override all other
moral considerations in the United States biomedical discourse. However, Beauchamp
and Childress disagree with this characterization.94
The practice of clinical medicine was historically paternalistic until modern
developments, though the physician was obligated to protect and not to harm the
individual patient. This foundational ethos of not harming the patient is coded in the
Hippocratic Oath. The ethical shift in favor of individual self-determination was
prompted in part by a renewed attentiveness to Kantian ethics and Stuart Mill’s
exposition on the individuality of autonomous agents. Stuart Mill’s ethics rejects
society’s paternalistic tendencies to control the individual’s preferences and behavior.
According to Stuart Mill, the only justifiable limit to individual’s liberty and freedom is
harm to others.95
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Kantian moral philosophy provides that the autonomy of the will is the supreme
principle of morality.96 For Immanuel Kant, “autonomous persons are ends in themselves,
determine their own destiny, and are not to be treated as merely means to the ends of
others.”97 The principle of autonomy, according to Kant, is: “Always so to choose that
the same volition shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as a universal law.”98
Hence, the freedom of the will is autonomy, which in turn is understood as the property
of the will to be law to itself.”99 Consequently, actions are permitted in so far as they are
consistent with autonomy of the will, “one that does not agree therewith is forbidden.”100
In the United States’ legal system a connection was made, in the 20th Century,
between autonomy and the notion of the right to bodily integrity. As a legal doctrine,
bodily integrity is the determination that “a person of adult years and sound mind has a
right, in the exercise of control over his body, to determine whether or not to submit to
lawful medical treatment.”101 Justice O’Connor explained that the right to bodily integrity
is grounded in American common law, and firmly entrenched in American tort law.102
Courts have expounded that “the notion of bodily integrity has been embodied in the
requirement that informed consent is generally required for medical treatment.”103
As a legal doctrine with an ethical foundation, informed consent is based on the
ethical value of individual autonomy. According to Beauchamp and Childress, “to respect
an autonomous agent is at a minimum, to acknowledge that person’s right to hold views,
to make choices, and take actions based on personal values and beliefs.”104 Fiduciary
duty and informed consent obligates the physician to the disclosure of information that
enables a competent person to weigh benefits and risks, and make an informed decision
to submit to, or refuse, medical treatment.105
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In research ethics, as evidenced in both clinical medicine and public health, in order
to be ethical, research must be conducted with the informed consent of the individual
participant. Ezekiel Emanuel, and colleagues, detail a number of controversial unethical
research studies since the 19th Century conducted without the voluntary authorization of
the participants. For instance, as part of the yellow fever research in 1897 in Uruguay,
Giuseppe Sanarelli injected five people with a harmful bacillus incteroides agent in an
experiment to induce yellow fever.106 But the most deplorable violations of individual
autonomy were the exploitive Nazi medical experiments that subjected vulnerable people
to compulsory sterilization, euthanasia, and eugenics.107 The Nuremberg Code of 1947
established a requirement for voluntary consent in research practices.
Even after the enactment of the Nuremberg Code, principles of respect for persons
and voluntary consent were not always adhered to in medical experiment protocols. In
1963, Chester Southam, with the collaboration of Dr. Emanuel Mandel, conducted a nontherapeutic immunological study of cancer cells in chronically elderly patients at the
Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital in Brooklyn, New York. Twenty two debilitated
patients were injected with live cultured cancer cells without soliciting for their informed
consent.108 Though Dr. Southam believed that cultured cancer cells posed no risk to the
subjects since they were eventually to be rejected by the immune system, his paternalism
was incompatible with new developments requiring informed consent and patient’s
decisional autonomy.109
Probably no controversial public health research drew such intense public outrage
over disregard for individual autonomy than the Tuskegee Syphilis Experimentation. For
forty years, physician Taliaferro Clark, and colleagues, subjected 600 black men in a non115

therapeutic scientific study to document the effect of untreated syphilis in black males.
The United States Public Health Service (USPHS) did not seek informed consent, and
never informed the men that they had syphilis. The participants were instead told they
were being treated for “bad blood.”110 To entice them to stay in the study, the men were
promised the benefits of a certificate of appreciation: a dollar a year; hot meals and free
transportation on days of examination; and burial stipends.111 According to James Jones,
the USPHS engaged in deception “by withholding critical information about the nature of
their (victims’) illness and the true purpose of study.”112
The notion of disrespect for individual autonomy is not only linked to disregard for
bodily integrity, but also a violation of the dignity of a person.113 The 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) affirmed the inherent dignity of persons as the
basis for freedom, justice, and peace, and as a reason for non-discrimination, as well as a
course for respect for cultural diversity.114 As Donald Evans explains, in the formulations
of the articles of the UDBHR, autonomy provided a convergence point between the
Nuremberg Code (bioethics) and the prominence of autonomy in the UDHR.115
(ii) Solidarity
Whereas autonomy, as understood in the narrow sense in liberal individualism, is
consistent with the pursuance of individual interests, the substantive principle of
solidarity in population health is associated with responsibilities and obligations to
collectively foster the well-being of humanity. Solidarity is “the desire to make common
cause with those in need.”116 In the Report of the International Bioethics Committee of
UNESCO (IBC) on Social Responsibility and Health, solidarity infers membership in a
group and a shared human destiny.117
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The principle of solidarity is formulated in the UDBHR, article 13, as a basis of
advancing the principle of international co-operation.118 The notions of solidarity and cooperation are construed as issuing from fundamental individual freedom, as opposed to
the interpretation of freedom as individualism.119 This freedom is considered as
“personified in a concrete real individual, who is at the same time agent, (and) is
displayed in its singularity and complementarily with the freedom of others.”120 In this
context, it is a freedom that is consistent with the notion of solidarity among human
beings “prior to articulating private interests.”121
According to Howard Brody and Eric Avery, recent pandemic threats and
bioterrorism have drawn attention to the principle of solidarity as an important ethical
indicator towards the kinds of moral responsibilities and commitments physicians, and
other members of society, owe to each other.122 These scholars interpret the physician’s
duty to care as grounded in the concern of social solidarity. Since pandemics pose
significant risks to physicians and health providers due to the inadequacy of scientific
data regarding rates of transmission and mortality, the duty to care should be justified on
the basis of the substantive principle of solidarity rather than on a rigid stance of the
traditional prima facie physician duty to treat.123 As defined in the American Medical
Association (AMA)’s 1847 code, the physician’s duty to treat “is the duty to face the
danger (when pestilence prevails), and to continue their labors for the alleviation of the
suffering, even at the jeopardy of their own lives.”124
The 2001 AMA Principle of Medical Ethics, article VIII, stipulates that the
physician’s responsibility to the patient is paramount. However, article VI of the code
also strikes a compromise by requiring a delicate balance. In so far as it is within the
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provision of appropriate care, Principle VI provides the physicians freedom to choose
whom to serve, and the environment in which to provide medical care, with the exception
of emergencies.125 Ethicists Rosamond Rhodes regards the AMA’s compromise, which
limits the duty to treat, as an unnecessary softening of the assertion of professional ideals
and commitments. For Rhodes, AMA Principle VI “takes back with one hand” what the
statement of professional duty “appears to have given with the other.”126
The principle of solidarity is an alternative way of thinking through the professional
duty to treat, especially during pandemics and epidemic. Since the commitment to this
obligation of rendering treatment in disaster emergencies varies according to proximity,
capability, and level of need, so does the level of commitment vary. Accordingly, “the
greater the need the greater the obligation to assist.”127 Moreover, the basis upon which
physicians are expected to adhere to a professional acceptance of risks in pandemic
disease is the relevant expert knowledge. Such knowledge may be absent in the initial
stages of a pandemic disease, thereby rendering the physician’s acceptance of risks a
matter of heroism rather than a professional moral mandate.
The Pandemic Influenza Working Group of the Joint Center for Bioethics –
University of Toronto invoked the substantive principle of solidarity for purposes of
addressing the health professions’ duty to treat. The Group further identified the
procedural values of reasonableness, open and transparency, inclusivity, and
accountability for balancing the competing values to formulate effective pandemic
policy.128 In this sense, solidarity entails open and honest collaboration, communication,
and cooperation between professionals and the community for the wellbeing of the
vulnerable129
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When the notion of the professionals’ duty to treat is grounded in the substantive
principle of solidarity, the duty to care entails “solidarity (among staff) within the
institution, between health professionals and the community, and the community as a
whole, to the vulnerable members.”130 This interpretation accommodates the diverse
obligations professional groups such as physicians, nurses, kitchen staff, housekeepers,
and other service and support personnel, owe to vulnerable persons and the community
during the pandemic outbreak.131 These commitments pertain to open and honest
communication, and collaboration, in a spirit of common purpose, within and between
health care institutions. Moreover, the spirit of solidarity requires the sharing of public
health information, and the effective coordination of health care deliveries, as well as the
deployment of human and material resources.132
The notion of solidarity as “a communal responsibility to help others,” originates
from “socialist and religious roots.”133 Specifically, the nineteenth century was
characterized by a political philosophy that construed the notions of freedom and liberty
by way of “a clash between (liberal) individualism and socialist collectivism.”134 In
Marxist socialist moral thought, the collective classless humanism, born of
socioeconomic interdependence, was the unit of moral discourse.135 The Marxist socialist
tradition understood rights as social objectives which the state was obligated to secure, as
well as social means, which the state must commit to providing in pursuance of the
material ends.136
For Marxist socialism freedom means liberation of the working class by the
abolishment of the exploitive capitalist system, sustained on (liberal) individualism, and
replacing it with economic collectivism. In this regard, equality would mean social rights
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of members to being guaranteed basic needs, and the contribution to collective goal of
production.137 Collectivity implied not “merely an aggregate of social individuals but
represented in its significance a social and economic interdependence with far-reaching
implications.”138 Specifically, the individual members are understood as “creatures of
social circumstances, acquiring social rights through community affiliation.”139
The liberal position has roots in the Lockean views in which rights are alienated from
the notion of shared responsibilities. Accordingly, “the person enters civil society with
rights, but not bound by a fabric of social responsibilities.”140 Connectedly, in the liberal
Kantian view of the 19th Century, freedom meant “the right to determine one’s own
affairs (self determination).” In the new liberalism of Stuart Mill and Thomas Hill Green,
emphasis is put on “both negative and positive freedoms in the context of capitalist
society.”141 So, freedom is “freedom from interference in the exercise of one’s rights,”
and, “the function of the state is to facilitate the individual exercise of his or her
rights.”142
In Catholic moral thought, the concept of solidarity found its clear articulation in
Catholic social teaching. Pope John XXIII, in the encyclical Mater et Magistra (1961),
taught that “both workers and employees should regulate their mutual relations in
accordance with the principle of human solidarity and Christian brotherhood.”143 He
characterized Marxist class warfare, and, “unrestricted competition in the liberal sense,”
as contrary to the nature of man.144 Pope John XXIII’s teaching followed Pope Pius XI’s
instruction in Quadragesimo Anno (1931) that: “ownership of property must avoid two
extremes: individualism, denying or minimizing the social and public character of the
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right to own property; and collectivism, rejecting or minimizing the private and
individual character of the right to own property. ”145
As defined by Pope John Paul II, in the Encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1985),
solidarity means “a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common
good; (meaning) the good of all and each because we are all really responsible for all.”146
In this sense, solidarity in Catholic moral teaching is in conformity with justice and
charity as the basis of social order. Justice and charity complement each other since,
“charity cannot substitute for justice and justice alone cannot bring people together in
social harmony.”147
The 1994 Synod of Bishops in Africa used the metaphor of “Church as family of
God” to symbolize the self-understanding of the Church in Africa.148 This model
emphasizes solidarity in compliment with other notions, such as care for others,
acceptance, dialogue, and trust.149 The 2003 Symposium of Episcopal Conference of
Africa and Madagascar (SECAM) invoked solidarity to forge collective actions towards
the amelioration of the threat of HIV/AIDS on the African continent.150 The SECAM
Bishops elucidated that solidarity entailed a plan of action which involves making
available the Church’s resources for health care education and social services,
encouraging change of behavior, and personal and shared responsibility.151
The Bishops of Uganda called on all people to respond to the victims of HIV/AIDS,
and their families, with special care, generosity, and courage. They viewed the initiative
to alleviate HIV/AIDS as a call for solidarity, interior purification, and personal
salvation.152 Solidarity with victims of HIV/AIDS is not about feelings only, but
engagement in a variety of ministries to aid the victims. Michel Kamanzi calls this
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initiative an “imperative of solidarity.”153 For personal identity in sub-Saharan Africa
occurs in the context of family interdependence where the “we’ comes before the “I.”154
If family is synonymous with marriage relationships in the African context, some
rights advocates in global HIV coalitions argue that such relationships diminish the
decisional autonomy of vulnerable persons in HIV/AIDS prevention. For these critics,
marriage relationships, in so called poor countries, subordinates women rights, and
provides no pathway to gender equality, or effective prevention of HIV/AIDS.155 For
instance, the development of microbicides has been identified as one way of enhancing
women’s decisional autonomy and gender equality. Accordingly, the development of
user-controlled tools “must expand dramatically and quickly.”156 However, in the absence
of concerted efforts to harmonize autonomous claims with the principle of solidarity as
sustained in interfamily relationships, scientific endeavors alone have not resolved the
vulnerability problem, as demonstrated in the failure of the candidate microbicides CS
clinical trial.
(iii) Common Good
The common good implies “the sum of those conditions of social life which allow
social groups and their individual members, relatively thorough and ready access to their
own fulfillment.”157 According to Benedict Ashley and Kevin D. Rourke, the common
good is the signature fundamental demand of social justice. For the common good entails
love, mercy, and communities of mutual concern and responsibilities.158 The foundational
basis for the common good in Catholic social teaching is the intrinsic value and dignity of
persons created in God’s image.159

122

As observed by Lisa S. Cahill, the encyclical tradition appeals to the notions of basic
equality and dignity of each and every person so as to strike a balance between
individualism and social responsibilities. For Cahill, this vision provides the cornerstone
of social justice in HIV/AIDS crisis, for the individual is construed in terms of having
“inviolable value in himself or herself, while strongly affirming the inherently social
nature of the person.”160 In the Encyclical Pacem in Terris (1963), Pope John XXIII
affirms the rights and duties of each person that are universal, inviolable, and inalienable.
This acceptance further leads to the recognition of an imperative to provide the individual
person with the necessary social services.161
Common good also requires a commitment to the principles of subsidiarity. The
notion of subsidiarity implies the sharing of decision-making power at all various
(vertical) level of local, state, and national (Federal), as well as among other (horizontal)
sectors representing other functions.162 Pope John XXIII expounded that the principle of
subsidiarity “governs the relationship between public authority and individuals, families
and intermediate societies.”163
Communitarian theorists, such as Michael Walzer, and Dan Beauchamp, attach great
importance to the principle of common good, particularly for the safeguard of the
communal needs of health and safety.164 In this sense common good means interests held
in common by the people (or the public). Beauchamp draws this definition from the
interpretation of the US Constitutional tradition whereof common good refers to “the
welfare of individuals considered as a group, the public or the people generally, the body
politic or the commonwealth ...”165 Common good is then the basis for the regulatory
police powers that subordinate individual liberty interests to “protect compelling
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community interests.”166 Subsequently, public health and safety are community or group
interests, and not simply aggregates of each individual’s interests in health and safety. 167

C. Procedural Standards of Necessity, Reasonableness, Proportionality and Harm
Avoidance
(i) Specification of Substantive Principles
The Rev. David Jacobson controversy arose because he was unconvinced of
Massachusetts’ public health authorities’ arguments for imposing compulsory vaccination
to protect population health and safety against smallpox. All that mattered to Rev.
Jacobson was whether there were safeguards in place to protect his liberty interests. He
regarded the compulsory vaccination law as an invasion of his right to self
determination.168 He argued that “the execution of such a law against one who objects to
vaccination ... is nothing short of an assault upon his person.”169
The tension between the promotion of individual interests, such as of Rev. Jacobson’s
liberty claims and the population interests prioritized by the public health initiatives,
cannot be resolved by appealing to solely foundational ethical theories, such as
libertarianism or utilitarianism. The most effective pathway is to seek balance between
conflicting principles that accrue from a commitment to these foundational ethical
theories.
The balancing of conflicting principles, for instance, involves the interpretation and
specification of individual autonomy issuing form libertarian approaches and common
good resulting from a commitment to population welfare. When it is established that a
commitment to individual autonomy prioritizes privacy and confidentiality, while a
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commitment to common good prioritizes collaboration and communication, there is a
need to explore the scope and meaning attached to these notions for purposes of
determining aspects that increase or decrease conflict.170
In the 2005 PA’s IPRP draft, the Pennsylvania Department of Health justified
invoking the police powers of the state to prevent and suppress pandemic disease (for the
common good) as a constitutional mandate.171 Following this reasoning, the Pennsylvania
State’s 2005 pandemic influenza draft guideline provided for the imposition of restrictive
control measure, in certain circumstances, such as mandatory reporting of contact
persons, isolation, quarantine, and civil confinement.172 Those measures restrict the
individual’s freedom of assembly, consent, and privacy. In the context of conflicting
principles such as these, the importance of interpretation, and specifying the meaning of
competing substantive principles, cannot be underestimated.
Let us, for instance, take Hans Haugen’s specification and interpretation of the
concept of reduced autonomy as increased vulnerability. The understanding that
“autonomy can defer considerably between individuals” means that “those with reduced
autonomy have the highest vulnerability.”173 The implication regarding public health
coercive policy, in the event of the influenza pandemic, is that these decisions impact
people at different levels of vulnerability. According to Hans Haugen, vulnerability is
“person-specific, condition-specific and situation-specific.”174 Therefore, interpreting
vulnerability is useful for purposes of understanding and demonstrating insufficient
autonomy.175
In the absence of concerted effort to minimize individual vulnerability, the use of
coercive measures is incompatible with the goal of promoting the common good. The
125

justification for overriding legitimate interests of the individual should be by way of a
substantive (good reasons) and procedural process. Even then, the Supreme Court in the
United States has provided guidance with three levels of scrutiny in constitutional law to
assess the importance of the individual interests at stake.176 The categories are strict
scrutiny (most rigorous), intermediate scrutiny, and the minimum rationality (least
rigorous). A strict scrutiny applies when coercive laws classify by categories such as
gender, race, or national origin. Of importance here is the need to prevent the
advancement of public health statutes that are reflective of prejudice and antipathy.
The process of negotiating balance between individual and population interests does
not only require the understanding and interpretation of competing substantive principles,
but also benchmarks, such as procedural standards of necessity, reasonable,
proportionality, and harm avoidance. An example of the application of these standards is
the Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) case that defended the population health interests,
while imposing constitutional limitation on public health authority.177 Other sources, such
as the Toronto Joint Center for Bioethics, included these standards in their listing of
substantive and procedural values.178
(ii) Application of the Procedural Standards
The procedural standard of public health necessity, reasonableness, proportionality,
and harm avoidance are suitable tools for negotiating balance between the conflicting
substantive principles. When utilized, either on their individual merit or complimenting
each other, these procedural standards provide benchmarks for the process of
interpretation and balancing of conflicting principles.

126

Public health necessity infers that the use of coercive and mandatory restrictive public
health measures can only be justified, in limited application, when essential to protect the
health and safety of the public. Even in this case, moral considerations require the least
infringement reasonably adequate for the control, and containment, of the contagious
disease.179 If a general moral consideration is to be infringed upon, there should be a
strong reason for not adopting alternative strategies that are less invasive.180 Reasoning
must be evidence-based on plausible, and consistent, credible scientific data, as well as
political, and ethical considerations.
Necessity here implies “the necessity of the case.” In his critique of the original 2003
MSEHPA, George Annas invoked the necessity argument questioning what problem the
proposed mandatory laws of isolation, quarantine and confinement sought to resolve
given that “proposed laws should respond to real problem.”181 Annas argues that the
authors of the proposed coercive laws assumed that physicians and citizens are not likely
to cooperate with public health authorities when bioterrorism attack occurs. Moreover,
the effectiveness of these coercive measures is assumed for all forms of public health
emergencies involving bioterrorism and pandemics. Annas’ point is that “trade-offs
between civil rights and public health measures are (case specific), not always required
and can be counterproductive.”182 For Annas, better planning, coordination and
cooperation is more helpful than targeting the restriction of civil liberties.183
In Uganda, the ABC-PEPFAR program attracted foreign and domestic proponents of
competing principles (individual autonomy and common good) bent on introducing
unnecessary measures. The enactment of laws that punish gay activities for the purpose
of preventing HIV/AIDS is not a necessary public health measure since there are other
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effective means such as education, collaboration and coordination. Likewise, the
imposition of punitive measures such as withholding foreign-aid to cause Uganda to
prioritize gay interests, are unnecessary measures for purposes of HIV/AIDS prevention.
The procedural standard of reasonableness refers to “reasonable means.” Negatively,
measures are unreasonable if they do not diminish the public health emergency threat.
Probably the most recent example of unreasonable means is the 2001 nevirapine case in
South Africa. The South Africa government restricted the use of nevirapine for the
prevention of mother-to-child HIV transmission though the manufacturers were willing to
avail it for free, given a high annual mother-to-child HIV infection rate of approximately
70,000 infants.184 The government’s 2001 policy that limited access to nevirapine to two
study sites in each province prevented physicians elsewhere from prescribe a medically
indicted HIV preventive drug.185
In 2001, the High Court of South Africa ruled that government’s restriction of
nevirapine to a limited number of pilot sites was “not reasonable and is an unjustifiable
barrier to the realization of the right to health care.”186 The court ruling was in accord
with the South African (post-apartheid) constitution which states that “The State must
take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve
the progressive realization of each of these rights (access to health care, water, food, and
social assistance).”187
In poor countries, such as Uganda, where in 2010 as many as 540,000 people were
eligible for antiretroviral therapy but only 240,000 received treatment, donor funding
makes a difference. Thankfully, the United States’ PEPFAR program contributed to
about 70 per cent of the HIV programs in Uganda.188 Without donor funding many
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people with HIV/AIDS would remain untreated. For this reason, the anti-funding
campaigns that seek to restrict donor funding, so essential for the alleviation of
HIV/AIDS suffering in Uganda, is an unreasonable population health strategy. 189
The procedural standard of proportionality is a balancing ethical tool that renders a
public health measure permissible if the benefit outweigh the infringed interest.190 Public
health measures that impose excessive burdens, yet offer comparatively little benefit,
ought to be avoided. Mandatory measures ought to be by the least restrictive means
necessary to manage the public health danger. The Toronto Joint Center for Bioethics
pandemic working group referred to proportionality as a requirement that “restrictions to
individual liberty and measures taken to protect the public from harm should not exceed
what is not necessary to address the actual level of risk to or critical need of the
community.”191
In research ethics, an intervention is proportionate when sufficient evidence has been
adduced that the study is consistent with sound scientific design, and the potential for
clinical benefit, or social value outweighs the risk to participants. The Nuremberg code
disallows research whereby there are prior reasons to believe that “death or disabling
injury will occur.”192 But regarding minimal risks, Institution Review Boards (IRB) are
generally tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that “research interventions do not
pose excessive net risks” to participants.193
Research regulating bodies generally rely on two types of standards for assessing risk
benefit standards. One standard categorizes research as therapeutic or non-therapeutic.
The second standard uses the direct benefit standard. In the case of therapeutic
interventions, only those interventions that satisfy clinical equipoise are permitted. For
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non-therapeutic research (even of no interest to the participant), net-risk (reasonable
risks) is justified on the basis of social values to be gained.194
Research regulating bodies that rely on the direct benefit standard, rather than the
therapeutic/non-therapeutic standard, mandate additional safeguards in research that do
not offer a sufficient prospect of direct benefit to participants.195 For instance, the U.S.
federal regulations that govern human-subject research, “Common Rule” require that the
IRB not only ensures fair subject selection and informed consent, but also that risks to
subjects “are minimized,” and “are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits.”196
The United States Public Health Services (USPHS), for instance, requires additional
protection for children participants in research that offers no prospect for direct benefit to
them, yet could yield generalizable knowledge regarding the subject’s condition. The
additional safeguards include the requirement that IRB’s establish that “the risk
represents a minor increase over minimal risk,” and the adequate provisions for seeking
children assent and parent permission.197
According to Alex London, if an “IRB finds that the risks associated with a particular
study are not reasonable then it is unethical even to offer participation to potential
subjects.”198 Risks are considered to be reasonable “when they are offset or outweighed
by the anticipated benefits of the research.”199 The two types of benefits considered
important enough to justify tradeoff are potential benefits to the individual participant,
and potential benefits for other individuals, or the community.200 However, in the absence
of clear criteria for determining the specification and the value of knowledge that
override individual participant’s interests, critics have pointed out the danger of
arbitrariness.201
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London’s proposed criterion for establishing reasonable risks to individual
participants is:
…. the least amount of intrusion into the interests of participants that is necessary
in order to facilitate sound scientific inquiry and … are consistent with an equal
regard for the basis interests of study participants and the members of the larger
community whose interests that research is intended to serve.202
This consideration addresses the need for scientific rigor, and justification for subjecting
participants to only what is necessary for sound scientific inquiry. Moreover, the
motivation for securing best interests of others (research endeavor), versus the best
interests of the individual, is determined with the same moral concern.203
London provided helpful guidance towards what counts as a reasonable balance
between the interests of individual research participants, and interests in potential future
science benefits. He proposes “conceptual and operational clarity,” in addition to “an
appropriate balance of relevant moral concerns,” and, “theoretical unit in scope of
applicability.”204 Conceptual clarity entails clearly defining what is meant by reasonable
risk, and a normative justification of the definition. In addition, there is a need for
delineating the boundaries that separate reasonable from excessive risks, and set practical
benchmarks to assess favorable outcomes.205
The procedural standard of harm avoidance implies that public health providers
should seek the least infringement. The goal of the proposed intervention should be the
promotion of wellbeing, and not the overburdening of individuals. The control measures
“should not pose an undue health risk to its subjects.”206 The CS microbicide trial case is
an example of a public health research initiative that caused undue harm to the
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participants. The non-therapeutic Phase III clinical trial exposed HIV sero-negative
women to a high risk of HIV sero-positive conversion. Though the research was justified
on the basis of its potential social values, there were questions regarding scientific rigor
and whether the risks to participants were reasonable.
Ezekiel Emanuel and Christine Grady identified a trend by research activists,
beginning in the 1980s, of asserting “an autonomous right to try risky but potentially
beneficial treatments” – a right that they claimed should trump regulatory protectionism
and paternalism.207 Starting particularly with HIV experimental interventions, the model
of “protectionism” was categorized as an injustice that should be replaced with ensuring
(the right to) individual access.208 The harmful outcome of the candidate CS microbicide
trial underlines the dangers of absolute rights claims against protected, experimental
scientific endeavors. The development justifies a need for a new approach that
harmonizes the rights and safety interests of individuals with society interests, by way of
negotiating between the underlying substantive and procedural principles.

D. MIEM and The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights
(i) Human Rights Advocacy and Reductionism
The concept of human rights derives from the inherent and inviolable dignity of a
person. Human rights are considered to be equal and inalienable rights of all human
beings.209 In this context, a human right is defined as “a principle of justification with
respect to what is due each person and which each person must dutifully respect in others,
in virtue of being a human being.”210 But, as commented on by Alan Rosenbaum, the
determination of the meaning of a human rights concept hinges on the security of the
132

foundation (moral or otherwise) on which it is developed. Consequently, in global human
rights discourse, the interpretation of the concept of human rights, particularly from the
philosophical and political perspectives, “is not univocal.”211
There is convergence in international human rights philosophical discourse on the
justification of the universal relevance of human rights based on the inviolability of the
dignity of a person. But the common misnomer is assuming that “human rights are
synonymous with natural rights, individual rights, social rights, or community rights.”212
This confusion happens because of the interconnectedness of the philosophical features
of human rights with political considerations. Even though these terms are products of the
evolutionary history of human rights philosophy, and politics, they are component rightscategories conforming to “different facets of the human rights idea.”213
Human rights are “rights held on the basis of one’s nature as a human being.”214 From
a philosophical perspective John Locke’s natural rights theory was vital to the evolution
of the human rights concept. But Locke was influenced by the natural law tradition which
has roots in Thomas Aquinas. Though Thomas Aquinas did not specifically develop a
concept of human rights, his explication of the natural law ethics in Summa Theologiae,
I-II qq. 90-7, inspired future development of the foundations of moral and legal rights.
Having defined law as “an ordinance of reason, for the common good, made by him
who has care of the community and promulgated,” Thomas Aquinas went on to
distinguish between natural law, eternal law, human or positive law, and divine law.215
Accordingly, natural law is “the participation of the eternal law in the rational
creature.”216 But human reason can only grasp certain general principles of the perfect
divine reason, thereby restricting natural law to general precepts. This requires
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supplementation by human laws, which “are particular specifications of the general
precepts of natural law.”217 This distinction is important because Thomas Aquinas
considers an act to be right “because it is in accord with the requirements of human
nature, not because it is reducible to a divine command.”218
The transition from the understanding of natural law as “merely a natural set of
objective norm,” to natural law as “protective of subjective interests and rights of
individual interests,” occurred in Locke’s rationalism.219 Unlike Thomas Hobbes, for
whom the state of nature prior to any form of government was ungoverned by moral law,
Locke claimed that in the state of nature, “the individual possesses by nature, the right to
life, liberty and property.”220 This law of nature, according to Locke, is given by God.
These natural rights, however, “must be exercised within the substantive moral limits set
by natural law.”221 In the state of nature, the natural (human) rights are morally
inviolable, but enforceable only in a civil society that is obligated to protect those rights
through the social contract.222
The European Enlightenment through the 1700s was characterized by dominance of
natural rights theory that underscored the individual’s autonomy of reason and
morality.223 The French and the American revolutions gave prominence to the idea of
“equality before the law.”224 Fuelled by the “Age of reason,” the European philosophy
had a single mission of “the liberation of the individual from absolute authority and of
human reason from dogma.”225 This development is more explicitly demonstrated in
Kantian moral thought, following in the tradition of the Enlightenment rationalism of
philosophers such as Hugo Grotius and Locke.
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For Kant, the moral worth of an action lies not on the effects expected (utilitarian) or
pragmatic consideration, but a prior in the virtuous will of a rational individual.226 If the
principle that rational nature exists as an end in itself holds true for the individual, then it
applies universally to all rational beings. This principle has implications for our
responsibility to others, as a duty, to treat them as ends in themselves, and not as means
to an end. Kant thereby regards autonomy (self-determination) as “the basis of the dignity
of human and of every rational nature.”227
Stuart Mill’s liberal formulation of individualism has had strong influence on the civil
and political components of the evolution of human rights theory.228 For Stuart Mill, if
liberty means anything, the individual is absolute in pursuit of his own interests, such as
freedom of thought and feelings, opinion, speech, and assembly. Moreover, “each
(individual) is the proper guardian of his health, whether bodily or mental and
spiritual.”229
Stuart Mill argued that in the era of expansive political communities and the
separation of spiritual and temporal authority, there was no justification for society’s
encroachment on the power of the individual.230 The limits of the sovereignty of the
individual over himself, and to which society is justified to impose its jurisdiction, is
conduct that prejudicially affects the interests of others. Society’s disinterested,
benevolent actions to promote the well-being of one another are encouraged, if they are
by means of conviction and persuasion, and aimed at promoting self-regarding virtues.231
Nineteenth century socialism introduced an aspect of collectivism which conflicted
with liberal individualism in the natural rights discourse. Karl Marx characterized the
natural rights idea as “the ideological expression of bourgeois egoism and social
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antagonism.”232 Accordingly, the declaration of the universal rights of man by modern
states established an instrument of partiality in favor of the bourgeois rights.233 Equal
rights here meant rights of inequality, since “the equality consists in the fact that
measurement is made with an equal standard, labor,” for unequal individuals.234
Thus Marx rejected the abstract individualism of human rights because he perceived
those rights as based on antagonistic relationships. The proletarian socialist revolution
would establish egalitarian relationships and remove the need for human rights. But
before that accomplishment, the abolishment of human rights would not serve a good
purpose since society will revert to a worse stage of despotism.235
According to Jack Donnelly, the post-Marx socialist critique of the Western
interpretation of human rights focused on the Western emphasis on civil and political
rights, and how those rights are practiced regarding the relationship between rights and
duties.236 The argument is against severing the two human rights sets of ICCPR and the
ICESCR. Some critics in Asian and developing countries lambast the sole use of Western
standards of liberalism and democracy to determine human rights performance in those
countries. The approach is seen as advancing a reductionist overemphasis of legal rights,
and narrow benefits that ignores the socio-cultural aspects of human rights. Moreover,
developing countries are mischaracterized as too pre-occupied with survival and
development issues to afford individual rights.237
In the 1990s, as observed by Kieran Donaghue, humanitarian international
organizations such as Medecins San Frontier, and developmental international
organizations such as Oxfam, began to explore and incorporate rights-based approaches
to development. Likewise, international human rights organizations, such as Amnesty
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International and Human Rights Watch, became attentive to the importance of
reconciling civil and political rights with social, economic and cultural rights.238 The shift
came as a response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic when consensus begun to emerge that
health and human rights conditions are interrelated.
Since their founding and before the global HIV epidemics, international human rights
organizations, such as Amnesty International and the United States-based Human Rights
Watch, advocated for civil and political rights of vulnerable people, particularly in less
developed countries; though, the ICCPR was ratified only in 1992 by the United
States.239 Of concern were the right to liberty, and freedoms of: movement, association,
expression and religion. The sister treaty ICESCR was largely ignored by conventional
human rights movements for its perceived disregard for private property. Since economic
rights were suspect, the prevailing advocacy methodology and strategies were deemed as
not suitable for pursuance of economic goals.240
As evidenced in the ABC and PEPFAR tension, the harmonization of the political and
civil categories with the social, economic, and cultural components of human rights is
still an elusive goal. Much of the tension in Uganda’s HIV/AIDS prevention strategy, as
prioritized by Western advocates, hinges on emphasis on the political perspective of
human rights as civil and political rights.241 This development is consistent with Alan
Rosenbaum’s explication that some political theorists think of human rights in a political
sense, independent from other considerations. Others consider human rights as “broader
than its political signification.”242 Still other political theorists “generally consider the
political perspective on human rights as derivative from, but as important as, one or more
of the other foundational principles.”243
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Right from their founding, organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, used a
confrontational approach of “investigate, expose and shame” that targeted mostly
governments in developing countries to pressure them into compliance with, and
promotion of, civil and political rights.244 The approach was in some cases effectively
used to secure the rights of vulnerable persons in oppressive regimes. When HIV/AIDS
became a global menace, human rights advocates reversely used the shaming strategy on
pharmaceutical companies, and the United States government, to secure funds and drugs
for HIV prevention and treatment in resource-challenged countries.245
For instance, the Global Access Project (HealthGAP) compelled President Clinton’s
administration to support the production of low-cost, generic alternative drugs for HIV
treatment in poor countries. This was done by exposing the administration’s role in
“protecting U.S. pharmaceutical companies from actions by foreign governments to
obtain access to low-cost generic alternatives for treating HIV/AIDS.”246 One of the inyour-face confrontation scenes, as pointed out by Holly Burkhalter, was the taunting at
Vice President Gore’s campaign events with “flinging blood-drenched pills, waving
signs, and chanting.”247
In the global multi-cultural community, particularly poor countries that lack health
resources and infrastructure, a solely narrow strategy of generating outrage and shaming
do not guarantee the goals of equality and adequate access to HIV treatment. Starting in
the 1990s, health and human rights advocates made a strategic shift by making a
compelling argument to developed countries to share resources for the provision of
needed care for those afflicted with HIV/AIDS in poor resource countries.248 Gavin
Yamey and Rankin argued that wealthy countries must act justly, to address the economic
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imbalance in poor countries devastated with HIV, by providing the money needed to fight
the epidemic. These measures involve scaling up antiretroviral drugs, vaccine research,
empowerment of women, and the care of the AIDS orphaned children.249
The United Nations, in 2001, established a Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria. Other international organizations, such as the World Health Organization,
followed suit by scaling up antiretroviral treatment. It had occurred that by 1998 an
estimated 33 million people worldwide had HIV infection or AIDS. Out of the estimated
new 5.8 million HIV infections that occurred worldwide in 1998, more than 95 percent
were in developing countries.250 In 2003 President George W. Bush launched the
PEPFAR initiative with a goal of expanding treatment to more people in the most HIV
affected countries in Africa.251
Despite the out-pouring of global solidarity by some donors, skeptics questioned
whether all donor partners were prepared to respond to local needs of the people, rather
than their own interest.252 As it turned out, the ABC-PEPFAR program in Uganda was
subjected to meticulous scrutiny by advocates of competing human rights perspectives to
assess its commitment to interests such as condoms, sex orientation, and abstinence only
programs.253
Though human rights advocates rightly emphasized government responsibility to
protest and promote the greater realization of human rights, some at times misrepresented
human rights. As Jack Donnelly points out, “violations of human rights are denials of
one’s humanity rather than deprivation of one’s needs.”254 The focus by civil liberties
advocates, in the case of Uganda HIV prevention strategy, was often on the need for
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condoms supply, or legal enforcement to protect or suppress homosexuality trumping
other considerations.
One of the cultural perspectives in the fights against HIV/AIDS is the role of the
marriage institution. Jonathan Cohen and Tony Tate rightly addressed the issue of
violation of women’s human rights in the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda, but, again they
viewed the civil liberties (rights) perspective of human rights as irreconcilable with the
cultural perspectives of marriage. These critics argued against the focus on the institution
of marriage in Uganda as protective of HIV.255 Cohen and Tate claimed that:
Indeed, the suggestion that marriage provides a safeguard against HIV may
amount to death for women and girls. Uganda women face a high risk of HIV in
marriage as a result of polygamy and infidelity among their husbands, combined
with human rights abuse such as domestic violence, marital rape, and wife
inheritance.256
There is no justification for downplaying marital infidelity and sexual violence
against women in Uganda. But, to appear to suggest that HIV infection among Ugandan
women results from endemic violent and sexual proclivities of Ugandan men is depictive
of a cultural bias. In fact, if most sex encounters were coerced, the HIV prevalence rate
would be much higher than 6.2 percent in a population of thirty three million. The claim
only served to confirm that stereotyping about Africa sexuality is still prevalent in the
thought processes of some Western human rights advocates as they confront HIV/AIDS
prevention strategies, in communitarian-oriented, sub-Saharan African countries.257
The trend by some Western human rights advocates was to approach the HIV/AIDS
prevention campaign in Uganda by avoiding complex moral discourse regarding the
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interplay between health, human rights, and socio-cultural issues, and instead focus
narrowly on condoms availability, abstinence only, or gay and anti-gay tension. Such
focus has given rise to human rights reductionism. When human rights advocates turn to
pursuing policies that prioritize partial, narrow benefits, or legal positivism, they abscond
from the responsibility of promoting collective human flourishing.
Reductionism proceeds by the “replacement or explanation of one phenomenon by
another reality of a different nature, one supposedly simpler or more fundamental.”258
Richard Jones further elucidates that:
This process (reductionism) may be a direct substitution of realities or the
specification of the real causes at work in the phenomenon. In either case, our
picture of what is actually real in a phenomenon has to change: the “whole” is no
more than the sum of its “parts,” and, indeed the ultimate “parts” alone are real.259
To further explore the meaning of reductionism, let us for instance take the claim that
individual autonomy is unrelated to the notion of human dignity. Dignity, then, is
declared “a useless concept,” which “means no more than respect for persons or their
autonomy.”260 Ruth Macklin, for instance, claims that “appeals to dignity are either vague
restatement of other, more precise, notions or mere slogans that add nothing to an
understanding of the topic.”261 Accordingly, dignity is not real for the ethical analysis of
medical practice or research since, there are no criteria for establishing when dignity has
been violated.262 For reductionists, what is reducible to something else is not fully real.
For Macklin, the use of the notion “human dignity” in religious sources, and as
applied in the language of the UDHR and other European Council documents,
inadequately suffice for its application and relevance in medical treatment and
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research.263 It appears that, for Macklin, what is real should be analyzable. Subsequently,
there is no criterion for analyzing human dignity in medical ethics. What is real, for
Macklin, is autonomy, or respect for the persons, because these notions involve “the need
to obtain voluntary, informed consent; the requirement for confidentiality; and the need
to avoid discrimination and abusive practices.”264
Reductionism is also evidenced in the definition of human rights as “gay rights are
human rights and human rights are gay rights.”265 No doubt discrimination based on
sexual orientation is against the dignity of persons, and subsequently a violation of
human rights, but to claim that human rights and gay rights are essentially
indistinguishable is to make the whole no more than the parts. The inviolability of human
rights is justified on the basis of the inherent dignity of each and every person (the
whole), but not on whether one is gay or heterosexual (the parts).
Let us consider another example of the claim that participation in clinical research is a
right. This view is compatible with Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian reductionism. As
commented on by Jack Donnelly, Bentham argued that “rights are merely beneficial
obligations.” Accordingly, “being the intended beneficiary of an obligation is a necessary
and sufficient condition for the possession of a right.”266 Rights are thus established, or
granted, by “imposing obligations or by abstaining from imposing them.”267
Legal positivism commits to a form of reductionism that acknowledges no point of
intersection between law and morals. The separation thesis, as proposed by Hart, implies
the severing of legal orders from moral values.268 As Carl Schmitt, and colleagues, argues
that American legal positivists “severe moral substance from form.”269 This is because,
they see the separation thesis as having a moral playoff – “it enables the individual
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citizen to decide on the merits of the law free from the constraints of an ideology which
holds that law is legitimate.”270 Moreover, as they suggest, “the separation thesis
facilitates conscientious judgment by the good liberal citizen.”271
Legal positivism as reductionism appears to apply to the form of human rights
advocacy that prioritizes the legal system over moral foundations in HIV prevention
strategies in Uganda.272 In this case, laws are prioritized over the moral force of empathy
and altruism in HIV/AIDS prevention strategies. So the individual citizen is “free” to
decide on the best course to take in HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment on the merit of
the laws, rather than on moral values.
According to Richard Jones, the term “reductionism” was introduced in the mid-20th
century. However, the reductionism versus anti-reductionism controversy has roots in
Greek philosophical thought and in19th century scientific revolution.273 Greek thought
was more speculative in approach and focused on “what is the ultimate nature of things
(the issues of substantive reductionism).”274 In Newtonian physics, the application of
Euclidean geometry focuses more on “how things interact and what kind of parts they
were composed of (the issue of structural reductionism).”275 This development resulted in
a fundamental distinction between the speculative and experience, as well as appearance
and reality.
Richard Jones further elucidates that modern philosophical thought involves issues of
structural, theoretical, and methodological reductionism. This shift was motivated by
interests in “analysis of phenomenon and more empirical (rather than a priori) approaches
to theorizing.”276 In science, Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace advanced the biological
theory of natural selection, leading to the later evolutionary idea of random mutation
143

within genetic material. Subsequently, reductionist controversy in science revolves
around “reductive versus holistic explanations and methods in biology and the social
sciences.”277
Reductionism has emerged as an issue requiring attention as human rights and global
health engage the global multi-cultural communities over universality and plurality, the
primary and the secondary, holism, and fundamental parts. Given the plurality of
cultures, and the diversity of moral vision, the most effective pathway to balancing
individual and population interests in pandemic and epidemics is the use of bioethics
principles approach, as suggested by UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and
Human Rights document.
As HIV/AIDS became a global epidemic in the 1980s, and as a global coalition
emerged, the harsh reality of inequalities related to economic, social, and physical
infrastructures, were exposed. The goal of promoting global health was hampered by
“poverty and lack of access to healthcare services.”278 The 1997 WHO Fourth
International Conference on Health Promotion, held in Jakarta, recommended a global
initiative to promote social responsibilities for health. Later WHO Conferences in 2001
and 2005 underlined the importance of clarity about responsibilities and rights, and
recommended that governments make the amelioration of poor health and inequality a
policy priority.279
When the UDBHR was formulated in 2005, the principle of social responsibility and
health was included. A consensus emerged that: “… for the improvement of global health
conditions, bioethics should address at the same time the moral values that actually guide
the behavior of individuals and communities and the moral values and priorities that
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should guide public health on these values.”280 A link was made in global health between
inequalities, cultural and moral diversity, and the promotion of wellbeing.
Article 12 of the UDBHR acknowledged and addressed the reality of diversity and
plurality of cultures. The notion of respect for cultural diversity was understood, as
reaffirmed in the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (UDCD) adopted in 2001.
The preamble stipulated that:
… culture should be regarded as a set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual
and emotional features of society or a social group and that it encompasses …
lifestyles, way of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.281
However, though there is interdependence between cultural diversity and human rights,
the universality of human rights guarantees that cultural expressions do not infringe on
human dignity, for all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
Bioethics principles, as set out in the UDBHR, are considered in the context of
complementariness and interrelatedness.282 These principles are a result of linkages
between science and politics, intercultural views, and diverse religious traditions. The
bioethics principles stipulated in the document represent a global perspective because
they have been adopted by governments committed to their implementation.283 The
heuristic nature of these general principles provides a framework for various
interpretations, and applications, of commonly shared moral experience, in the context of
human rights.284 The UDBHR bioethics approach seeks a balance between individualistic
and communitarian moral perspectives by anchoring the principles in human dignity and
fundamental freedoms.285
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(ii) MIEM as Balancing Criterion
Recent population health initiative towards containing threats to global health have
given rise to advocacy for developing policies that promote health while providing
safeguards to individual and universal rights. Article 27 and article 22 of the UDBHR
require limiting conflicting principles to provide for balance between individualistic and
communitarian interests, in situations such as pandemics and epidemics.286 This
dissertation provides Mixed Interests Ethics Model (MIEM) as a criterion to balance
individual and population interests when principles conflict.
The MIEM criterion draws substantive principles as provided in the UDBHR to
negotiate a balance between individual and population interests in pandemics and
epidemics. Mandatory vaccination, for instance, may be regarded as infringing on the
individual’s autonomy interests while the measure may be considered by others in terms
of solidarity for the safeguard of population health interests. Balancing autonomy and
solidarity requires the specification of these conflicting principles to establish their scope,
meaning, and areas of possible harmonization.
The interpretation of substantive ethical principles concern: a consideration of the
meaning and range of scope so as to determine what interpretation increases or reduces
conflict; and the strength of the principle so as to determine considerations that yields to
others, in case of conflict. For instance, the meaning and range of the scope of the
substantive principle of autonomy involves consent, voluntariness, and privacy.287 The
meaning and scope of the substantive principle of solidarity involve equity, collaboration,
communication, and coordination.288 Common good involves social relationships,
interdependence, mutual concern, and responsibility.289
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For instance, the first major work the International Bioethics Committee (IBC) of
UNESCO undertook after the adoption of the UDBHR was an elaborate interpretation,
and specification, of the principle of informed consent, as derived from autonomy and
stipulated in articles 6 and 7 of the declaration.290 In the narrow sense informed consent is
understood as the voluntary, autonomous authorization by a person to a medical
professional to initiate, or not to initiate, to proceed or not to proceed, with the proposed
medical or research plan.291 In the broader sense, informed consent is closely connected
with the principle of autonomy and dignity.292 Autonomy implies respect for the person’s
rights to hold views, and make choices based on those beliefs.293
The essential features of informed consent are adequate disclosure of information,
decisional capacity, comprehension (knowledge), voluntariness, and consent of the
person.294 The condition of being informed requires that a person is given clear
information concerning, for instance, diagnosis, prognosis, the nature and process of the
procedure or treatment, possible risks and benefits of recommended intervention, benefits
and burdens of reasonable alternative intervention, and, anticipated outcome in terms of
benefits and risks.295
Comprehension requires competence, which implies the ability to communicate
choices, understand relevant information, and manipulate information rationally.
Information needs to be communicated in ways a person can understand, regardless of
barriers. Voluntariness means being free from external coercion, or moral manipulation,
over and above the limitations arising from circumstances. As for persons without
decisional capacity, article 7 of the UDBHR requires the protection and promotion of
their best interests, as in accordance with domestic law.296
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Courts in the United States established that incompetent persons have the same right
of self-determination as competent individuals, since the value of human dignity applies
to both competent and incompetent. A surrogate acts on behalf of an incompetent
individual to exercise the right to refuse medical interventions. The In re Conroy (1985)
case set the “subjective” (substituted judgment) standards and the “best interests”
standards for determining the exercise of those rights. The substituted judgment applies
when there is clear evidence that the incompetent person would have exercised it, and the
best interest standards is when such judgment is lacking.297 All these measures are put in
place to protect and enhance individual, autonomous decision-making.
But as pointed out by the UNESCO’s IBC, public health control and prevention
measures, such as those in the influenza pandemic could interfere with the right of selfdetermination of the individual.298 For the protection of public health, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others, for instance, article 27 justifies a balance
by the imposition of some limitations to the competing principles set in the UDBHR.299
Challenging ethical issues, as considered by World Health Organization, may involve
measures, such as quarantine, and mandatory immunization that restricts individual
freedoms.300 But, as recommended, laws that limit principles ought to be consistent with
human rights laws, in respect to the fundamental freedoms and dignity of the human
person.301
According to Ten Have, the need for balance was underlined in the early stages of
UNESCO’s IBC discussions in 2004, when it was emphasized that “it was necessary to
strike a balance between the principles of autonomy (emphasizing individual decisionmaking) and the place accorded to family and solidarity among human beings by
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particular religious and cultural traditions.”302 In later discussions a distinction was made
between “fundamental principles” (that cannot be derogated), derived principles (justified
by one or more fundamental principles), and, procedural principles (setting frameworks
or rules to follow).303 The claim of this dissertation regarding substantive and procedural
principles is consistent with the IBC’s elucidation of fundamental, derived, and
procedural principles.
For instance, in the influenza pandemic crisis the State of Pennsylvania included in its
2005 draft plan a mandate, in some circumstances, of the temporal isolation of influenza
stricken persons or quarantine contacts.304 Those measures restrict peoples’ freedoms and
liberties. In health care practice individual liberty is enshrined in the substantive ethical
principle of autonomy. The scope of the meaning of autonomy is diverse, and includes
notions such as self-governance, liberty rights, individual choice, consent and privacy.305
But, in the epidemiological model, the foundational principle of public health rests in the
obligation to protect the health and safety of the population.306 This approach generates
principles such as solidarity. The meaning of solidarity encompasses collaboration in the
spirit of common purpose, openness, honesty, cooperation, and coordination.
Following the interpretation of the meaning and scope of moral determination of
these substantive principles, the balancing of individual and population interests further
entails negotiating between, for instance, self-governance and collaboration. This stage of
negotiating between self-governance and collaboration requires the utilization of
procedural standards, such as necessity, reasonableness, proportionality, and harm
avoidance. Applying the procedural standards provides benchmarks, and enables the
process of determining which considerations yield to others in case of conflict.307 The
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importance of articulating these procedural standards to serve as benchmarks is that they
put into perspective the requirements for the values of professionalism, integrity, and
transparency as in article 18 of the UDBHR.308
Let us consider for instance the balancing between autonomous decision-making and
community solidarity by engaging the procedural standard of necessity to effect
mandatory examination, and testing, of suspected influenza infected persons. As provided
in the MSEHPA, article VI, section 602 (b), and the PA’s draft IPRP, government
coercive powers, or criminalization, may be applied on non-compliant individuals.309 But,
such coercive measure may be unnecessary if specifications, such as information,
cooperation, and coordination as in the principles of autonomy and solidarity, are
harmonized to strike a balance between individual and population health interests.
Restrictive measures are considered necessary if they are the least infringements essential
for the protection of the health and safety of the population.
To determine actions that are of least infringement, values such as information,
collaboration, and communication, as specified from principles such as informed consent
and solidarity, must be adequately (in the circumstances) considered. George Annas
makes a compelling argument that we live in an era of vast scientific advancement,
professionalism, and better health facilities, which make coercive measures distasteful.310
The new tools of social media, including web-based and mobile technologies, have
enabled easy communication and interactive dialogue. Means are at hand today to
quickly disseminate information regarding available scientific data, and environmental
and social determinants of pandemic diseases.
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The use of ethics committees, for instance, at all levels to enhance cooperation,
collaboration and communication is a more plausible approach than coercive laws
compelling institutions, such as hospitals, to provide mandatory examination, and
treatment, of suspected influenza pandemic persons. With the understanding that coercive
laws have limited application, ethics committees play vital roles in the analysis and
establishment of decisions and actions considered to be necessary, reasonable, and
proportionate in the circumstances to contain the pandemic.
Ethics committees provide an appropriate forum for utilizing a principles-based
framework to negotiate between conflicting values. As clarified in article 19 of the
UDBHR, ethics committees are characterized by their independence, multidisciplinary
nature, and plurality.311 Ethics committees are relevant for all categories of population
health decision-making, be it for individuals, groups, committee, or institutions and
corporations. The cogency of ethics committees lies in the multidisciplinary, and
analytical assessment, of the relevant ethical, legal, scientific, and related social issues.312
Ethics committees then need to be diversely composed to include representation for
individual liberty interests, health-providers obligations, and community representation to
promote the population safety and health interests.

E. Summary
This chapter suggests Mixed Interests Ethics Model (MIEM) as overlapping criteria
for resolving conflict between ethical principles generated by the epidemiological,
libertarian, and social justice models, so as to attain an ethical balance between
competing individual and population interests in pandemics and epidemics intervention.
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These ethical models are made practical by generating substantive principles, and
procedural standards which facilitate negotiation of balance between conflicting
principles.
The UDBHR provides a hermeneutical context for applying MIEM. For, the UDBHR
seeks to ameliorate individual and universal rights by anchoring the conflict between the
individual and populations interests in a bioethics principles’ framework that is heuristic.
By interpretation and specification of the substantive principles, MIEM innovatively
applies the generally accepted sets of procedural standards of necessity, reasonableness,
proportionality, and harm avoidance to balance between conflicting interests.
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4. Chapter Four
The Importance of MIEM for Policy Development in the Influenza Pandemic
Intervention

Introduction
Ever since the threat of bioterrorism and the possibility of a future outbreak of
influenza pandemic became a global problem, bioethicists and population health agents
have generated numerous literatures of ethical methodological approaches for the
effective management of influenza pandemics. Some suggestions tend to give primacy to
the individual-centered approaches, such as promoted in libertarianism, while other
approaches prioritize ethical considerations that promote societal interests, such as
utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and communitarians.
The principles approach that has been successfully deployed in clinical medicine to
protect individual interests has gained acceptance as an effective variable for negotiating
balance between individual and population interests. But no overwhelming consensus has
emerged as to whether the principles-based approach has convincingly demonstrated
sufficient critical and analytical ethical tools to override other ethical methodologies in
the management of population health disasters, such as influenza pandemic.
Chapter Four of this dissertation makes the case for the principles-based Mixed
Interests Ethics Model (MIEM) as robust enough to provide ethical tools that can be
successfully deployed to effectively manage the influenza pandemic. The MIEM
provides for argumentative rigor to exhaust, and underpin, the meaning and justification

153

underlying the competing substantive principles that generate conflict between individual
and population interests.

A. MIEM and the Illustrative Principles of Autonomy and Solidarity
(i) Influenza Pandemic Occurrence
Influenza virus is categorized as types A, B, and C. Influenza B virus is hosted, and
causes disease, in humans but does not result in pandemics. Influenza A virus is hosted
by several species such as birds, pigs, horses, dogs, and humans.1 Of major concern to
public health authority is Influenza A virus that is responsible for causing previous major
outbreaks among humans, beginning with the HINI pandemic (Spanish flu) of 1918,
H2N2 pandemic of 1957, H3N3 pandemic of 1968, H5N1 (avian flu) human infection
since1997, and the reemergence of H1N1 (swine flu) of 2009.2
Categories of Influenza A virus vary according to subtypes that occur due to changes
in proteins hemagglutinin (HA) and neuramidinidase (NA) on the surface of influenza A
virus, and how the protein combine.3 Influenza viruses evade human immune response by
utilizing “two mechanisms referred to as antigenic drift and antigenic shift.”4 Antigens
are “the physical markings that the immune system feels and reads and then binds to.”5
HA and NA are the main antigens of the influenza virus that project out on its surface.
For instance, antibodies bearing receptors on their surface function in a manner that
recognizes and binds on a virus bearing the antigen. Sometimes, however, the HA and
NA can evade the immune system by rapid mutation to change into different forms that
can only be recognized by the immune system with some difficulty. This phenomenon is
called antigen drift, and can create epidemics.6
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More worrisome is the antigen shift whereby the immune system cannot recognize
antigens at all. This phenomenon is a replacement of the old with entirely new gene
coding for HA, or for NA, or for both by which “the shape of the new antigen bears no
resemblance to the old one.”7 This situation creates a pandemic that occurs “if a large
proportion of the population lacks immunity to the novel HA and NA and if the virus has
the ability to spread efficiently from person to person.”8 Moreover, “influenza viruses
replicate extremely rapidly in the host” complicating health professionals’ efforts to
effectively contain the subsequent high morbidity and mortality.9
According to scientists, viruses generally appear in spherical form with two types of
protuberances: the HA has a spikes-like shape while the NA has the appearance of a
tree.10 So, in the event that the influenza virus collides with a cell, HA “brushes against
the molecules of sialic acid that juts out from the surface of the cell in the respiratory
tract.”11 The viral HA protein binds onto the cell surface’s sialic acid receptors in a
process called adsorption. Once the virion manages to penetrate the cell membrane in a
vesicle by endocytocis and fusion, the shape and form shifts, making it unrecognizable by
the immune system. In a complementary function, the viral NA protein cleaves the sialic
acid receptors remaining on the cell surface (membrane) disabling “the acid’s ability to
bind to the influenza viruses.”12 Consequentially, new viruses can now freely escape from
inside the destroyed cell, after it bursts, and invade new health cells.
John Barry elucidated that, “the virus is nothing more than a membrane … that
contains the genome, the eight genes that define what a virus is.”13 Unlike bacteria that
consist of one cell with metabolism, and produces by division, viruses are less than a
fully living organism whose only function is to replicate by invading cells, subvert them,
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and thrive on. The virulence of a virus lies in the ability to invade a cell and then, “insert
is own gene in the cells genome, and the viral genes seize control from the cell’s own
genes.”14
Scientists explain that antibodies against the HA offer protection from infection,
while antibodies against the NA may reduce the spread of the virus, but are unable to
prevent infection.15 One effective strategy of managing human infection of influenza
virus is vaccination. But there are often, and will probably always be, inadequate
stockpiles of vaccines and antiviral drugs in the event of influenza pandemic outbreak.
Scientists have to identify the specific influenza strain, and prepare the appropriate
vaccine, which usually takes a period of at least four to six months.16 The challenge to
vaccine development is “the ability of the virus to drift and evade immune detection.”17
Moreover, Kanta Subbarao and colleagues state that there is “paucity of HA conserved
epitopes that include cross-reactive neutralized or protective antibodies.”18
Influenza viruses attack the respiratory tract causing victims of influenza pandemics
to suffer nose mucosal membranes swelling, pharynx, inflamed throat, cough, fever,
headache, body aches, exhaustion, and may develop complications such as viral
pneumonia and acute respiratory distress. These complications require antiviral
treatment, and mechanical ventilation treatment, that will be in limited supply at the time
of a pandemic. The shortages create ethical dilemmas for public health decision-makers
regarding the denial of medically effective care to some who need it. Subsequently,
consideration of rationing, prioritization, and triage become necessary, but highly
contentious.
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Most controversial, however, is the question of individual liberties and freedoms.
Traditionally, public health officials have used measures, such as isolation of sick
persons, quarantine of contact persons, and involuntary treatment, to manage morbidity
and mortality in the influenza pandemics. Yet, these measures entail problematic ethical
issues regarding the legitimacy of government’s compulsory public health interventions,
and related issues of ethical justification. The most outspoken critiques of the proposed
influenza pandemics plans, and other disaster intervention plans, are libertarian and
liberal cosmopolitan thinkers who question the justification for public health authority
powers to limit individual liberties and freedoms.19
Historically there are good reasons why the public, and the heath providers, are
concerned with balancing individual and population interests in the influenza pandemic
outbreak. For instance, the anguish caused to the human population by the H1N1
influenza virus (Spanish flu) of 1918 is well chronicled in John Barry’s book, The Great
Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History.20 The so called Spanish flu
was estimated to have killed between twenty million to fifty million people worldwide. It
overwhelmed heath facilities, health care resources, professional capabilities, and
disrupted individual freedoms, such as of assembly, as it decimated population health and
safety.21
In the city of Philadelphia, distress began to unfold barely seventy-two hours after
two hundred thousand people gathered for the Philadelphia Liberty Loan Drive. The
patriotic crowd was more concerned with funding the war than heeding warning of a
public health danger. The influenza pandemic struck the city soon after the parade. One
hundred and seventeen people died on the third day after the parade. On the eighth day,
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two hundred and fifty four people died, while on the ninth day two hundred and eighty
nine people died of the influenza pandemic.22
According to Barry, the city’s thirty-one hospitals ran out of beds, and health
professionals resorted to turning away influenza pandemic stricken victims, even with
attempted offers of one hundred dollars bribes to nurses.23 Public health officials banned
all public meetings, including public funerals. Infrastructures such as schools, churches,
theaters, and courts were all closed. Arrests were made of anyone who spit in public.
Soon there were no more available caskets, morgues, and undertakers in the city, as
bodies stacked up and others were left in homes where the influenza pandemic victims
died.24
Horrors, such as those discharged by the 1918 Spanish flu onto the human population,
have caused governments globally to invest considerable resources in preparation for a
possible future influenza pandemic outbreak. The scare of the 1997 H5N1 avian
influenza outbreak, and its reemergence in 2003, convinced the World Health
Organization (WHO) of the need for governments worldwide to have influenza pandemic
preparedness plans. Scientists became concerned that if the H5N1 influenza virus
mutated and developed the ability to be transmitted from person to person, a highly
pathogenic influenza A (H5N1) pandemic may occur.25
In 1997 the world community began to engage the H5N1 avian influenza outbreak
when several humans in Hong Kong became infected after exposure to infected birds.26
Six of the eighteen patients admitted to hospitals with confirmed avian influenza A
(H5N1) died. The avian influenza A (H5N1) recurred in 2003 causing an outbreak of
human cases, most of them fatal, in Vietnam and Thailand. Within that same period, bird
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populations in Asia were dying of an epidemic of avian influenza A (H5N1).27 At its peak
in 2006, there were four thousand outbreaks in sixty three countries. Just when
epidemiologists thought the virus was eliminated in most of those countries, the United
Nations expressed fear that a mutant avian influenza strain was resurging in Asian
countries in 2011.28
Since 2004, WHO feared the worst, and warned of a possible pandemic outbreak of a
highly virulent influenza A (H5N1) pandemic, should human-to-human infection begin to
occur.29 Working closely with the WHO, the United States federal government embarked
on monitoring, planning, and preparing for a possible global influenza pandemic
outbreak. Both on the federal and state levels, the strategies for preparedness and
response activities were categorized according to periods of pandemic influenza
surveillance, emergency response, community disease control and prevention, travel
management, distribution of vaccines and antiviral, clinical guidelines, public health
communication, and workforce support.30
Ethicists worldwide began to collaborate with public health officials to forge an
ethical pathway towards the effective management of pandemics, and other disaster
occurrences such as bioterrorism.31 Since then, ethical frameworks suggested for the
guidance of informed policy development have tended to address three interrelated areas
of concern: respect for individual liberties and freedoms, restricting individual freedoms
to advance population health and safety, and fair distribution of limited health resources.
The 2001 draft Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA) issued by the
Center for Disease Control (CDC) as a model for states’ pandemic preparedness, stirred a
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debate over the legitimacy and justification of coercive public health powers that
subordinate individual interests.32
Mixed Interests Ethics Model (MIEM), as suggested by this dissertation, strikes a
balance between a relentless commitment to individualism, and the subjugation of the
individual in collectivism. Anchoring policy development in substantive ethics principles
provides a way for negotiating between competing ethical theories, such as
libertarianism, utilitarianism, and Kantian deontology. This strategy involves the
specification of the substantive ethical principles, delineation of areas that ameliorate the
tension, and articulating procedural standards to effectively manage of pandemics and
epidemics.
The hermeneutical context for the application of MIEM is provided by UNESCO’s
international normative standards, based on bioethics principles enumerated in the
UDBHR. The UNESCO framework also sets limitations on the application of principles
in conflicting situations. Specifically, article 27 of the UDBHR requires that the
limitation of principles, or on human rights, be “strictly necessary for and proportionate”
to the protection of societal interests such as public safety, health, and for the protection
of others rights and freedoms.33
(ii) Use of the Principles Approach in the Influenza Pandemic
While the case for the protection of individual interests in clinical medicine is well
argued in bioethics literature, consensus is yet to be attained regarding an effective
overlapping ethical strategy in population health. Ethical considerations in clinical
medicine tend to promote and protect individual interests, such as autonomy, privacy, and
confidentiality. In the early 1970s, principlism emerged as the most dominant ethical
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approach in clinical medicine, edging out approaches such as casuistry, and
comprehensive ethical theories such as virtue ethics, utilitarianism, and ethics of care.
The strength of the principles approach lies in the flexibility to overlap different
ethical theories. Popularized by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, the biomedical
principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice were meant to serve as
an analytical framework “through which we can reason about problems in bioethics.”34
Beauchamp and Childress suggested a method of specification, justification and
balancing of principles, and rules and rights, as a strategy for dealing with moral
conflicts.35 Accordingly, specification addresses the dimension of range and scope of a
principle, and the balancing addresses the dimension of weight and strength.36 These
scholars further elucidate that the determination of weight and strength calls into play
values, such as reasonableness and necessity.37
Though the strategy of specifying, justifying and balancing principles has proved to
be fairly successful in clinical medicine, and in the domain of individual interests, its
application in population health interventions is not yet properly articulated. Population
health presents a new paradigm in which the population good is prioritized over the
individual’s preferences. Moral considerations in population health are pluralistic, and
applied in a multidisciplinary and multifaceted manner, since the population good takes
primacy over individual preference. Subsequently, ethical approaches such as
utilitarianism and egalitarianism gain prominence over ethical approaches that promote
individual interests such as libertarianism.
But, despite the differences between clinical medicine and population health, ethicists
think that the principles approach is suited to the goal of balancing individual and
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population interests. Since the application of principles in clinical medicine is well suited
to the needs of the individual, ethicists have developed additional principles that are
applicable in population health.38 UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and
Humanities Rights (UDBHR) document sanctioned the bioethics principles approach, and
expanded the principles to accommodate societal interests such as solidarity, cooperation,
and social responsibilities.
UNESCO acknowledged the moral complexity associated with public health
measures that alleviate public health threats, while also interfering with the selfdetermination of the individual.39 The primary aim of the Declaration was to provide “a
universal framework (a normative standard) of principles and procedures to guide States
in the formulation of their legislation, policies or other instruments in the field of
bioethics.”40
The UDBHR declaration is a non-binding, legal instrument but human rights
advocates attribute the moral weight of the principles approach to the fact that
governments have adopted, and committed to the principles therein, and their
applications.41 But probably the strongest justification for the principles approach in
public health and human rights connection comes from philosophical reflection. Stephen
Holland explains that “public health principlism is very promising because it is a
relatively accessible and practical way of doing public health ethics.”42 Moreover, public
health principlism has double attributes of clarifying the nature of the dilemma and
resolving dilemma in public health.43
The UDBHR enumerated principles found application in public health when
UNESCO became concerned about a potential influenza pandemic outbreak, as was
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warned by the WHO. UNESCO guided that compulsory measures, such as quarantine,
require strict regulation “in accordance with Article 27 of the Declaration on limitation of
the principles.”44 Article 27 lays out instances, such as protection of public health and the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others, as reasons for limiting the application of
principles. But the Declaration does not provide concrete guidance on how the balance is
to be achieved in the real situation of a pandemic outbreak, such as influenza pandemic.
(iii) Autonomy and Individual Interests
The substantive principle of individual autonomy is the most appropriate ethical
variable for the practical application of individual interests associated with individual
liberty and freedoms. In clinical practice, the primary responsibility of the provider is to
implement the informed, autonomous decision of a competent person, or the patient’s
surrogate. Likewise, in research ethics, the investigator is obligated to seek the informed
consent of the individual research participant.
Beauchamp and Childress explain that autonomy connotes “meanings as diverse as
self-governing, liberty rights, privacy, individual choices, freedom of the will, causing
one’s own behavior, and being one’s own person.”45 In clinical medicine and research,
autonomy is enshrined in the concept of informed consent. It is in this sense that
Beauchamp and Childress refer to personal autonomy as “at a minimum … self-rule that
is free from both controlling interference by others, and from limitations … that prevent
meaningful choice.”46 Informed consent then, is the patients “voluntary, autonomous
authorization to proceed with the proposed intervention.”47
While the focus of clinical medicine is the individual’s health interests, the influenza
pandemic presents a paradigm shift from prioritizing the individual to the emphasis on
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protecting populations. This change is clearly attested to in the Pennsylvania’s Influenza
Pandemic Response Plan (IPRP), which adopted the federal draft Model State Emergency
Health Power Act (MSEHPA). The 2005 draft IPRP asserts the State’s duty to protect the
public from serious harm during a public health emergency through disease prevention
and suppression.48
As stipulated in the IPRP, the Governor is invested with the powers to protect citizens
of the commonwealth against a health disaster. Those powers include the declaration of a
disaster emergency, suspension of regulatory statutes that may hinder or delay emergency
response, and appropriation of some public and private property for state use in disaster
intervention.49 The IPRP grants the Governor, in consultation with the Department of
Heath, powers to order the isolation and quarantine of an individual, or groups of
individuals, for purposes of limiting the transmission of a contagious disease.50 The
Secretary of Health has powers to issues warrants for apprehending and arresting
“persons who disobey the quarantine orders or regulations of the Department of
Health.”51
For hospitals, and other healthcare institutions, the requirement to implement
mandatory coercive intervention could interfere with the ordinary standard of care.
Compulsory control measures may be incompatible with the strictly guarded,
autonomous decision-making authority of individual patients. In a public health
emergency, the individual’s decisional authority is subdued, since health care officials
take over the control of the population health emergency response.
Hospitals may be required to limit access to some services such as elective surgery,
and impose infectious control measures, such as wearing masks. They could be required
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to enforce control measures such as culling, isolation, and quarantine, as well as reporting
suspected persons.52 Additionally, health care institutions may receive orders from the
state to carry out compulsory medical tests and diagnostic procedures. A person who
refuses to comply could be committed to civil confinement.53
Coercive measures may be ethically justifiable if balance is struck between individual
and population health interests. From the legal perspectives, due process provides that no
person shall be deprived of liberty, or property without due process of the law.54 Courts
have established that “the parameters of due process require an analysis of both the
individual and government interests involved and the consequences, and the avoidability
of the risks of errors and abuse.”55 Due process as guaranteed in the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, limits police power. Even in cases in which
confinement is justified “the terms of confinement must minimize infringement on liberty
and enhance autonomy.”56
In this context, therefore, hospitals and other healthcare institutions ought to have in
place ethically sound administrative policies, and procedures, to provide for ethical
guidance in decision-making during the pandemic influenza outbreak. Concerned about
this need, Alison Thompson and his Canadian colleagues developed a pack of ten
substantive values and five procedural values meant to ensure the safeguarding of
individual and societal health interests. However, these experts do not offer an in-depth
discourse to demonstrate a coherent methodology for balancing conflicting principles,
such as autonomy and solidarity.
Ethicists differ in their conceptual analysis of autonomy. For libertarian-oriented
experts, such as Griffin Trotter, legitimacy for public health powers issues from
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individual authorization via public (democratic) deliberation. Cosmopolitan liberalism, as
espoused by George Annas, commits to a rights-based approach that defends individual
interests, and civil liberties against government and corporate overreaching, by drawing
legitimacy from the interpretation of constitutional rights and universal human rights.57
Communitarians, such as Michael Walzer and Dan Beauchamp, regard the individual as
“being part of a well regulated society that seeks to prevent risks that all members
share.”58 The implication of these diverse perspectives on the role of autonomy is
enormous for policy development, particularly in hospitals during the pandemic influenza
preparedness and response.
If one concurs with Trotter’s libertarianism, the question of population interests, as
common good, does not arise. From Trotter’s perspective, balance is necessary where
liberty interests of the individual clash with the aggregate security interests regarding
decisions about coercion. The means off striking the balance is by “proper exercise of
practical judgment,” and not by “moral principles (substantive) … applied like recipes to
produce distinct and singularly correct solutions.”59 Trotter argues that decisions are
about, and affect, individuals, who then should be the legitimate source of authorization.
Trotter appears to be more concerned with limiting government involvement and
ensuring the primacy of individual rights. Accordingly, “In so far as possible, citizens
should cultivate advance agreements about terms of coercion in such events.”60 Health
professionals, for their part, should cultivate the art of practical judgment through guiding
principles (procedural standards) and training regimens.61 In this sense then, autonomy
assumes the meaning of individual self-governing.
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This vision of autonomy as embraced by Trotter is fully defended by Tristram
Engelhardt in its strictest sense of individualism. The only moral basis for one to transfer
one’s goods to another is consent and permission62 Emphasis is put on the primacy of
individual preferences, and on limiting the governing powers of the state, or any other
social institution over the individual.63 The legitimacy of the minimal state is strongly
defended by Robert Nozick who was influenced by Kantian views that individuals are
ends in themselves, and not merely means.64
According to Nozick, more than a minimal state is unjustifiable. People are so
different that imposing a single utopian vision would be absurd. Only the minimal state
provides a framework for utopia by respecting people’s rights, freely allowing them to
choose their lives and realize their ends, and, “aided by the voluntary cooperation of the
individuals possessing the same dignity.”65 The distribution of resources in society is not
based on a patterned central distributive or allocating agency, but on individual holdings.
The principle of transfer is “from each as they choose, to each as they are chosen.”66
On the contrary, the communitarian vision as explained by Daniel Callahan,
subordinates individualism and prioritizes the needs of the community.67 For Callahan,
any initial questions raised about ethical problems “should focus on the social meaning,
implications, and context, even those cases which seem to affect individuals only.”68 In
this sense, the state is primarily obligated to guarantee the security and health of the
populations.69
Not surprising, if the influenza preparedness and response committee is comprised of
a libertarian, a utilitarian, a liberal cosmopolitan, and a communitarian, there will, most
likely, be diverse perspectives regarding autonomous decision making. Yet no single
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principle accruing from these theories, such as “the greater good for the greater number,”
is sufficiently suited, on its own, to the purpose of resolving complex ethical problems.
Attempts to strike balance between protecting the individual and ensuring societal wellbeing, should involve procedural values such as necessity, proportionality, reciprocity,
mutuality, and solidarity 70 Subsequently, UDBHR considers autonomy, and individual
responsibility for self and others, as mutually connected. Article 10 stipulates that, “the
autonomy of persons to make decisions, while taking responsibility for those decisions
and respecting the autonomy of others, is to be respected.”71
A policy statement based on MIEM criterion, and protective of individual autonomy,
ought to emphasize both aspects of responsibility to self, and the autonomy of others.
Such a policy could be stated as follows:
In a public health crisis of the magnitude of the influenza pandemic, Y Hospital
respects the substantive principle of individual autonomy and solidarity in
implementing guidelines that restrict individual liberty and freedom. The
restrictions need to be indispensable, applied equitably, and employ the least
restrictive means necessary for the prevention of the influenza pandemic, and the
amelioration of the individual and universal rights.
This sample ethical policy statement is coherent and robust enough to provide for the
safeguard of the individual’s autonomous interests in liberty and freedom, as well as the
population health interests in health and safety. The goal is to anchor decisions and
actions in a universally accepted ethical standard that requires consistency with respect
for “the dignity of human person, and respect for, and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms.”72
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The International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO delineated their vision of
autonomy by expounding the notion of informed consent.73 Accordingly, in clinical
medicine or medical research, a person has a right to make autonomous decisions if they
provided with adequate information, comprehend the information, and voluntarily make
the choice.74 In population health, the application of the principle of informed consent
needs to be applied within the context of article 27 of the UDBHR declaration, which
allows for the limitations on the application of the principles, for instance, in danger of a
public health threat.75
(iv) Solidarity and Protection of Populations
Respect for the autonomy of others and the promotion of others’ wellbeing calls into
play the substantive principle of solidarity. To comprehend the contrast between
autonomy and solidarity one needs to analyze the connectedness of solidarity to the
notion of common good. When solidarity is understood as common cause for the
wellbeing of those who are in need, the notion necessarily implies the promotion of the
common good of all. Trotter explains that utilitarianism, egalitarianism and
communitarianism (broadly) entail the three varieties of the fulfillment model of the
common good.76 Though, Trotter himself does not find these approaches very helpful
since his interpretation of the notion of common good is merely an aggregation of the
individual’s goods.
The substantive principles of solidarity and common good are notions that are
mutually connected with each other. Solidarity requires proactively taking measures to
protect those in danger of a public health threat. The intervention may involve
justification of some legitimate coercive measure that limit individual freedom and
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liberty, as well as prioritizing and rationing scarce community resources. But, as
explained by Alison Thompson and colleagues, solidarity requires coordination as well as
“good, open and honest communication.”77 One recognizes a pattern of overlapping
values such as information, open communication, and collaboration that mutually inform
both autonomy and solidarity.
A group of ethicists assembled by the Greenwall Foundation in the year 2002 to “map
out the public health ethics terrain” established that there are areas in competing moral
considerations that either decrease or increase conflict.78 James Childress and colleagues
recommended that for practical guidance to resolving conflict, general moral
considerations, such as autonomy and liberty, need to be made more specific and
concrete. In this regard, there should be a consideration of “the meaning and range of
scope” as well as their “weight or strength.”79 This exercise is important, since no general
moral consideration can be taken to be absolute.
These scholars elucidated that a consideration of meaning and range of scope
determines the extent of conflict among the conflicting general moral considerations.
Subsequently, “if their range of scope is interpreted in certain ways, conflict may be
increased or reduced.”80 Moreover, by determining their weight and strength we can
establish when “different considerations yield to others in case of conflict.”81 A
combination of meaning, scope, context, and circumstances provide the ethical trajectory
for determining practices, features, and actions that qualify as prima facie consideration
when moral considerations conflict.
Applying this standard in the MIEM context, the substantive principles require
specification and interpretation to delineate their meaning and scope. To determine
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considerations that yield to others, one needs to apply procedural principles such as
necessity, reasonableness, proportionality, and harm avoidance. This is the context in
which, for instance, one engages autonomy and solidarity to negotiate balance between
individual and population interests. The essential features of autonomy, such as
knowledge, comprehension, and voluntariness, are compatible with the essential features
of solidarity such as open communication, collaboration, coordination, and a sense of
common purpose.82

B. Meaning and Scope of Autonomy and Solidarity
(i) Specification of Autonomy (information, comprehension, and voluntariness)
The Pennsylvania 2005 draft IPRP is a bold statement of proactive, strategic planning
for the future influenza pandemics; incomparable to the sloppy response to the
horrendous 1918 Spanish Flu. Nevertheless, one of the most controversial features of the
IPRP is the sanctioning of the exercise of mandatory and intrusive public health powers,
such as culling, isolation, quarantine, and possible confinement. Moreover, the state may
limit the individual’s freedom of movement and assembly.83 These measures could lead
to ethical and legal questions about restrictive public health intervention that disrupt
personal freedoms and liberties, such as those enshrined in the substantive principle of
individual autonomy and the related values of privacy and confidentiality.
Another ethical problem is the subordination of the individual’s autonomous
preferences in the allocation of limited health resources, such as vaccines, antiviral
medication, or hospital beds which raises the question of distributive justice. The
individual’s interest in self-determination, as understood in libertarian ethics, prioritizes
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the free market system as the appropriate variable for attaining distributive justice. The
main actors in the market system are the individual consumer, private investor, insurers,
and business corporations. The government’s role is understood as the protection of the
individual by applying limited regulation to prevent unfair practices, and incentives to
encourage investment and competition.84
But even pro-libertarian ethicists acknowledge that, in population health emergency,
success is measured not on individual preferences, but on the state’s ability to reduce
morbidity and mortality in the population.85 The paradigm shift from emphasis on the
individual to community preferences results in the rationing, and prioritization, of
resources whereby specific individuals may be legitimately denied care, or subjected to
involuntary treatment. Most ethicists now concur that respect for individual autonomy
requires that public health authority ought to apply the least restrictive (infringement)
means necessary for achieving population health goals.86
Attentive to the legal and ethical requirements to protect the autonomous individual,
Pennsylvania’s 2005 draft IPRP included, among its recommendations, the use of “the
least restrictive means necessary” and the granting of due process protection by providing
for the petitioning of courts for the extension of quarantine, or isolation, as required by
Pennsylvania’s Counterterrorism Planning, Preparedness and Response Act (CPPR).87
Under the CPPR, the Governor has authority to order the immediate isolation or
quarantine of contacts for a designated period, beyond which, a court proceeding and
permission is required.88
Informed by ethical reflection, courts in the United States have developed a legal
framework for determining what legitimately counts as a least infringement on the
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individual’s liberty, and freedom for purposes of pursuing the common good. The courts
distinguish between substantive and procedural kinds of restrain on police power of the
state. The substantive requires strong justification (good reason) for infringing on
individual liberties and freedoms. The procedural requires fair process if individuals are
to be deprived of their liberties and freedoms.89
The interference with the substantive, autonomous decision-making right of an
individual requires strong justification commensurable to a fundamental level of a threat,
or risk of contagiousness to others. Even then, coercion may not be necessary unless there
is credible proof that the affected individual poses such risk, and would not cooperate,
thereby putting others at risk for infection.90 Autonomous decision making is
synonymous with the notion of informed consent, which requires that adequate
information is given and comprehended, and that the decision is voluntarily made. One
important piece of reliable knowledge in public health emergencies is scientific
information arrived at by way of rigorous analysis and replicable method.91
Experts have argued that the dissemination of information also entails public health
accountability. According to Childress and colleagues, public health accountability refers
to the responsibility of the public health agents to involve “the public and scientific
experts to identify, define, and understand at a fundamental level the threat to public
health, and the risks and benefits of ways to address them.”92 To be voluntary, the
individual’s action requires adequate information, absence of controlling influence, and
competency. Non-voluntary actions are defined as those that occur in circumstances of
inadequate information, a controlling influence and incompetence.93
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Most ethicists agree that the standard of autonomy as set in clinical medicine is not a
perfect fit in population health intervention. Health care experts have come to the
conclusion that planning for health care disasters emergencies can entails undertakings
that alters the accepted standards of care.94 But ethicists insist that even in situations
where altering standards is justified, safeguards must be put in place to protect against
unnecessary overreaching into the rights of the autonomous individuals. One helpful
approach is to think of decisional autonomy as also “taking responsibility for those
decisions and respecting the autonomy of others.”95
It is important to emphasize that responsibility is not compatible with coercion. Ruth
Faden argued for persuasion as a strategy of communicating public health information.
Persuasion enhances individual autonomy while manipulation compromises autonomy. In
persuasion, “the reasons that comprise the persuasive appeal exist independent of the
persuader.”96 Persuasion is an appeal to reason so that a person “freely accepts – as his
own – the beliefs, attitudes, values, intentions, or actions advocated by the influencing
agent.”97
Contrasting persuasion with manipulation, Ruth Faden finds manipulation to be a
threat to individual autonomy. For, manipulation of information aims at deliberate
modification of a person’s perception of the available options to affect what that person
believes. Because of the manipulation of information, the targeted person is rendered
ignorant.98 For example, Dr. Taliaferro Clark and his colleagues who conducted the
Tuskegee Syphilis Study relied on manipulation to render the participants ignorant of the
whole purpose of the study, and thereby, deprived them of decisional-autonomy.99
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Connected with persuasion are the notions of transparency and openness. Concurring
with Normans Daniels, Allison Thompson and colleagues argued that “decisions must be
publicly defensible.”100 Decision-makers have a responsibility to let the public, and
particularly the affected stakeholders, access and scrutinize the process, and to
understand the basis upon which decisions are made.101 One strategy to demonstrate
transparency is the involvement of all affected parties. In the influenza pandemic
planning and response, committees should be comprised of stakeholders such as ethicists,
clinicians, lawyers, public health officials, and representation from the community that
will be affected.
Epidemiologists make a connection between increased vulnerability and reduced
autonomy. In determining risks, they also focus on the level of vulnerability. A
distinction is made between vulnerability resulting from the interplay of virology factors
and the individual’s biological susceptibility, and vulnerability that occurs due to
unfavorable social, economic, and political factors.102 To minimize vulnerability resulting
from biological susceptibility, the IPRP identified specific groups of persons to be
targeted first to benefit from the limited supply of vaccination. These people include aged
persons with high risk medical conditions, pregnant women, persons above age 65, and in
certain circumstances, infants aged 6-12 months.103
But, more ethical oversight may be required when decisions and actions affect
persons who are vulnerable due to socio-political and economic problems. Ethnic
minority populations are often subjected to discrimination and stigmatization during
infectious disease outbreaks.104 Moreover, individual persons in minority populations
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rarely receive adequate health care, making them highly susceptible to contagious
diseases and easily targeted for coercive intervention during pandemics.
Elaine Vaughan and Timothy Tinker explained that, from a public health perspective,
vulnerability means “an increased potential for loss in a hazardous situation, including
reduced capacity to respond effectively.”105 The link between vulnerable individuals, or
groups with disproportionate care, and reduced autonomy during the influenza pandemic
partly accrues from health disparities such as living conditions, health literacy,
immigration status, and language.106
The judiciary in the United States is attentive to the problem of reduced autonomy
resulting from vulnerability in population health intervention. For instance, government
statutes that identify people by race, class, alienage, or gender, are subjected to a standard
of strict scrutiny. Courts have established that these categories are often likely to be
subjected to unequal treatment, bias, and antipathy. 107 To enhance trust, and increase the
prospects for effective management of influenza pandemics, public health authorities
need to have better ethical oversight in dealing with vulnerable individuals and groups.108
When the joint advisory group of the Massachusetts Department of Health and the
Harvard School of Public health recommended the utilitarian principle of maximizing
benefit in allocating limited resources, they also included safeguards against
discrimination based on gender or class.109 The principle stated that:
Limited resources be allocated so as to maximize the number of lives saved
(determined on the basis of the best available medical information, implemented
in a manner that provides equitable treatment of any individual or group of
individuals based on the best available clinical knowledge and judgment, and
176

implemented without discrimination or regard to sex, sexual orientation, race,
religion, ethnicity, disability, age, income, or insurance status).110
In the domain of universal rights, according to Roberto Andorno, “human dignity is
specifically invoked as an argument against discrimination (article 11), as well as the
framework within which cultural diversity is to be respected (article 12).”111 As affirmed
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “all human beings are born free and equal
in dignity and rights.”112 Glenn Rivard explains that the injunction against discrimination
and stigmatization, in article 11 of the UDBHR, “is in reference to the resolution of ethics
issues related to medicine, life science and associated technologies as applied to human
beings.”113
Some of the most effective strategies employed by epidemiologists for enhancing
autonomy and reducing societal vulnerability are effective communication; partnership
and collaboration; and coordination.114 Ethicists consider communication, along with
collaboration and coordination, as the essential features of the substantive principle of
solidarity.115 These values are essential for the abridgement of the tension between the
principles of autonomy and solidarity for effective prevention, containment, and
treatment of influenza pandemic.
(ii) Specification of Solidarity (communication, collaboration, co-ordination)
Communication, collaboration (cooperation), and co-ordination enable the
dissemination of the information that individuals, and populations at risk, require to
comply with the population health intervention. Good communication, as proposed by
Elaine Vaughan and Timothy Tinker, aims at successful instruction, information, and
motivation, as well as updating risk factors, building trust, and dispelling rumors.116
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Pennsylvania’s IPRP underpins the importance of communication in the pandemic
influenza by outlining strategies for a wide range of communications about risks, ranging
from those related to virology and environment to, various social factors. Accordingly,
the goal of public health communication in an emergency or disaster is to provide
accurate, consistent, and timely messages to the public. These messages are coordinated
and disseminated on federal, state, and local levels.117
The IPRP identified various means of communication, such as news conferences,
media updates, public education campaigns, and providing education materials to the
public. Other ways are Public Health Department websites, script resources for response
to telephone calls, establishment of hotlines and central sources of public information, the
use of local communication channels, and providing staff as resources to manage any
surge in the demand for public health information.118 Individuals are most likely to
cooperate with public health officials when adequately informed, rather than when they
luck such information. Cooperation from diverse parties helps reduce negative
consequences.119
Public cooperation with health officials in population health emergency occurs within
the context of collaboration. The notion of collaboration in influenza pandemic
intervention refers to participatory approaches, in which public health agencies, systems,
emergency managers, and the communities are involved in planning and response.120
While exploring the role of low-skilled and paraprofessional home care providers in the
influenza pandemic preparedness and response, Sherry Baron and colleagues underlined
the importance of collaboration. This is because when faced with surge capacity, the
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effective management of the influenza pandemic requires reinforcing staffing by, for
instance, the mobilization of home care providers. 121
Effective collaboration and cooperation between public health officials and home care
providers will be essential for soliciting the cooperation of vulnerable individuals in
population health emergency. Though many of these homecare providers lack some
clinical competencies, they could assist with the “distribution of information, infection
control supplies, food and medication.”122 Collaboration will be key, since some of the
home care providers, such as those employed and certified or licensed by Medicare, are
required by federal law only to pass a skills competency test.123 Other home care
providers, employed directly by agencies or clients, are not required to undergo national
standard training.
The notions of cooperation and collaboration have also gained increased attention as
ethicists explicate the meaning of the duty to care, as stipulated in all health care
professionals’ codes of ethics. The increased risk that comes with caring for patients
during the influenza pandemic makes health professionals weigh obligations to self, their
families, and against their professional duty. Additionally, as Alison Thomson observed,
physicians may also need to assess the implication of complying, for instance, with
mandatory vaccination, or antiviral regimens for prophylaxis with their interest in
individual liberty.”124 Rather than understanding the physician’s duty to treat as
overriding all their personal concerns, even to the jeopardy of their lives, emerging ethics
literature emphasize solidarity.125 Collaboration, rather than a rigid stance on
uncompromising obligation, provides a pathway to easing their moral burden.
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One way of distributing the burden of the professional duty to care is to consider the
need for priority setting, and fair allocation, of limited resources within the context of
solidarity. In this sense, decision-makers work in advance, and collaboratively, with all
involved parties to establish priority guidelines for the influenza pandemic intervention.
The provisional guidelines must establish fair and accountable processes, such as triage
protocols, and means for resolving interparty complaints.
When, for instance, physicians and health care providers in Minneapolis, Minnesota
developed a “tiered, scalable framework for restricting mechanical ventilation” in an
epidemic, one of the objectives was to ease the burden of the individual physician in his
duty to the individual cases (patients).126 They argued that the criteria for resource
allocation, or withdrawal, “will reduce the potential for each physician to have to design
and defend individual strategies for individual cases and improve consistency.”127 This
strategy is compatible with values of care and stewardship and is much needed in medical
professionalism.
Care within the context of solidarity, entails a moral response to a human need and
suffering, as characteristic in medical conditions.128 One dimension of care is
compassion, which is the ability of the health care provider to be empathetic to the
patients in their pains and sufferings. More closely related to care is the notion of
stewardship, which means “the prudent and careful use of resources necessary to sustain
life.”129 Stewardship infers “trust, ethical behavior, and good decision-making.”130
According to Alison and colleagues, the notion of stewardship should guide individuals
and institutions that will be entrusted with the governance and allocation of scarce
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resources, such as “vaccines, antivirals, ventilators, hospital beds, and even health care
workers.”131
One practical way of being good stewards of insufficient health resources in the
influenza pandemic is the development and implementation of a triage protocol. Triage is
meant to ensure that critical care resources are rationed in an equitable manner and offers
opportunity for a greater number of people to survive.132 Usually, when the object to be
triaged is limited critical care resources, a determination is made regarding the inclusion
criterion, exclusion criterion, minimum benefit for survival, and prioritization pool.133
According to Michael Christian and colleagues, inclusion criterion identifies patients
who may benefit from admission to critical care with focus on ventilatory failure, while
hemodynamic support and other advanced care modalities are provided in areas with
appropriate monitoring, but not at the level of ventilatory support care.134 Exclusion
criterion identifies patients with: poor prognosis, despite care in ICU, those who require
resources that are inaccessible in a pandemic, and advanced medical illness with poor
prognosis and a high likelihood of death. The minimum qualification for survival
criterion sets a ceiling on the amount of resources that can be used on any one person in
comparison to the chances and opportunities to save others.135
For instance, the Minneapolis group of experts developed a triage of mechanical
ventilation based on three tiers of criteria. Then, they adopted the Sequential Organ
Failure Assessment (SOFA) measuring system, as a validated reliable tool for comparing
mortality predictability.136 The adoption of the triage protocol, and the SOFA criterion,
underlines a practical commitment to the promotion of collective wellbeing of the all
people and a solid sense of solidarity.
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The three-tiered triage critical care protocol, developed by the Minneapolis group of
experts from their drills experience, restricts inadequate mechanical ventilations in an
epidemic disaster. The first tier is comprised solely of patients in “respiratory failure with
shock, and multiple organ dysfunctions.”137 Physicians are not to initiate, and can
withdraw, ventilator support from patients meeting these conditions of respiratory failure
and poor prognosis “based on current and underlying disease.”138
The Minneapolis group of experts detailed the conditions as follows:
Respiratory failure requiring intubation with persistent hypotension …
unresponsive to adequate fluid resuscitation after 6-12 hours of therapy and signs
of additional end-organ dysfunction … Failure to respond to mechanical
ventilation … and antibiotics after 72 hours of treatment for a bacterial pathogen
… Laboratory or clinical evidence of >4 organ system failing … pulmonary …
cardiovascular … renal … hepatic … neurological … hematological.139
Tier two is comprised of criterion “related to high potential for death, prolonged
ventilation, and high level of resource utilization.”140 If the restrictions imposed in tier
one adequately meet resource demands, tier two is unnecessary.141 Tier three involves
“additional restrictions or numerical scores” to standardize assessment of patient care and
“further restrict demand on resources.”142 The first and second tier criteria differ from the
third tier criterion in that they largely depend on “respiratory failure and poor prognosis
based on current and underlying disease” and not on “familiarity with scoring system.”143
The conditions in tier 2 were detailed as follows:
Known congestive heart failure with ejection fraction <25% … Acute renal
failure requiring hemodialysis … Several chronic lung disease including
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pulmonary fibrosis, cystic fibrosis, obstructive or restrictive diseases requiring
continuous home oxygen use before onset of acute illness. Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), (and) other immunodeficiency syndromes
at stage of disease susceptibility to opportunistic pathogens … with respiratory
failure requiring intubation … Active malignancy with poor potential for survival
… Cirrhosis with ascites, history of variceal bleeding, fixed coagulopathy, or
encephalopathy … Acute hepatic failure with hyperammonemia … Irreversible
neurological impairment that makes patient dependent for personal care.144
The third tier criterion entails the application of specific protocols that could be
agreed upon by the guideline development committee. The Minneapolis group of experts
suggested the following possibilities:
Restriction of treatment based on disease-specific epidemiology and survival data
for patient subgroups (may include age-based criteria) … Expansion of
preexisting disease classes that will not be offered ventilatory support …
Applying Sequential Organ Failure Assessment scoring to the triage process and
establish a cutoff score above which mechanical ventilation will not be offered.145
The Sequential Organ Failure Assessment Score system is generally accepted as a
useful scoring system “generating a numerical score that offers good predictive accuracy
based on a few clinical and simple … laboratory observations.”146 SOFA was originally
developed by the European Society of Intensive Care Medicine as Sepsis-related Organ
Failure Assessment (SOFA) Score.147 The reason for the SOFA score development was
“to find an objective and simple way to describe individual organ dysfunction/failure in a
continuous form, from mild dysfunction to severe failure, that can be used over time to
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measure the evolution of individual (or aggregated) organ dysfunction in clinical trials on
sepsis or for clinician at bedside.”148
John Hick and colleagues argue that predictive survival instruments such as SOFA in
tier three, “allows for more efficient allocation of available resources to institutions in
greatest need and provides us a consistent level of care (as possible) across the
community and region.”149 In much as it is possible, the Minneapolis tiered protocol puts
emphasis on “objective determination of the effectiveness of care affecting survival, and
of resource utilization, rather than subjective determinations regarding the value of either
the intervention or the value of the patient’s life.”150 Physicians are also guaranteed a
rational and quantitative guidance in population emergency critical care.151
Some ethicists have cautioned that solely scientific evidence cannot be the basis for
fair allocation of limited critical care resources.152 Alison Thompson and colleagues have
pointed out, for instance, that though science offers guidance to decision-makers
regarding “maximizing benefit in the allocation of ventilated beds,” it does not account
for whether “the initial decision to maximize benefit is just.”153 Maximizing benefit is a
notion that arises from reflecting on values. This further raises the question of why a
utilitarian approach of maximizing benefit was selected as the preferred principle of
distributing rights, burdens, and benefits over other moral considerations.154
The contrast to utilitarianism, offered by John Rawls, is the egalitarianism maxim that
“social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to the offices and positions open
to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”155 The goal of John Rawls’ is to
ensure that “each person benefits from any social inequality.”156 In a fair setting, it is “the
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requirement that the least advantaged benefit under the stipulation of maximin in the
original position.”157
What the utility approach, and Rawls’ egalitarianism, remind us of is the need to have
fair and well balanced community mechanisms that empower the physician’s patientadvocacy role (where patients compete for resources), and enables the physician to make
impartial allocation decisions.158 In this sense, the notion of the physician’s duty to care is
correlative with the notion of solidarity. As observed by the Council on Ethics and
Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association, “the physician role as a patient
advocate would be jeopardized, and trust between physician and patients would be
undercut” if out of loyalty, and not objective allocation mechanism, physicians feel
pressured “to choose their own patients over others.”159
The list of philosophical perspectives that could influence the trajectory of policy
development in the influenza pandemic is, in fact, longer than libertarian, liberalism,
utilitarian and communitarian, but there are principles that overlap. Catholic social
teaching, for instance, defines justice and social structures by prioritizing the notions of
human dignity and man’s social nature.160 According to Karen Lebacqz, the teaching puts
emphasis on three basic affirmations: “the inviolable dignity of the human person, the
essential nature of human beings, and the belief that the abundance of nature and social
living is given for all people.”161
Man is understood as created in God’s image. Thus, the demands of justice and social
structures are based on the fundamental affirmations of the transcendental human dignity,
and on man’s social nature.162 These affirmations result in practical application at the
level of moral principles, such as the common good, solidarity, stewardship, and
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subsidiary.163 But as observed by Karen Lebacqz, the common good advocated by the
Catholic teaching is not the utilitarian “greater good for the greater number.”164 The
plight of the worst off is the standard for justice in the society.165
(iii) Ethical Justification
As demonstrated so far, the substantive ethical principles such as autonomy and
solidarity are appropriate variables for decision making in the effective management of
the influenza pandemic. Although these principles do conflict in some circumstances,
they also yield sufficient ground for negotiating the safeguard of individual rights, while
effectively managing population interests in health and safety. Through critical analysis
and specification, it can be established that the notions of information, comprehension,
and voluntariness that inhere in the principle of autonomy are not exclusively
disharmonious with the notions of communication, collaboration, and cooperation that
are inherent in the principle of solidarity.
Nevertheless, effectiveness in rendering information or collaboration does not
substitute for the need to make an inquiry into the ethical justification of the decisions or
information being communicated. There is need for a critical analysis and deeper
investigation of the ethical ground that gives prominence to some specific decisions and
actions over others. One needs to establish, for instance, why a particular approach that
maximizes and distributes benefit is ethically preferable, even though it excludes from
benefit certain individuals and groups of people.166
Each of the approaches of utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and communitarianism
contribute, in a unique way, toward the realization of a commitment to solidarity and the
common good. Libertarianism, on the other hand, uniquely contributes toward a
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commitment to individual autonomy. It is impossible not to notice, in various pandemic
preparedness literatures, how these pluralistic ethical theories influence the trajectories of
proposed ethical guidelines of different pandemic preparedness committees.167
Several experts have advanced a number of ethical criteria for resource allocation in
public health emergency that are helpful, but not often easily agreeable. The Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association (CEJA) distinguished
between ethical considerations that are appropriate, and those that are inappropriate, in
certain circumstances.168 Likewise, the Ethics Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee
to the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention explicated on a number
of morally diverse considerations that have been proposed for allocating scarce resources,
such as ventilator treatment.169
Most experts regard as inappropriate, in public health emergency, those criteria that
allocate resources based on ability to pay (free market system), as preferred in libertarian
ethics, or based on the patient’s social worthiness, as is the case with meritarians. The
criteria that are most favored are those that allocate based on “the likelihood of benefit to
patient, the impact of treatment in improving the quality of the patient’s life, the duration
of benefit, the urgency of the patient’s condition, and the amount of resources required
for successful treatment.”170
The meritarian criterion based on social worthiness, and instrumental value in
resources allocation in pandemics, has been cautiously embraced by most ethicists. The
approach “involves summary judgments about whether an individual’s past and future
contributions to society’s goals merit prioritization for scarce resources.”171 Related to the
person’s social value is the instrumental value that “refers to an individual’s ability to
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carry out a specific function that is viewed as essential to prevent social disintegration or
a great number of deaths during a time of crisis.”172
This utilitarian “multiplier effect” refers to the practice of “prioritizing certain key
individuals” through whose work “more many lives are ultimately saved.”173 The IPRP
sanctioned this approach, in the case of limited supply of vaccines, so as to “maintain
essential public services and the health care infrastructure.”174 Some of the prioritized
groups that are targeted first to receive vaccination include healthcare personnel involved
in treatment, research personnel, emergency medical services providers, medical supply
transporters, and their family members. Other beneficiaries include those who maintain
essential public services, such as those responsible for community safety and security.175
A utilitarian criterion based on “likelihood of benefits to the patient” is favored by
many decision-makers who want to “maximize the number of lives saved as well as the
length and quality of life.”176 But some egalitarians accept the maxima of maximizing the
number of lives saved, “not because this approach produces the best good, but, because
each life has an equal claim on being saved.”177 However, the challenge of knowing those
lives that will be saved is the uncertainty in outcome-predictions. Though, generally it is
possible to distinguish care that offers no physiological benefit to the patient, and is thus
futile, from care with a low likelihood of benefit.178
Resource allocation based on the change in the quality of life of the patient means
that treatment is provided to those “who will have the greatest improvement in the quality
of life.”179 The CEJA preferred an approach that determines quality of life in terms of
functional status to allow for comparison between patients. In this utilitarian sense,
“improvements in quality of life would be measured for each patient by comparing
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functional status with treatment and functional status without treatment.”180 The approach
allows for the use of resources, where they will do the most good, without discriminating
against those with preexisting disabilities.181
Another egalitarian approach gives primacy to the urgency of need. Resources are
prioritized to benefit the urgent cases in hopes that the less urgent cases will have timely
access as scarcity is addressed.182 This approach attempts to give equal chances to all to
survive. However, experts worry that the conditions of patients set aside may deteriorate,
to the point of requiring emergency care and treatment, which then may not be as
effective as it would have been if the interception was made earlier.183
Decisions that subordinate individual interests for the common good, whether
utilitarian, or egalitarian, are not always indisputable. No matter how a single principle
strategy, or ethical theory for allocating limited resources in a pandemic, seems to satisfy
targeted population health outcomes, there are always individual interests that are
undermined. Take, for instance, the triage protocol that requires physicians to allocate
mechanical ventilation to some patients by withholding, or withdrawing, the care from
other patients against their wishes.184 In attempting to promote the collective good,
individuality is ignored.
With the emerging moral consensus of applying multi-principle allocation strategies,
the most important question is how to ethically balance individual and population health
interests, and not about which ethical theory or criteria is definitive.185 Solely the fact that
some particular ethical considerations are chosen over others in pandemic intervention
does not necessarily make them right. Aware of that ethical quandary, John Rawls
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proposed “reflective equilibrium” as a reliable method of procedural assessment.186 The
method ensures that our considered conviction of justice is tested and verified.
As mentioned previously, the specification of the competing substantive principles,
and the harmonization of areas that decrease tension, such as information and
communication, is the first steps towards the effective management of the influenza
pandemic. The MIEM approach puts in practical terms the proposal by Douglas White
and colleagues that a multi-principles approach requires treating “each principle as a
continuous variable and weigh them according to judgments about their relative
importance.”187 This strategy then requires a procedural standard, as provided in MIEM.

C. Application of Procedural Standards (Illustrative procedural standard of necessity)
(i) Limiting Public Health Powers
The UDBHR document recommended that the balancing of conflicting principles,
that entail engaging ethical and legal considerations, be done in a spirit of
“professionalism, honesty, integrity and transparence.”188 Previous experiences with
population health interventions exposed some instances of antipathy towards ethnic
groups, or individuals. One such case is the 1900 ordinance by the Board of Health of the
City of San Francisco to quarantine a whole district for purposes of containing a bubonic
plague, and yet enforce the restrictions only on “people of Chinese race and nationality
and not against persons of other races.”189 The court determined that the manner of
administration of the ordinance was “with an evil eye and an unequal hand.”190
It takes a leap of faith to expect that once public health authorities are provided with
the relevant substantive and procedural ethical tools, they will all act as guided by their
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moral compass of honesty and integrity. Cases of betrayal of trust in public health
interventions are not unknown. There are two outstanding examples in public health
literature: the negative eugenics of the early 1900s in the United States, when vulnerable
people were involuntarily sterilized to prevent procreation and promote social
degeneration, and the Tuskegee syphilis study that subjected participants to deceitful
experimentation instead of offering them treatment.191
Antipathy aside, even well intention health resources allocation policies may result in
unfavorable outcomes based on underlying socio-political conditions of ethnic, race,
gender, or economic disparities. The individual liberties and freedoms at stake are so
important that public health decisions and actions that subordinate individuals ought to be
clearly delineated with practical benchmarks, such as the procedural standards of
necessity, reasonableness, proportionality, and harm avoidance.
Attentive to this problem, the American Public Health Journal issued a supplement in
February 2009 to highlight important information on influenza pandemic preparedness
and response. Several articles focused on health policy and ethnicity, as well as, on
vulnerability based on gender, women, ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees, and
people with disabilities.192 Sonja and colleagues explain that health disparities based on
racial, or ethnic minorities, may result in high morbidity and mortality among these
groups during influenza pandemics.
Ethicists warn that minority groups are economically disadvantaged and lack
financial resources, “including economic assets to use during protracted pandemic.”193
They are at high risk because “they cannot stockpile food and clean water or pay for
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utilities, transportation, and shelter if they cannot work while complying with some
isolation or quarantine recommendations.”194
To effectively manage pandemics, public health powers cannot be exercised in an
absolute manner in situations of vulnerability. There are factor, such as the
aforementioned individual vulnerability and protected liberty interests that mollify public
health powers to necessitate balance. For these reasons, efforts to develop influenza
pandemic preparedness and response policies need to include the question of limiting
public health powers. In the United States one of the legal mechanisms for limiting public
health powers is stipulated in the U.S. Constitution and was defended by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905). The constitutional parameter of
limited public health coercive powers entails the application of public health procedural
values, such as necessity, reasonable means, proportionality, and harm avoidance.195
These legal procedural standards of necessity, reasonableness, proportionality, and
harm avoidance are also recognized in bioethics as ethical procedural standards. Tom
Beauchamp and James Childress in their treatise on biomedical principles outlined
conditions that restrict the balancing of principles. Accordingly, the conditions of a better
reason, necessity, least possible infringement (proportionality), and minimizing the
negative effects of the infringement (harm avoidance), must be met to “justify infringing
one prima facie norm in order to adhere to another.”196
From a legal perspective, government is required “to have a good reason for public
health intervention,” and that “individuals subjected to coercion receive procedural due
process.”197 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
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opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.198 Accordingly, “the
parameters of due process requires an analysis of both the individual and government
interests (substantive) involved and the consequences and avoidability (procedural) of the
risk of error and abuse.”199 The norm here is that “the state may regulate in the name of
public health, but it may not overreach … may act on the basis of scientific evidence, but
not arbitrarily or with animus.”200
In accordance with the constitutional standards set by the Supreme Court in the
Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) case, the state overreaches when it uses public health
powers unnecessarily. The necessary use of public health powers is when the least
restrictive means are used to “to prevent an avoidable harm.”201 The method used must be
by “reasonable means” that “prevent or ameliorate a health threat.”202 The burden
imposed should not be “wholly disproportionate to the expected benefit.”203 Public health
authority must also ensure that intervention “does not pose an undue risk to its
subject.”204
(ii) Illustrative Procedural Standard of Necessity
In the United States, the Supreme Court determined that states possess police power
to compel individuals to submit to compulsory public health interventions for the
common good.205 The procedural standard of necessity ensures that the exercise of police
power remain in the parameters of what is reasonably required to prevent avoidable risks
to the safety and health of the population.206 Though, at stake is the individual’s bodily
integrity and privacy, neither individual autonomy nor police power is construed to be
absolute. The most cited example of the states coercive laws sanctioned by courts on
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necessity grounds is public health laws that require compulsory vaccinations or school
attendance.207
The necessity to protect other vulnerable children against crippling, and yet
preventable diseases has often been regarded by courts as important enough to override
even exceptions based on the First Amendment rights of religious beliefs.208 In Brown v.
Stone (1979), the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that:
(The Mississippi statute) requiring immunization against certain crippling and
deadly diseases particularly dangerous to children before they may be admitted to
school, serves an overriding and compelling public interests, and that such interest
extends to the exclusion of a child until such immunization has been effected, not
only as a protection of the child but as a protection of the larger number of the
children comprising the school community and with whom he will be daily in
close contact school rooms … 209
Vaccination laws for school attendance may be regarded as least intrusive in the sense
that “they do not institute an illegal search and seizure” as protected in the Fourth
Amendment.210 Moreover, as determined also in Adams v. Milwaukee (1913),
“vaccination laws do not discriminate against school children to the exclusion of others in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”211
According to James Childress and colleagues, necessity and least infringement are
corollaries. For, “a proposed coercive measure must be necessary in degree and in
kind.”212 These experts argued that it is not enough for a policy to satisfy the justificatory
conditions of effectiveness, to realize the goal of public health; it is essential that “agents
should (also) seek to minimize the infringement of general moral consideration.”213
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Public health agents also have a moral responsibility to “explain and justify that
infringement, whenever possible, to the relevant parties, including those affected by the
infringement.”214 Offering public justification, or transparency, is essential for creating
and maintaining trust” and establishing accountability.215
The moral justification of the infringement depends on whether it leads to a realistic
achievement of the objective and “no morally preferable alternative action can be
substituted.”216 According to Beauchamp and Childress, “the infringement … must be the
least possible infringement, commensurable with achieving the primary goal of the
action.”217 When, for instance, the moral consideration of confidentiality is to be
infringed, Childress and colleagues suggest that public health agents should “only
disclose the amount and kind of information needed, and only to those necessary, to
realize the goal.”218
The Pennsylvania public health statutory authority, as incorporated in the draft 2005
IPRP regarding confidentiality of reports and records, puts emphasis on adherence to the
necessity standards. Statute 35 P.S. #521.15 restricts disclosure of confidential records
and reports obtained as a result of intercepting communicable diseases, pursuant to the
act, only to members of the Department, or the local board of health. Only where
necessary to realize the purpose of disease prevention and control, could the confidential
information be divulged to any other party.219
Balancing conflicting ethical principles can be a complex endeavor, but ethics
committees are an effective strategy for clarifying and providing guidance in complex
moral issues. As acknowledged by the IBC, ethics committees have proved their
worthiness in three decades of existence and have considerable experience as “guarantors
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of respect for ethical conditions” in human experimentation and medical practice.220
Because ethics committees are characteristically pluralistic, and multidisciplinary in
nature, they provide clarity to ethical decisions and practices by demonstrating diversity
of competences, independence, and transparence.221
(iii) Procedural Standards and Relevance of Ethics Committees
Probably the precursors to ethics committees in hospitals are the “medico-moral”
committees, in Catholic Hospitals, that were sanctioned by the Catholic Hospitals
Association in the Ethical and Religious Directives of 1949.222 The medico-moral
committees were composed of physicians, nursing sisters, and at times a hospital
chaplain. The role of the committee members was to ensure adherence to “Catholic
teaching on matters such as contraceptives, sterilization, abortion, and euthanasia.”223 But
before the emergence of ethics committees, the Advisory Council of the National
Institute of Health and Regulation of Research in the United States endorsed the
formulation of Institutional Review Committees. These independent, peer review boards
were meant to “ensure an independent determination of risks and benefits and assure the
voluntary informed consent of the subject.”224
In the Karen Ann Quinlan (1976) case, the New Jersey Supreme Court endorsed the
establishment of Institutional Ethics Committees that would be better suited to resolving
conflicts in the field of medical competency than the courts.225 The President’s
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research endorsed the establishment of Hospital Ethics Committees in
1983.226 The President’s Commission recommended three functions for ethics
committees, namely, education, policy development, and case consultation.227
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The United States Congress, in 1991, passed the Patient Self-Determination Act
requiring that all health care institutions that receive federal funds for Medicare or
Medicaid inform patients, upon admission, of their right to participate in health care
decision-making, and in particular, about advance health care directives.228 According to
Albert Jonsen and colleagues, the Patient Self-Determination Act inspired the engaging
of ethics committees and professional organizations in community education.229 As
currently understood in clinical ethics, Institutional Ethics Committee refers to a group of
individuals of diverse backgrounds tasked with supporting the health care institutions
with ethics services that include ethics education, ethics consultation, and policy
development.230
In the global community, member states of UNESCO are signatories to UDBHR
whose article 19 recommends that States “should encourage the establishment of
independent, multidisciplinary, and pluralistic ethics committees.”231 This strategy is
undertaken to “establish a pluralistic dialogue about bioethics issues between
stakeholders and within society as a whole.”232 According to Claude Huriet, the attributes
of ethics committees “are the evaluation of ethical problems linked to scientific and
technological progress, formulation of advice on ethical dilemmas, educating and
mobilizing the public.”233
The influenza pandemic creates a situation that necessitates the evaluation of ethical
considerations emerging from both clinical medicine and public health interventions. In
clinical medicine, ethics committees partake in important decisions, by both patients and
physicians, only by invitation of the principle parties.234 Public health ethics, on the other
hand, pertains to decisions and actions, by government or public health agents, that
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prevent disease and promote health populations even when it entails overriding individual
autonomy.235
While ethics committees have gradually gained ample competencies for engaging
clinical ethics, organizational ethics, professional ethics, business ethics, and research
ethics, the integration of ethics in clinical medicine and public health is still a slow work
in progress. But lessons drawn from the experience of harmonizing clinical ethics, and
organizational ethics can inform ethics committees in the new paradigm shift to public
health ethics.
Haavi Morreim explains that, in clinical medicine, the free market system created “a
competitive environment where marketing is virtually as important as medicine.”236
Market approaches introduced value conflicts that tend to be outside the competencies of
clinical ethics. Economic influences by payers and providers led to conflicts of interest in
areas of billing practices, access to health care, financial incentives and penalties to
influence clinician’s decisions, and restriction on access to specialists.237 This
development meant that the hospital’s obligation to the patient derived from two
relationships. One is the patient-provider trust relationship, based on clinical ethics, and
the other is the customer-supplier relationship governed by business ethics.238
To ensure that business practices are ethical, the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) expanded its patient’s rights standards in 1995.
The “Patient Rights and Organization Ethics” linked good management policy with good
ethical practice.239 Accordingly, ethics committees began to draw from business ethics to
address values-laden organizational ethical issues, and on clinical ethics to address
patient-provider clinical issues. A consensus gradually emerged among ethicists that
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clinical ethics and organizational ethics are components of one entity. The preferred
approach became one that provided structures and processes that integrate rule-based and
values-based approaches to yield practical ethical solutions, and address ethics quality in
the health care organization, at all levels and across the full range of domain.240
For instance, over the last decade, hospital ethics committees in the United States
worked towards the harmonization of clinical ethics with business, or organizational,
ethics. By the year 2009, the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH)
was no longer recognizing “clinical ethics and organizational ethics, as distinct
entities.”241 The Veteran’s Health Administration, of the United States Department of
Veterans’ Affairs (VA), undertook the in-depth integration of clinical ethics, and
organizational ethics, in secular bioethics in the United States.
In an initiative that created the IntegratedEthics Model, the VA expressed
dissatisfaction with a clinical ethics approach that left non-clinical concerns
unaddressed.242 They critiqued the clinical ethics approach for tending to be primarily
reactive and case-based (responding to ethical questions that arise), and not “proactively
indentifying, prioritizing, and addressing concerns about ethics quality at the
organizational level.”243 Moreover, leaders tended to become aware of problems after a
crisis occurrence.
The VA embarked on developing an ethics model that addresses ethics quality at all
levels of the healthcare organization, taking into account both rule-based, and valuebased approaches to ethics. The approach involved defining core functions of ethics
committees as consultation, prevention ethics, and ethical leadership. These core
functions are used to improve three targeted levels of quality, namely, decisions and
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actions (consultation), systems and processes (preventive ethics), environment, and
culture (ethical leadership).244
The VA explained preventive ethics as concerned with addressing “the underlying
systems and processes that influence behavior” rather than just waiting to respond to the
arising individual ethics questions. The aim of preventive ethics is to “produce
measurable improvements in an organization’s ethics practices by implementing systemlevel changes that reduce disparities between current practices and ideal practices.”245 A
step-by-step ISSUES approach is used to address the ethics quality gap in health care. “I”
stands for “identify the issue;” “S” stands for “study the issue;” “S” stands for “select a
strategy;” “U” stands for “undertake a plan;” “E” stands for “evaluate and adjust;” and,
“S” stands for “sustain and spread.”246
Ethics Consultation, according to the VA, is a service that responds to individual
ethics concerns arising out of people’s decisions and actions.247 Integrated ethics ensures
high quality consultation through a step-by-step CASES approach. “C” stands for “clarify
the consultation request;” “A” stands for “assemble the relevant information;” “S” stands
for “synthesize the information;” “E” stands for “explain the synthesis;” and, “S’ stands
for “support the consultation process.”248
Integrated ethics utilizes ethical leadership as a tool for improving ethics quality at
the level of the organization’s environment and culture. The VA supposes that leadership
plays a critical role in “creating, sustaining, and changing the organization’s culture”
when “they undertake behaviors that foster an ethical environment.”249 The ethical
leadership role also involves ensuring that “employees throughout the organization are
supported in adhering to high standards.”250 The VA outlines four “compass points” that
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ought to be made clear, in words and actions, that state: “ethics is a priority, communicate
clear expectations for ethical practice, to practice ethical decision making, and, support
the facility’s ethics program.”251
The VA’s approach is an example of a robust approach that integrates diverse
competencies, and could provide guidance to ethics committees addressing population
health on how to effectively strategize in the influenza pandemic preparedness and
response. For instance, in 2006 when the VA began to hold staff discussion forums on
ethics issues in influenza pandemic preparedness, they based their moral considerations
on substantive values, such as individual liberty, protection of public from harm,
solidarity, equity, and duty to provide care.252 The focus on these substantive values was
not unconnected to the VA’s goal of improving ethics quality in the organization by
targeting the three levels of actions and decisions (consultation), systems and processes
(preventive ethics), and environment and culture (ethical leadership).253
(iv) Role of Ethics Committees in Influenza Pandemic
Article 19 of the UDBHR document, which explicitly recommend the establishment
of ethics committees, is necessarily connected with article 18 that specifies the spirit by
which decision-making and addressing of bioethics issues ought to be approached. In
article 19, the UDHBR sets out four constitutive attributes of ethics committees:
assess the relevant ethical, legal, scientific and social issues related to research
projects involving human beings; provide advice on ethical problems in clinical
settings; assess scientific and technological developments, formulate
recommendations and contribute to preparation of guidelines on issues within the
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scope of this Declaration; foster debate, education and public awareness of, and
engagement in, bioethics.254
Ethics committees are useful strategies in pandemic preparedness and response if they
are pluralistic and multidisciplinary, and if they can demonstrate competence,
independence and transparence.255 They provide the diverse competencies needed to
engage logistical and scientific needs with moral dimensions, such as ethical principles,
norms, values, interests, and preferences in allocation of scarce resources.256 The cost of
not explicitly engaging and balancing these values, as the Canadian public health
providers learned in the SARS experience, is “loss of trust, low hospital staff morale,
confusion about roles and responsibilities, stigmatization of vulnerable communities, and
misinformation.”257
Ethics committees are very effective tools in handling ethical problems in clinical
medicine, but they can also be successfully deployed on both state and local levels in
pandemic planning and response. The ethics committee members help to clarify issues
and delineate substantive and procedural principles required for the successful
management of the influenza pandemic. In some states, pandemic planning committees
used (implicitly) the model of ethics committees by involving people of diverse
backgrounds, such as ethicists, clinicians, lawyers, local and state public health officials,
and the local community, in decision-making regarding strategies for allocation of scarce
resources.258
Article 18 of the UDBHR document provides that affected persons, professionals, and
society should engage in dialogue for the appropriate sharing of knowledge and
reviewing bioethics issues. The basic ethical features “of decision-making and addressing
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bioethics issues,” as explicitly stated in the UDBHR document, are “professionalism,
honesty, integrity, and transparency.”259 These features inform ethics committees in their
role of evaluating ethical problems, advice formulation, and the mobilization and
education of the public.260
The Pennsylvania’s IPRP document, for instance, provides guidance that requires
application of diverse clinical, and non-clinical, competencies in hospitals in concrete
influenza pandemic situations. Discussions of these guidelines in hospital ethic
committees could propel more effective, and more ethical, strategizing. The hospital
ethics committee could be comprised of representation from administration, medical staff
(physicians and nurses), emergency department staff, other departments, community
representation, ethicist, lawyer, and public health personnel trained in disaster
preparedness.261
Due to the pluralistic and multifaceted ethical issues in the pandemics, the ethics
committee may function better when divided into subcommittees to focus on the different
specific interests of individuals, and the population. Each of the subcommittees could be
tasked with focusing on ethical considerations in specific domains of moral complexity,
such as a subcommittee on individual liberties (autonomy and individual responsibility),
a subcommittee on protection of the population good (mandatory measures, allocation of
limited resources, solidarity and community participation), and a subcommittee on the
duty to care (clinical competence and solidarity).
Minimally, the subcommittee on individual liberties, or autonomy, should be
comprised of a representative from the community, an attorney, a public health official, a
staff member with clinical competence, and a person trained in ethics. This committee
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would be tasked with the analysis and interpretation of how the IPRP statutory guidelines
affect individual interests in the influenza pandemic response. This segment of the IPRP
guides the use of coercive powers of quarantine, isolation, compulsory examination and
treatment, mandatory reporting, and commitment to confinement.262 The subcommittee
may need to debate the relevant application of ethical notions such as least restrictive
means, equal treatment, necessity, proportionality, and reasonableness.
The ethics subcommittee on the protection of the population good (protection of the
public from harm) could be tasked with promoting shared decision-making, reasons for
public health control measures, communication strategies, mechanisms for effective
engagement of all stakeholders, and providing justification for impinging on individual
liberties. These discussions could be anchored in substantive principles such as solidarity.
This committee should at least have representative from the community, a person trained
in ethics, a public health official, a medical staff, and a representative from hospital
administration.
The subcommittee on the duty to care need to address the clinical challenges
associated with patient surge, resource allocation, additional professional demands, and
personal and family safety. The reflection on the professional duty to care will necessitate
focusing beyond adherence to rule-based professional codes to a commitment to the
substantive principle of solidarity. The subcommittee on the duty to care need to have, at
a minimum, a representative of hospital clinicians, a non-clinical staff, a public health
officials, a person trained in ethics, and a community representative.
Subcommittees are appropriate strategies for breaking down complex ethical
problems into manageable component that could be studied, and analyzed, by the
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appropriate entities. Some members may represent a moral vision that is strictly
prohibitive of actions that are not permitted, or consented to, by individuals. Other
members may be inclined to support approaches that prioritize community interests such
as, greater good for the greater number, maximizing life-years, prioritizing the worse off,
or social value. The opportunity to debate and engage in dialogue paves the way for
committee members to clarify and abridge diverse perceptions of the notion of just
allocation of resources, or the link between autonomy and responsibility. 263
The work of subcommittees should be submitted to the full ethics committee to
further reconcile appropriate procedures, goals, and objectives. Subcommittees contribute
to the multidisciplinary representation, and allow for a consideration of diverse
competencies. The plurality of moral thinking brings rigor and balance to the ethical
discourse as the ethics committee seeks to zero in on balancing the relevant substantive,
and procedural, principles. But, the influenza preparedness and response plan will keep
evolving as the substantive and procedural values are regularly analyzed, and reassessed,
based on the most objective determination of the available scientific information,
effectiveness of care, and resource capacity.

D. Summary
The influenza pandemic outbreak is likely to lead to drastic increases in morbidity
and mortality. It will overwhelm public health resources and infrastructure, while
prompting public health officials to resort to coercive measures and contentious
allocation decisions. In the attempt to protect the interests of the population, individual
interests will be subordinated. The principles approach has demonstrated its worth in
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clinical medicine that prioritizes the individual’s choices and individual liberty interests.
But population health presents a different paradigm that is accommodative of individual,
and population, interests at different levels, and, involves pluralistic moral considerations
such as utilitarian, egalitarian, and communitarian.
The Mixed Interests Ethics Model (MIEM) proposed by this dissertation provides
policy-makers, and health providers in the influenza pandemic, with a set of ethical tools
to facilitate a balance between individual and population interests. MIEM is consistent
with the bioethics principles-approach developed by UNESCO in the Universal
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights document. MIEM enhances the amelioration
of individual and human rights in the influenza pandemic intervention, by requiring the
subjugation of substantive and procedural principles, to a rigorous analysis of
specification, meaning, scope and justification. The individual-oriented substantive
principles of autonomy, as protected in libertarian ethics, is contrasted with the
population-oriented substantive principle of solidarity, as promoted in utilitarianism,
egalitarianism, and communitarian ethics.
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5. Chapter Five
The Importance of MIEM for Policy Development in the HIV/AIDS Epidemic

Introduction
The global fight against HIV/AIDS is probably the most recognizable altruism-driven
public health intervention in the last three decades. Uganda in particular has been the
beneficiary of immense generous monetary grants and volunteer HIV/AIDS experts from
international organizations, such as the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS
(UNAIDS), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). Other contributions of resources, health volunteers,
and researchers came from individual countries all over the world. Likewise, numerous
international faith-based organizations, academic institutions, and philanthropist such as
Bill Gates, made the global fight against HIV/AIDS a priority.
The global HIV/AIDS movement for networking, participation, and monetary
contributions arose out of the shared urgent need for a concerted intervention effort.
HIV/AIDS was understood as one of the worst global threats to the safety and health of
populations and the overall wellbeing of people in the twenty-first century.1 By 1997 an
estimated 30.6 million people worldwide had been infected with HIV, or advanced to the
AIDS disease. Of these, 30.6 million, “an estimated 21 million were residing in subSaharan Africa.”2
The stark difference in the distribution of HIV/AIDS among the world’s populations,
and the contrast in intervention capabilities, came to be seen in terms of the economic
imbalance between the wealthier developed nations, and poor resource nations. Some
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ethicists began to argue that wealthier nations, with an aggregate national income
exceeding $21 trillion, had a moral obligation to contribute the estimated $7 to $10
billion needed annually for global HIV/AIDS intervention.3 The initiative was eventually
framed as a safety and health issue, as well as a social justice and human rights issue.4
One of the most successful, and yet most criticized foreign sponsored HIV/AIDS
program in Uganda, was the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) that
commenced in 2003. The U.S. funded program adopted Uganda’s behavioral change
policy known as Abstinence, Faithfulness, and use a Condom (ABC). The PEPFAR
initiative remarkably reduced mother-to-child (PMTCT) HIV transmission, increased
access to anti-retroviral treatment, and improved counseling services and palliative basic
care.5
However, not much of these success stories impacted global public health ethics
literature and discourse as strongly as the controversies regarding condoms, abstinenceonly, and minority rights. The disputes emerged from a pushback against a provision in
the PEPFAR that allocated a small portion of the funds to promoting abstinence-only
programs.6 But, as the controversial discourse, often referred to as the “ABC debate,”7
intensified the HIV prevalence began to rise.8
While many public health and human rights experts agree that a human rights
framework is the appropriate strategy for addressing HIV/AIDS policy and prevalence,
the interpretation and application of human rights is not univocal. In some instances,
human rights claims have been expressed in a language that is overly high-pitched and
divisive on the issues of HIV intervention, human rights, and social-cultural diversities.9
HIV/AIDS intervention in Uganda needs a human rights-based ethical guidance, such as
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suggested by the bioethics principles approach of UNESCO’s Universal Declaration for
Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR), and as made practical, by engaging the Mixed
Interests Ethics Model (MIEM).
Engaging and critiquing the aforementioned diverse perspectives regarding HIV
prevention in Uganda necessitates the deployment of the Mixed Interests Ethics Model.
MIEM requires balance between the underlying individual interests and population
interests through a critical analysis of the moral conviction informing the competing
belief systems. This normative analysis approach is necessary for purposes of enhancing
communication, coordination, collaboration, and cooperation, as well as the amelioration
of health and human rights.
This chapter identifies and applies two substantive principles relevant to Uganda’s
ABC and PEPFAR initiative to fights HIV/AIDS. The principles are non-stigmatization
and non-discrimination, and the principle of the common good. The UDBHR document
included the principle of non-discrimination and non-stigmatization in article 11.10
Balance is negotiated through the strategy of specification, justification, and limiting the
application of the principles by considering procedural standards such as reasonableness.

A. MIEM and the Illustrative Principles of the Common Good, and Nondiscrimination and Non-stigmatization
(i) Behavioral change, Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and HIV/AIDS in Uganda.
Uganda, a country that gained global prominence for its behavioral change-based
HIV prevalence reduction from 18 percent to about 6.2 percent in the 1990s, stands to
lose its gains as HIV/AIDS prevalence rose from 6.5 percent in 2009 to 7 percent in
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2011.11 The civil societies’ umbrella organization – Uganda Network of Aids Services
Organization (UNASO) – blamed the regress on unqualified staff, and inadequate
services in Uganda’s district health centers and hospitals. Some epidemiologists
denounced the uncoordinated responses by pro-gay and lesbian civil societies as
obstructive to the goals of HIV prevention.12 The Uganda AIDS commission attributes
the HIV rise to complacency.13 Other voices attributed the problem to Uganda’s failure to
scale up biomedical intervention of prevention of mother-to-child transmission
(PMTCT), safe male circumcision (SMC), and universal access to antiretroviral
medication (ART).14
While it may appear that all of these measures were essential for HIV prevention,
parties chose to overemphasize different key drivers to foster the narrative that best suited
their preferred intervention options, be it biomedical, civil liberties, individual rights,
minority rights, or behavior change (ABC). Soon after the President’s Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was initiated, disagreements emerged between global AIDS
experts who favored advancing the behavioral change approach (partner reduction, age of
sex debut, condom use), and those for the scaling up of scientific tools and broad
structural factors, such as the economic empowerment of vulnerable populations and
protection of minority’s rights.15
For Jonathan Cohen and colleagues, the very idea of focusing on the A, B, and C in
Uganda’s HIV prevention was a sanctioning of discrimination and stigmatization.16
These researchers argued that:
For too many Ugandan, especially women and girls, ABC is not enough. In 2003,
we interviewed Ugandan women who described how domestic violence caused or
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contributed to their HIV infection. These women could not “abstain” from being
raped by their spouses; much less insist on their fidelity or condom use. Nor is
ABC an effective strategy for girls who face rape or sexual coercion … Programs
should focus on empowering vulnerable populations to achieve economic
independence, protecting their legal rights, and providing them with the
information and tools they need to prevent HIV – not preaching abstinence until
marriage.17
Several studies, including the World Health Organization/Global Program on AIDS
(WHO/GPA) survey, established that AIDS-related behavior change occurred in Uganda
in three areas: “increase in the age of sexual debut by adolescents, reduction in number of
non-regular partners, and increase in condom use, especially after 1993.”18 According to
Edward Green and colleagues, Uganda’s behavioral change-based approach to HIV
prevention, that led to a dramatic decline in HIV prevalence in the 1990s continued to
generate considerable interest and debate among researchers and policymakers in global
public health.19
By the year 2006, some public health experts, such as Rand Stoneburner and Daniel
Low-Beer, had come to the conclusion that “a decrease in casual/multiple sexual partner
behavior” rather than “mainly condom use or increase in mortality” was the overriding
factor that led to the HIV prevalence decline. Other analysts such as Bob Roer, Jonathan
Cohen, Rebecca Schleife, and Tony Tate insisted on the scaling up of scientific tools, and
an array of broader structural factors, such as reduction of poverty, gender violence, and
conflict.20
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Neither proponent of A or of C explicitly took an extreme position that negated any
relevance of condoms or partner reduction.21 Yet the discourse developed into the intense
ABC debate that gradually narrowed down to an A (abstinence) versus C (condoms)
controversy– a development, these writers suggested, that may have occurred “perhaps
inadvertently.”22 But a careful analysis of diverse literatures on the topic reveals that
these developments were not random, but an inevitable upshot from the ethos of the early
HIV/AIDS discourse in the United States, that shaped the tension between civil liberties
(or individual interests) and the public health’s focus on the common good.23
In the 1990s when Uganda used the socio-cultural tools of behavioral change to
successfully reduce the rising HIV prevalence rate, global public health ethics, was also
undergoing a metamorphosis. The evolution started in the early days of HIV/AIDS in the
United States when public health, civil liberties, and social justice were linked.24 The
initial strategy was the identification of homosexual men, bisexual men, and intravenous
drug users (IDUs) who were labeled as risky groups, before the focus shifted to risky
behaviors.25
When identifying those “with asymptomatic HIV infection” became a matter of
clinical urgency in the United States, gay organizations “began to argue homosexual and
bisexual men to have their antibody status determined under confidential or anonymous
conditions.”26 Physicians maintained that HIV-antibody tests be considered just like any
other blood tests that required only a presumed consent of the patient.27 Using rightsbased arguments, advocates also sought to “preserve the (autonomous) right of pregnant
women to undergo HIV testing only after special informed consent.”28 But the prospects
of saving the newly born babies from HIV infection, through the administration of
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zidovudine to pregnant seropositive women, caused many to argue for routine testing of
pregnant women, and mandatory screening of newborn babies.29
New developments in global public health ethics in the 1990s led to an explicit
linkage of public health with social justice and a focus on human rights.30 This was
thought of as a new way of “defining and advancing human wellbeing.”31 But, while
some saw the economic, social and cultural rights asserted in the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and cultural rights (ICESCR) as complimenting the civil-political
rights in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), others
considered ICESCR as optional.32
Even as public health and human rights were being linked, some epidemiologists and
ethicists could not overcome the division that characterized the two human rights treaties
in the mid-20th century. Those committed to advancing the interests of liberal states were
inclined to emphasize civil and political rights. Those who saw governments as obligated
to “meet basic economic and social needs” of people tended to emphasize the ICESCR.33
These two approaches appear to have been in play as the Uganda ABC and PEPFAR
debate engaged individual rights and freedoms, and diversities of beliefs and culturalsocial values.
As the transnational, global civil societies assumed the responsibility for global
HIV/AIDS and human rights advocacy, as well as the role of advancing democratic
practices, tension began to re-emerge regarding conceptual issues about human rights,
and cultural diversity.34 Not all human rights claims advanced a balanced and more
realistic view of human rights. Tom Hadden referred to this phenomenon as the “The
pendulum theory of individual, communal and minority Rights.”35
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According to Hadden, those who promote the individualistic understanding of human
rights hold the view that “human rights can be deduced from, or at any rate linked to, the
nature of the human individual.”36 The absolutists regard human rights as “absolute and
unchanging and can therefore be used as a basis for the development of a global theory of
democracy and governance.”37 Others are of the view that “all human rights are of equal
status and that non-can be subordinated to any other.”38
Roberto Andorno states that “in many Western nations there has been an excessive
emphasis on rights and freedoms for the individual, sometimes to the detriment of
families and community values, which are of paramount importance to most non-Western
societies.”39 This scholar advances his argument in defense of the bioethics principlesapproach stipulated in the UNECSO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human
Rights (UDBHR) document, as the most effective way of engaging health and human
rights.40 The UDBHR draws legitimacy from the universal recognition that every human
being has an inherent dignity, and inherent rights, simply by virtue of being human.
Subsequently, “human rights emerge from international law instrument with sufficient
flexibility to be compatible with full respect for cultural diversity.”41
Tony Barnett and Priers Blaikie were among the first researchers to explore the link
between the AIDS epidemics and the socio-cultural, economic and political dynamics
that prevailed before, and during, the 1980s in Uganda. The two researchers made an
inquiry into the societal structures of sexual relations, such as marriage expectations,
cohabitation and kinship, and how they impacted on the vulnerability to HIV/AIDS
epidemic.42 The study contributed to the understanding of behavioral change, in terms of
addressing the conditions and environment in which risky behaviors occur rather than
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focusing solely on the individual behavior, as had been done in the early days of
HIV/AIDS in the West.43
The high rate of HIV/AIDS infection, in the 1980s, was largely attributed to civil
wars that created an environment of economic inequality, and disruption of social identity
and property relationships.44 After the civil war in 1986, President Yoweri Museveni
sought to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS by reviving traditional societal structures to
harness their social cohesion and the power of community mobilization, as well as
interpersonal communication.45 Through a behavioral change strategy, articulated in
slogans such as “Zero Grazing,” “Love Carefully” and “Abstain, be Faithful, use a
Condom (ABC),” the HIV prevalence rate was reduced from a high of 18 percent in 1992
to 6.2 percent in 2004.46
The approach involved partner reduction, delay of sex-debut, condom use, and
improvement of women’s rights, such as the education of girls.47 Despite improvement,
however, issues of discrimination and stigmatization still occur in Uganda. With the
availability of donor funds, such as PEPFAR and the Global Fund to fight AIDS, one
would expect the HIV prevalence rate in Uganda to have dropped to lower than 6 percent
in the last nine years. Instead, HIV prevalence stabilized at a rate of 6.1 percent to 6.5
percent before it began to rise in 2006. By 2011, the prevalence rate had risen to 7
percent.48
The set back did not come as a surprise to some scholars and experts who had all
along argued that parties advancing competing interests were undermining Uganda’s
behavioral change-based program.49 The abstinence-until-marriage provision in the
PEPFAR program triggered a divisive debate among donors, and involved parties who
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cast doubt on the whole idea of the effectiveness of the behavioral change, particularly
the ABC-based approach in Uganda. Some United States-based evangelical groups
teamed up with their colleagues in Uganda to prioritize the abstinence and fidelity part of
the ABC strategy while discrediting condoms.50 The counter-criticism, led by Human
Rights Watch, sought to discredit the ABC while retaining the condom component.51
Jonathan Cohen and colleagues initiated a paradigm shift when they framed the
Uganda ABC-based behavioral change strategy as a human rights issue.52 They argued
for a new direction that would guarantee the rights of vulnerable minorities such as
children, lesbian, gay, and transgender persons. They sought to ensure that these groups
of people “are explicitly recognized in national and local HIV prevention policies and
programs.”53 As the support for homosexual rights in Uganda gained support in the
international community, the government of the United States counteracted the resistance
in Uganda with a policy of attaching foreign aid to improving gay rights in developing
countries.54
Global initiatives were also being undertaken to advance women’s rights. It is
generally accepted that gender imbalances in sub-Saharan Africa influence men’s
violation of women’s rights, and also increase women’s risks of acquiring HIV/IADS.55
According to Jacques du Guerny and Elisabeth Sjoberg, the economic dependence of
women, coupled with their lack of decisional power, makes it impossible for women to
have influence over sexual matters, such as demanding their partner use of condom.56
Some studies have also established that girls who marry in adolescence have higher rates
of HIV because an increase in coital frequency, along with a decreased use of condoms,
result in girls’ diminished abilities to abstain from sex.57
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While the parliament of Uganda passed the Domestic Violence Bill in 2009, the more
comprehensive Domestic Relations Bill tabled in parliament in 2003, was still shelved by
2010.58 The involved parties were reluctant to accept the necessary tradeoff between
cultural rights and individual rights. The bill sought to initiate reforms in marriage,
separation, and divorce, as well as property rights. The targeted issues were polygamy,
co-habitation, dowry, wife inheritance, early marriages, marital rape, and domestic
violence against women.59 The most contentious issues on which agreement could not be
reached were property rights, co-habitation, and restriction on polygamy.
Muslims, and some traditional cultural societies, objected to restriction on
polygamous marriages. The 2008 revision of the Domestic Relations Bill, which was
issued in two drafts, included a provision for customary marriages within the law. It was
provided that for Muslims, legally constituted lower Qadhic courts under the High Court
would be established to deal with marriage, divorce, guardianship, and inheritance of
property, in accordance to Islamic law.60 The provision to regard partners who had
cohabitated for ten years or more as married was dropped in the new draft because
Christians and Muslims alike objected to it.
It is likely that not many Western human rights advocates and ethicists are aware of
the role played by the government, and faith-based organizations, in Uganda, in the fight
against gender-based HIV/AIDS stigma and discrimination. In 2003, the Catholic
Bishops of Africa and Madagascar (SECAM) directly addressed the issue of stigma and
discrimination in their workshop on HIV/AIDS in Dakar, Senegal. According to Michael
Czerny, the SECAM bishops pledged to work “tirelessly to eradicate stigma and
discrimination and to challenge any social, religious, cultural and political norms and
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practices which perpetuate such stigma and discrimination.”61 The bishops of East Africa
emphasized the need for all people to respect the dignity and rights of people living with
HIV/AIDS, and to care for them.62
According to Sofia Gruskin and Daniel Tarantola, “adverse discrimination occurs
when a distinction is made against a person which results in their being treated unfairly or
unjustly.”63 Those groups that “do not share the characteristics of the dominant group
within a society” are targets for discrimination.64 This implies “social inequality and a
denial of equal opportunities.”65 For this reason, gender or class based-discrimination is
prohibited in all major international treaties, and international declarations.
UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR)
document included a principle prohibiting discrimination or stigmatization in violation of
human dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms.”66 This bioethics principle was
derived from article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) which asserts
that:
All (human beings) are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection
against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any
incitement to such discrimination.67
With the ABC and PEPFAR ethical discourse increasingly focusing on human rights,
the argument was no longer whether discrimination occurs in Uganda, but whether
parties could reconcile their differences regarding the meaning and interpretation of
human rights. This challenge is a reminder of the question Jonathan Mann and colleagues
raised, but did not satisfactorily address, regarding how to negotiate an optimal balance
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between public health goals and human rights norms, given the inevitability of conflict.68
This challenge has become even more urgent given that public health and human rights
are understood to be enabled by the pragmatic-oriented global transnational HIV/AIDS
advocates.
From a political-philosophical analysis, globalization affected public health at the
level of human rights. The implication of globalization for democracy meant a global
dimension of “the democratic recognition of a broader range of human needs” that set “a
gradual trend for international recognition of justice and human rights.”69 Another related
development of globalization, according to Deen K. Chatterjee, is the “surge of
pluralistically oriented social and political movements within both democratic and
nondemocratic countries.”70 These two developments “share the common democratic
ideas of autonomy, equality, and political participation, as well as the spur of
globalization.”71
In this new way of conceptualizing global interconnectedness and participation,
communities are conceived and empowered as “cross-border localities.”72 In question,
however, is the relevance, or irrelevance, of the old democratic principle of autonomous
self-government. Likewise, the diversity of culture, social and political formations
presents a complex problem in the application of cosmopolitan norms to different
localities. But, of significant importance to some advocates of liberal cosmopolitanism is
the idea that solidarity entails “cross-border interactions among members.”73 While the
link between public health and human rights has been fairly well argued in the normative
analysis of public health, the specific modalities of liberal cosmopolitan-biopolitics are
inconclusive.
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As provided for in MIEM, the discourse over HIV prevention and human rights
protection in Uganda must be subjected to an in-depth ethical analysis of the
specification, meaning, scope, and justification of the competing moral claims, so that a
balance via the appropriate procedural standards such as reasonableness and necessity
can be successfully negotiated. Attempts to balance competing interests ought to engage
the link between public health, human rights, and the new component of liberal
cosmopolitanism that involves networked transnational advocates.
(ii) Human Rights and Reductionism in Uganda HIV/AIDS Intervention
In his assessment of the policy trajectory of the heterosexual prevention of HIV in
Uganda, Edward C. Green, in the year 2003, boldly questioned the ethical objectives of
some international agents. He framed his concern as follows:
We who work in AIDS, as in other fields, fall into thinking and operating within
certain paradigms which become mindsets, which in turn erect blinders to ideas
and evidence that fall outside – or contrary to – the prevailing paradigm.74
He was frustrated with the Western approaches that he characterized as advancing
embedded ethnocentric interests over public health goals of the health and safety of
populations in Uganda, and other developing countries.75
The main target of Edward Green’s criticism was donor agencies, such as UNAID
and USAID, that allocated the billions in AIDS prevention funds worldwide based
largely on what they thought they knew about AIDS in America in the mid-1980s, and
not on the facts on the ground in those developing countries.76 Green’s observation was
later to be supported by Helen Epstein, in 2007, who claimed that UNAID and USAID
had for years ignored the hard evidence, presented by researchers such as Maxine
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Ankrah, that partner reduction was largely responsible for HIV reduction in Uganda in
the 1990s.77
Green’s criticism could not be ignorable following the divisive, and partisan, debate
over the policy priorities of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)
initiatives. The 2003 PEPFAR act by the U.S. Congress required that 55 percent of the
funds be spent on treatment of individuals with HIV/AIDS, 15 percent on palliative care,
20 percent on HIV/AIDS prevention, and 10 percent on helping orphans and vulnerable
children. Of the 20 percent designated for HIV/AIDS prevention, Congress further
directed that 33 percent (approximately one billion dollars) be used on abstinence-untilmarriage programs. Moreover, a “global gag rule” prevented funding any organization
that engaged in abortion services.78
The move to insert the abstinence-until-marriage provision superimposed the already
explosive United States’ moral discourse regarding condoms, abstinence until marriage,
women’s rights, and gay rights onto the Uganda behavioral change-based prevention
strategy. The once effective behavioral change model, known by the acronym of ABC in
Uganda, succumbed to the relentless demands for change. Critics insisted that it was
insufficiently suited to the task of HIV/AIDS prevention. This verdict emerged right from
the moment the PEPFAR plan included the abstinence-only requirement, endorsed by
Conservatives, but drew the ire of critics who otherwise preferred condom use.79
The confrontation gradually transformed into a divisive and stifling debate among
donors, activists, politicians, and ethicists over whether HIV/AIDS prevention in Uganda
should be a behavior change issue, a civil liberty issue, or a human rights issue. But,
following the persistent criticism of the “abstinence until marriage” provision, the
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PEPFAR reauthorization of 2008, which also tripled the fund, did not include directives
on how the funds were to be spent.80 President Obama’s administration that came to
power in 2009, sought to change the controversial aspects of PEPFAR by replacing what
he called “ideology” with “best practice.”81
According to Andrew Green, the lynchpin for U.S. President Obama’s goal for an
“AIDS-free generation” comprised “prevention of mother-to-child transmission
(PMTCT), safe male circumcision (SMC), and access to universal treatment.”82 While
these biomedical instruments are proven interventions, HIV/AIDS is also a social-cultural
encounter. One of the initiatives of President Obama’s government to address the sociocultural component was the 2011 policy of attaching foreign aid to the promotion of gay
rights abroad. This policy, however, did not help to abate the tension surrounding the
PEPFAR and ABC related controversies.83
Critics of the behavior change ABC strategy in Uganda had argued that it was
discriminative and against human rights since it gave unfair advantage to the choices of
men over women, and was repugnant to the sexual preferences of gay people. There were
those who dismissed the whole notion of marriage as useless for purposes of HIV/AIDS
prevention in sub-Saharan Africa. They argued that “to the extent that abstinence-onlyuntil-marriage approach promotes marriage as a safeguard against HIV infection, it
potentially endanger the lives of individuals who face a high risk of HIV infection from
their spouses.”84
But there were also people that did not apportion blame for increased HIV infection
among women on the institution of marriage, per se, but on the overall female-male
gender relation. They pointed out that different cultures assign different gender-based
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roles to women and men.85 While men are assigned more economic and political power,
“women are more likely to be in economic dependent positions, implying a lack of
power, lower status, and limited influence on decisions concerning themselves and
families.”86 So, the heterosexual spread of HIV, particularly as relates to the vulnerability
of women, results from, an inability for self-protection “because of their lower cultural
and economic status and their lack of influence on sexual relations.”87 For these experts,
the way forward for women’s rights and wellbeing is to improve, or change, their social
status.
Those who put the blame on marriage appeared to be of view that African
heterosexual men are prone to predatory sexual lifestyles of rape, marital infidelity, and
domestic violence while African women are reluctantly forced into marital submissions
sanctioned by oppressive cultural bondages.88 This perspective is reconcilable with an old
western missionary view of African sexuality as an “exotic, traditional, irrational and
immoral practice.”89
But, some scholars and ethicists who, although they agree that marriage infidelity and
sexual violence against women occur in Africa, maintain that predatory sexual life is not
an endemic feature by which Sub-Saharan heterosexual relationships should be
characterized. Africa, retorted Helen Epstein, is not “the Sodoma and Gomorrah depicted
by nineteenth century missionaries.”90
Most of the studies that put the blame on marriage tend to treat Africa as a culturally
homogeneous society. Ignored are the significant differences in cultural practices
pertaining to ill health, adolescence initiation, courtship and marriage, family, and
kinship affiliation. Absent from these literatures is mention of the basic characteristic
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features and relationships in marriage, such as the notions of love, husband, wife, mother,
mother-in-law, daughter, son, brother, sister, and sister-in-law.91 It is incomprehensible
that sub-Saharan African people could be perceived as so different from their Western
counterparts to such an extent that marriage, in their case, is seen as profoundly and
miserably devoid of love and kinship relations.
Despite disagreements over the scope and nature of human rights violations against
minority groups, ethicists and public health agents agree that HIV/AIDS prevention in
Uganda ought to change course, and address human rights issues concurrently with
public health goals.92 Both in Uganda, and in the global community, it is acknowledged
that some forms of discrimination based on gender, or sexual orientation, occurs in
Uganda.93 But, as to whether the anti-marriage stance is the most appropriate human
rights response is questionable. Debatable also is the wisdom of cutting foreign aid as a
punitive measure to enforce the recognition of gay rights, instead of utilizing ethical
tools, such as empathy, education, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration, with all
involved parties.
For some transnational advocates in the West, the stakes are high for protecting the
sexual freedoms of some minority groups in developing nations. A systemic change of
the cultural, political, and religious beliefs that infringe on the individual rights and
freedoms of private citizens should take priority over any other procedural
considerations.94 Accordingly, there is an urgent need for involving the global civil
society, born of systems of democracy that gives voices to the undermined, such as the
sexual minorities in countries like Uganda.95 Global civil society, according to Graham
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Long, “incorporates transnational social movements, NGOs and less formalized
individual or socially embedded activism.”96
The combating of HIV/AIDS gave rise to the new field of health and human rights
that engages social justice issues.97 Accordingly, “civil libertarians turned to the language
of human rights to defend persons living with HIV/AIDS from stigma and
discrimination.”98 In this sense, scholars such as Amartya Sen considered the task of
improving health as also entailing improvement in participatory politics that involves the
public, who see themselves as both patients and agents of change.99 The justification for
political participation in the establishment of health populations has given rise to
transnational global advocacy networks for the advancement of human rights.
But some scholars have drawn attention to the possibility that advocates use human
rights language in different and overlapping ways. Lawrence O. Gostin explains that:
Some use human rights to mean a set of entitlements under international law.
Others use human rights to mean a set of ethical standards that stress the
paramount importance of the individuals. Still others use human rights language
for its inspirational, or rhetorical, qualities.100
It appears that all three aspects of the use of human rights language were in play in the
manner advocates attempted to engage diversity and human rights for purposes of
influencing the trajectory of the ABC and PEPFAR initiatives in Uganda.
The justification for invoking human rights rests on inviolability of the inherent
dignity of human beings, irrespective of their gender or sexual-orientation. But,
depending on whether the goal is to emphasize individual rights over social rights or vise
versa, parties involved in the PEPFAR/behavioral change ethical discourse in Uganda at
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times invoked the language of human rights in ways that made them appear synonymous
with civil rights, legal rights, and social rights. These approaches gave rise to human
rights reductionism, which manifests in forms of legal positivism or in the thinking that
what is beneficial is a right.
Legal positivism was manifested in Uganda’s anti-homosexual, private member’s
parliamentary bill, and in the Western response that attached foreign aid to the demand
for reform, or enactment of laws, promoting gay rights.101 The justification for nondiscrimination is the inherent dignity of being human, and not differences such as
heterosexual or homosexual. Policies that are based on formulations such as, “human
rights are gay rights and gay rights are human rights,”102 appear to suggest that human
rights and gay rights are synonymous. The cause of harmonizing global health with
human rights is advanced by conceptual clarity, and not with ambiguity.
At least by the year 2011 it was clear Uganda had lost its focus on the behavioral
change HIV prevention strategy. Some blamed policies of abstinence-only, marriage or
anti-marriage, scarcity of condoms, and discrimination against sexual minorities, as
responsible for the rise of HIV.103 Other critics blamed activists who had consistently
campaigned against behavioral change approaches.104 There were also those who
attributed the problem to complacency, and the new understanding that HIV had become
a chronicle condition, rather than an acute fatal condition, due to the availability of
antiretroviral drugs.105
Some ethicists argue that ideology drove the debate on whether HIV/AIDS
intervention in Uganda is a behavioral change issue, a civil liberties issue, or a human
rights issue.106 Although, as believed by ethicists, ideology does not account for all
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aspects of the agent’s response to HIV initiatives, but it shapes and guides the trajectory
of the agent’s perceptions and objectives.107 To unravel the genuinely ethical issues from
some of the deceptive elements therein, it is necessary to engages in an analytical ethical
inquiry that goes beyond ideological identity.
The ethical inquiry ought to start with the early days of HIV/AIDS in the United
States, when the country struggled to find balance between the public health goals of
wellbeing, and political ideologies associated with race, ethnicity, gender, and sex
orientation. This is precisely because the first phase of HIV/AIDS intervention in the
early 1980s focused on risky behaviors, such as gay activities and prostitution.108 The
focus on behavioral change was partly due to limited therapeutic intervention, but also
largely because of prejudice based on gender and differences in sexual orientation.109
Because the first cases of what was then regarded as an unusual immune deficiency
were identified in gay men, it was erroneously thought that HIV/AIDS was a disease of
gay people and prostitutes. Worse still, women were underrepresented in the first
attempts to find treatment for HIV/AIDS. As Nancy Kass explained that, even by 1991,
“no large studies of the effect of HIV infection on women’s health” had been
undertaken.110 Yet, eighty million dollars had been spent “on a single study of the natural
history of HIV in gay and bisexual men.”111 Discrimination and stigmatization of gay
people resulted in activism and advocacy for civil liberties.112
Public health agents acknowledged the need to balance between population healthbased behavioral change priorities and the individual’s need for civil liberties and
freedoms. For the objective of the overemphasis on behavioral change was the promotion
of population interests while those that overemphasized civil liberties tended to promote
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individual interests. When the global fund to fight HIV and the PEPFAR programs were
implemented in Uganda, donor agents projected the experience and lessons learnt in the
first phase of HIV in United States onto Uganda’s HIV/AIDS ethical discourse.113
While Uganda’s first phase of HIV prevention, in the 1990s, focused on behavioral
change, the PEPFAR intervention in 2003 marked the beginning of a second phase of an
ethical discourse that prioritized individual rights and civil liberties. In 2005, Human
Rights Watch protested to the government of Uganda demanding that HIV policies and
programs incorporate the special needs of affected children, displaced persons, lesbians,
gay, bisexual, transsexual, and transgender persons. Human Rights Watch insisted that
Uganda abandon support for the PEPFAR’s behavioral change provision of abstinenceuntil-marriage.114
The tension, which negatively impacted on the PEPFAR and ABC program, played
out in a manner that pitted pro-abstinence against anti-abstinence, and pro-gay against
anti-gay activists.115 The pro-abstinence and anti-abstinence fight was evident in the U.S.
Congress between some Republicans and Democratic congressmen at the launching of
the PEPFAR program before the tension extended to Uganda.116 In Uganda, the proabstinence First Lady, Janet Museveni, started a chastity scholarship program to
encourage girls to remain virgins until marriage as a means of HIV prevention.117 An
evangelical church group also started an abstinence club by the name of Glory of
Virginity Movement (GLOVIM).118
The pro-gay and anti-gay tension was as contentious as the abstinence fight. An
article provided by the U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, in 2007, stated
that “the New York-based Human Rights Watch sent a letter to the U.S. officials
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demanding that United States reconsider funding HIV/AIDS programs in Uganda, where
it claimed recipients of such money violate the rights of homosexuals.”119 In Uganda,
Pastor Martin Ssempa of the faith-based organization Campus Alliance to Wipe Out
AIDS (CAWA) became the most outspoken anti-homosexuality, anti-condoms, and proabstinence only religious figure.”120
By 2006 divisions among HIV/AIDS experts in the global community were
beginning to emerge between those who attributed much of the HIV prevalence decline
to a decrease in multi-partner sexual behavior rather than merely condom use, and those
who credited the success to scientific tools and “broader structure factors.”121 According
to Edward Green and colleagues, one school of thought “concluded that a decrease in
casual or multiple sexual partner behavior, rather than mainly condom use or increase in
mortality, was primarily responsible for Uganda’s success.”122 Other HIV/AIDS experts
argued “in favor of the more prevailing prevention approach that has centered on condom
promotion and HIV testing as well as an array of broader structural factors, such as
poverty, gender violence and conflict.”123
According to Green and his colleagues, the Uganda behavioral change analysis, at
least as published in leading scientific journals, “has not argued that such broader factors,
as well as condom use were unimportant.”124 Likewise, those also who criticized the
partner reduction theory did not take an extreme position, such as – condoms only with
no role for partner reduction.125 Regrettably, the arguments focused on the relative
importance of the different ABC factors (Abstaining, Being Faithful and Condom use),
and perhaps inadvertently drove the ABC debate to the polarizing arguments of A versus
C.126
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Gradually the debate began to evolve from the condom-abstinence discourse to
rights-based arguments. By the year 2011international, non-government organizations,
such as Human Right Watch had intensified their criticism of the discrimination and
stigmatization of people in Uganda based on their sexual orientation and gender identity.
The controversies evolving around the Uganda anti-homosexuality private bill, and gay
rights activism, appear to have dominated all other considerations relating to the
HIV/AIDS prevention discourse in Uganda.127
There was also another important initiative associated with the notion of justice for
women with HIV that had focused on HIV microbicides research. One such clinical
research study was the 2007 candidate cellulose sulfate clinical trial, in Uganda and other
developing countries. The ethical justification for conducting this research was the felt
need to urgently make scientific tools (HIV inhibitors) available to assist women who
were at greater risk of HIV infection due to social vulnerability.128
The microbicides research conducted in Uganda was not unrelated to the campaign in
the United States, in the late 1980s, to include women in biomedical research as a matter
of justice.129 Women were harmed by the exclusion from HIV research, since medical
professionals could not acquire knowledge of women vulnerability or manifestation of
HIV infection. Women were often undiagnosed, and consequently untreated, for HIV and
AIDS.130 Likewise, the new initiative to intensify HIV research in Uganda, and other
developing countries, was understood as an issue of justice to remedy the powerlessness
of women in matters of sexual choices and HIV susceptibility.131
These initiatives to improve minority rights in Uganda’s HIV/AIDS intervention
program resembled the phases of the HIV/AIDS ethical intervention in the United States.
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The HIV/AIDS discourse in both countries appears to have progressed from an
overemphasis on behavioral change, to civil liberties, and to human rights. The
outstanding ethical issues driving this progress pertained to distributive justice,
stigmatization, and discriminations based on gender, race, and sexual-orientation.
In between the transition from emphasis on civil liberties to human rights was the
phase of “the resurgence of public health traditionalism,” in the United States.132 This
period was characterized by increased support for mandatory HIV preventive measures,
and less resistance to the inversion of the individual’s liberties where populations were at
risk.133 As scientific evidence increasingly indicated that early detection of HIV infection
was good for effective preventive measures using antiretroviral therapy, ethicists began to
interpret measures such as prenatal routine testing, as beneficial.134
As HIV research and other potential beneficial therapies, such as antiretroviral
intervention, became available, the issue of equitable access to health resources was
raised. Distributive justice was understood as entailing abandonment of over-protective
stances, particularly relating to research participation.135 Advocacy initiatives targeted the
inclusion of women and minority groups that had been ignored on the basis of their race
or economic status. According to Charles McCarthy, the 1980s feminist movement
scrutinized the concept of justice, particularly in research, and brought about new
meanings by the identification of “the many forms of discrimination against women.”136
Because of the need for equity, and access to scarce resources, a new thinking began
to emerge in the global community in the 1990s that linked public health with social
justice (or human rights). Lawrence Gostin and Lesley Stone made reference to the sound
epidemiological research which established that “social economic status is correlated
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with morbidity, mortality, and functioning.”137 Some experts came to the conclusion that
inferior health status is predominant in the societies that were experiencing more
inequalities between the rich and the poor.138 Normans Daniels rightly asserted that
“social justice is good for our health.”139
Martha Nussbaum developed Anartya Sen’s capability approach relating to social
justice, and “focusing particularly on women’s poverty and the relationship between
poverty and sex inequality.”140 Nussbaum envisions the ideas of Women and Human
Development as beginning with “the conception of the dignity of human beings, and of a
life that is worthy of that dignity” which is enabled with human functioning.141 She made
a link between capabilities and human rights when she argued that “my list of capabilities
include many of the liberties that are also stressed in the human rights movement.”142
Similarly, Jonathan Mann and colleagues linked the language of disease, morbidity,
and mortality in the populations with addressing social injustices associated with poverty,
racism, gender violence and inequity, and discrimination. These experts suggested the
human rights approach as the most appropriate variable for underpinning social justice
for individuals, and populations, in pandemics such as HIV/AIDS.143 They justify the
human rights-based approach on the basis that nations reaffirmed, in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) treaty, their faith in the “inherent dignity and of
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”144
The UDHR was adopted in 1948 “as a Universal or common standard of achievement
for all peoples and all nations.”145 The UDHR was a statement of aspiration, and not a
legally binding document. However, governments were to derive the legal obligations
from the two human rights charters of the International Covenant on the Civil and
232

Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) adopted by the General Assembly in 1966. Surprisingly the
United States has never adopted the ICESCR while Uganda adopted it in 1987.
The ICCPR is the preferred charter in modern liberal political theory, as held by
countries such as the United States. In this vision, the rights framework reflects and
institutionalizes “the existence of a political community of equal rights-bearing
subjects.”146 David Chandler explains that, “the liberal political ontology has the
autonomous rights-bearing individual as the foundational subject of legal and political
spheres of formal equality.”147 Subsequently, “the rule of law and legitimacy of
government were derived from the consent and accountability of rights-holding
citizens.”148
Not adopting the ICESCR is not an irrelevant detail, in the case of the United States.
This is because the tendency by some United States-based transnational HIV advocacy
groups is to overemphasize individual rights and civil liberties as the most important key
drivers for human rights protection.149 This is a reasonable demand if one understands
human rights as universal, and ascribing a single set of rights to all humanity in the global
diversity.150 African countries, such as Uganda are characterized by diversity of culture,
forms of life, or different circumstances. Human rights are relevant even in diversity,
since all are entitled to the same minimum of concern and respect by virtue of being
human beings.151
As cautioned by Peter Jones, certain types of diversity, such as belief and values, are
different and may pose uniquely complex moral questions.152 For instance, the diversity
of religious beliefs, such as pertains to Catholicism, Hinduism, and Islam, should be
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considered a normal part of the human condition.153 But, the implication, according to
Peter Jones, is that a theory of human rights not only accepts diversity, but must provide
for the diversity by telling us “something about how we should relate to one another as
people with diverse beliefs and values.”154 Accordingly, “acceptable diversity is
reasonable disagreement,” which means “reasonable doctrines held by reasonable
people.”155
Peter Jones further argues that the doctrine of human rights is different in the sense
that it is discontinuous with the doctrines of beliefs and values. The doctrine of human
rights is more concerned with “the people who hold the beliefs”, as humans, “than the
beliefs they hold,” and, “how people of diverse beliefs and values ought to relate to one
another.”156 As the new transnational application of democracy and human rights within a
liberal cosmopolitan vision gains prominence, Jones explication of diversity is important
for purposes of exploring the link between public health and human rights in the new
globalized post-territorial political communities.
Global cosmopolitans are dissatisfied with the old view of state sovereignty, whereby
democracy and human rights are regarded as embodied in national constitutions, and
understood as having application exclusively within national states.”157 Liberal
cosmopolitanism advocates envision the development of cross-border, post-territorial
global communities, and forms of democratic decision-making that are superior to “bonds
of citizenship, constituted by modern liberal rights frameworks.”158
The notion of cosmopolitanism as meaning “citizen of the world” is as old as
Diogenesis’ Greek thought.159 But the connection of liberalism to cosmopolitanism was
inspired by Kantian philosophy, and articulated in terms of post-territorial politics in the
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1990s “mainly by theorists who argues that liberal democratic politics could no longer be
meaningfully practiced within the confines of the nation-state.”160 The birth of liberal
cosmopolitanism, initiated by political theorists such as Mary Kaldor, David Held, Daniel
Archibugi, and colleagues, meant that democracy and political communities should
transcend territorial limits of national states and be asserted on the global level.161
Having attributed the liberal cosmopolitan theory to Mary Kaldor and colleagues,
David Chandler explicates:
The advocates of the cosmopolitan community in the 1990s were the first to
distance themselves from state-based politics, finding a freedom in the freefloating rights of global advocacy. It was under this banner of global liberalism
and ethical policy-making that political elites sought their own “exodus from
sovereignty” – justified on the basis of a critique of the liberal right subject – and
in the process, further attenuated the relationship between government and
citizen.162
Accordingly, the new forms of political communities ought to be constellations of
global civil societies constituted by many institutionalized structures, associations, and
networked agents “within which individuals and groups actors are interrelated and
functionally interdependent.”163 Civil society is understood in terms of “the most minimal
and negative sense,” as “involving the idea of society organizing itself separately from
and set against the state.”164 In this regard, the transnational civil society “refers to a set
of interactions among an imagined community to shape collective life that are not
confined to the territorial and institutional space or state.”165
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This post-territorial political vision has its critics. Chris Brown argues that the more
negative definition of civil society simplifies the relationship between civil society and
the state. This argument holds that, civil society cannot exist to limit state activities if the
state is not strong enough to guarantee peace and mechanisms enabling arbitration.166
David Chandler is of the view that since (liberal) cosmopolitan political community
“further attenuated the relationship between government and citizens,” it should be
understood as “a discourse that sought to respond to the collapse of political communities
rather than one that reflects the birth of a newer or more expansive one at a global
level.”167
If there are lessons to be learned from the current HIV/AIDS prevention dilemmas in
Uganda, it is that the linking between public health, human rights, and global HIV
advocacy is a complex ethical interlock. The conflicts relating to notions of abstinenceonly-until marriage, condoms, anti-marriage, and gay rights that appear to have
obstructed the fight against heterosexual transmission of HIV was a multi-layered, and
multifaceted, ethical quandary. Epidemiologists are not often prepared to safely navigate
the complex encounter between global biomedical, biopolitical and biosocio-cultural
drivers.
When Dr. Zainab Akol, coordinator of the Uganda national AIDS Control Program,
attributed the high 6.5 percent to 7 percent HIV prevalence rate in the country between
2009 and 2011 to the uncoordinated interference of gay and lesbian civil societies in the
HIVAIDS control program, she underpinned the intricate relationship between public
health, human rights, the state, and the new post-territorial civil societies.168 Akol further
stated that those in the health professional did not discriminate between sick homosexuals
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or heterosexuals. She, therefore, saw no justification for civil societies lobbying The
Global Fund to cut financial grants on which many sick people depend for HIV/AIDS
services.169
Godfrey Tumwesigye, of Human Rights Network Uganda (HURINET-U), refuted
claims that the organization was responsible for derailing the public health prevention
initiative by dragging it to “human rights issues of homosexuals.”170 However,
HURINET-U’s allied New York-based Human Rights Watch had, in 2009, asked the
government of the United States to “reconsider funding for HIV/AIDS programs in
Uganda, where it claimed recipients of such money violated the rights of
homosexuals.”171 Human Rights Watch got their wish when the government of the
United States attached foreign aid to “fighting discrimination against gay people
abroad.”172 The policy was based on the conceptual framework that “Gay rights are
Human Rights and Human Rights are Gay Rights.”173
In fact, Human Rights Watch began the HIV anti-funding campaign, as recommended
in the report by Jonathan Cohen and Tony Tate. The recommendation to “all other donors
to Uganda AIDS programs” was to deny funding to individuals or groups that do not
provide to young people “factual information about HIV prevention, discriminate against
marginalized communities such as sexual minorities, or use HIV prevention funds to
engage in religious proselytizing.”174 These are genuine human rights concerns, but
Cohen and Tate did not satisfactorily demonstrate that public health strategies, of balance
through collaboration, communication, and cooperation, had failed before recommending
harsher measures.
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The 2005 Human Rights Watch report also sought the repel of Uganda’s law, sections
140, 141, and 143 of the Penal Code that criminalizes homosexual activities and “at
times used as justification for failing to provide life-saving HIV prevention information
and services to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender.”175 Reversely, the antihomosexual coalition in Uganda that sought to severely punish homosexual activities in
Uganda was equally obstructive to HIV prevention campaign. The Uganda antihomosexual campaign also had external networked allies among some conservative
religious groups in United States.176
The focus of liberal cosmopolitanism is the spread of democracy, and human rights,
globally by individuals and groups of people, who are supposedly freed from the shackles
of state sovereignty. Since “the poor and the excluded cannot automatically enforce their
rights … an external agency needs to step in to empower them and constitute them as
rights holders.”177 However, as Graham Long has noted, global civil societies “face
conceptual and practical problems that arise from the diversity of actors and the motives
present within.”178 As liberal cosmopolitan moralists exert their influence on HIV/AIDS
prevention initiative in Uganda, the danger of advancing human rights reductionism is
becoming more explicit.
(iii) Common Good, Non-discrimination and Non-stigmatization
UNESCO’s International Bioethics Committee acknowledged the need to include the
principle of non-discrimination and non-stigmatization as one of the ethical instruments
to protect against “violation of human dignity, human rights and freedoms” of people.179
This substantive principle was identified for purposes of addressing issues of particular
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relevance to “healthcare, human reproduction, genetic and health care data, research
involving human subjects and behavioral genetics.”180
An important characteristic of this principle, and indeed to all UDBHR principles, is
that they set “global minimum standards in bioethics and clinical practice,” which are
intergovernmental, non-binding, and formulated generally.181 The principles are
deliberately formulated in general terms to allow for flexibility and “balance between the
universalism of some bioethics norms and respect of cultural diversity.”182 Moreover, the
goal is not “to oblige states to enact enforceable rules inspired by the common standards
but to encourage them to do so.”183 The strength of these formulations lies in the
overwhelming “widespread conviction that people have unconditional rights simply by
virtue of their humanity.”184
Discrimination against sexual minorities in Uganda became a profoundly healthrelated issue when Human Rights Watch, and the International Gay and Lesbian Human
Rights Commission (IGLHRC), demanded that Western donor countries refrain from
funding HIV/AID programs and organizations in Uganda that discriminate against sexual
minorities.185 Activists also sought the abrogation of a constitutional law that
criminalized homosexual acts. But the 2009 private member’s bill sought parliamentary
approval to impose the death penalty for gay adults who transmit HIV to minors.186
The critics of homosexuality framed the tension as a cultural diversity problem. In an
interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation, the president of Uganda accused the
West of seeking to impose on Africa a Western culture, particularly homosexuality.187 He
said “black Africans are very humble people; we never impose our views on anybody
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else.”188 He further stated that, although Uganda does not treat homosexuality as
something good, nevertheless, gay people are not persecuted but tolerated.
But U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had a different perspective on the gay
issue. She argued that being gay is a human reality, and should never be considered a
crime.189 Clinton attributed the gay hatred to personal, cultural, and religious beliefs.190
Theologian Russell Reno explains that there are times when our “conviction (personal,
cultural, religious) become excuses for exercising our perverse love of violence.”191 This
is “true of our violence against homosexuals.”192 But it is also true that “there are ways to
humanize our moral horror and reduce its capacity to lead to violence and injustice.”193
According to Reno, the solution in Christianity is “to hate the sin; love the sinner.”194
It is a call to “adopt the disposition of charity or love that allows us to see the intrinsic
dignity of the human person.”195 The focus turns to the action rather than to the person.
The liberal view, in the early modern period, was to “encouraged the virtue of tolerance,
a disposition that involves enduring what one objects to.”196
But the solution in contemporary liberalism (particularly in liberal cosmopolitanism)
is “to get to the root cause and promote systematic change.”197 Humanity will overcome
these obstacles erected by personal beliefs, and cultural and religious traditions, as
identified by Clinton, by accepting contemporary and enlightened views of sex, and not
humanizing elements of these beliefs or moderations by way of tolerance.198
If Reno’s exposition is correct, then it is not difficult to see how moral views on
either side of the HIV and gay rights debate have increasingly failed to accommodative
values such as transparence, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. These values
are central to disease prevention in public health initiatives. Instead, it appears that
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competing parties have regressively reverted to human rights reductionism by advancing
legal positivism, or by regarding human rights simply as what benefits minority groups.
To be effective, the HIV prevention program in Uganda must seek for balance
between competing interests. The principles approach, as proposed by the UDBHR
document, offers an international normative standard, and as engaged in MIEM, provides
guidance towards effective HIV/AIDS intervention and human rights safeguards. Within
this approach, the principle of non-discrimination and non-stigmatization is specified as
being comprised of the notions of equality of human beings and dignity, as well as the
understanding that being human is not synonymous with color, race, ethnicity, gender, or
sexual orientation.
Though the principle of non-discrimination and non-stigmatization is formulated in
negative language, the positive implication for public health is the promotion of the
wellbeing of individuals and populations. In this sense, non-discrimination and nonstigmatization is necessarily related to the principle of common good, which is not
enumerated in the UDBHR document.
Common good is a principle commonly used in the Catholic tradition, in reference to
our mutual rights and responsibilities as members sharing common humanity. Within the
Catholic vision of social justice, and common good, are the three basic affirmations of,
“the inviolable dignity of the human person, the essential social nature of human beings,
and the belief that the abundance of nature and social living is given for all people.”199
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B. The Meaning and Scope of Common good, and Non-discrimination and Nonstigmatization.
(i) Specification of Non-discrimination and Non-stigmatization
The substantive principle of non-discrimination and non-stigmatization, as stipulated
in article 11 of the UDBHR document, states that, “no individual or group should be
discriminated against or stigmatized on any grounds, in violation of human dignity,
human rights and fundamental freedoms.”200 Clearly, the specification of this principle of
non-discrimination and non-stigmatization constitutes three notions stipulated in article
3(1): inviolable dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms.201
This is the context in which the principle of non-stigmatization and discrimination
ought to be applied to the HIV/AIDS prevention initiatives in Uganda. In the UDHR
document, member states recognized and affirmed the inherent dignity of all members of
the human family. Human nature was assumed as the source of this inherent dignity,
which also serves as the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world.202 It is in
this sense that “human dignity is invoked as an argument against discrimination as well
as the framework within which cultural diversity is to be respected.”203
The substantive principle of non-discrimination and non-stigmatization is annunciated
negatively. In positive language this claim infers the promotion of respect for human
dignity, and protection of human rights, which necessitates “ensuring respect for the life
of human beings, and fundamental freedoms, consistent with international human rights
law (art.2(c).”204 Although the need to adopt, and include in the UDBHR, the principle of
non-discrimination and non-stigmatization was identified around 2003, the standards set
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by this principle appear to have been in practice in the first phase of HIV/AIDS
prevention in Uganda between 1987 through the 1990s.
Several ethics scholars testify to the fact that Uganda recognized the need to confront
stigma and discrimination as an important strategy for combating the HIV/AIDS
epidemic, and the tragic effects, in the early days of HIV/AIDS.205 Helen Epstein
articulated this spirit as follows:
During the early 1980s and 1990s, …., hundreds of tiny community-based AIDS
groups sprang up throughout Uganda and Kagera to comfort the sick, care for the
orphans, warn people about the dangers of casual sex, and address the particular
vulnerability of women and girls to infection. Yoweri Museveni’s government
developed its own vigorous prevention campaigns and the World Health
Organization provided funding, but much of it came from the pockets of the poor
themselves. Their compassion and hard work brought the disease into the open,
got people talking about the epidemic, reduced stigma and denial, and led to a
profound shift in sexual norms.206
Epstein herself concluded that this movement might have arisen partly because the
people of the region realized much earlier that “AIDS was not just a disease of
prostitutes, truck drivers and other stigmatized, high-risk groups.”207 She could not find a
name for this social movement, but thought of it as “collective efficacy,” to connote “the
ability of people to join together and help one another.”208 Epstein applied this term to the
Uganda phenomenon, but credited it to sociologist Felton Earls who coined “collective
efficacy” in reference to “a spirit of collective action and mutual aid … rooted in a sense
of compassion and common humanity.”209
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Bioethics, in fact, has a name for this phenomenon – solidarity and common good.
Solidarity implies mutual concern for one another because of our common humanity and
inalienable rights.210 In the encyclical Sollitudo Rei Socialis, Pope John Paul II refers to
the virtue of solidarity as an experience of interdependence, at all levels of human life
and development that occurs within the context of our collective moral action and
practical response.211 For Pope John Paul II, solidarity is not merely “a feeling of vague
compassion or shallow distress at the misfortune of so many people … it is a feeling of a
firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good.212
In this sense, solidarity entails the values of collaboration, communication,
coordination, and cooperation.213 When explaining the principle of solidarity and
cooperation, as stipulated in article 13 of the UDBHR document, Alphonse Elungu states
that:
It is through co-operation that the free human being becomes a citizen and is
brought to discover what is common between him or herself and others, what he
or she shares with others, and which bonds unites him or her to others.”214
The UDHR recognizes the inherent dignity, equality, and social nature of human
beings, and the need for mutual rights and responsibilities as members of the human
family.215 Sometimes the principles that underlie these fundamental rights conflict,
particularly when tension emerges between individual and population interests. But,
bioethicists understand that there are moral considerations that aggravate conflict, and
also moral values that reduce conflict.216 For instance, in the 1990s Uganda chose to
confront stigma and discrimination by implicitly appealing to solidarity and the common
good, as well as engaging the values of communication, collaboration, coordination,
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cooperation, and education as strategies for confronting HIV/AIDS-based stigma and
discrimination.
It is accepted by many, in global public health, that open and effective
communication, coupled with, political will for mobilization, were keys to Uganda’s
success in the fight against HIV/AIDS in the 1990s.217 But it is also known that much of
the now well developed tools of strategic communication in HIV/AIDS intervention, such
as those targeting knowledge, attitudes, social norms, collective efficacy, political will,
policy change, and resource allocation, had not been explicitly articulated in global public
health.218 Surprisingly, some of the earliest and most effective communication strategies
for confronting HIV stigma and discrimination in Uganda came from music artists.
When Philly Bongole Lutaaya, a famous Ugandan musician, became ill with AIDS he
was ostracized by colleagues.219 He disregarded his fame and prestige and openly
declared his HIV status. Using his musical talent and skills, Lutaaya captivated the
attention of Ugandans by opening a debate on HIV/AIDS, and called on Ugandan to
reject the stigmatization and discrimination of those living with HIV/AIDS.220 His
famous song “Alone,” reminded the public of our common humanity and destiny –
“today it’s me and tomorrow it’s someone else … let’s stand together and fight AIDS.”
He took this message of prevention and non-stigmatization to schools and institutions
around the country.
But probably no morbidity-and mortality-related, massage-driven-song has ever
captivated the minds and hearts of Ugandans more than Walumbe Zaaya (meaning death
the devastator), by Paul Job Kafeero. In a uniquely Ugandan traditional music lyric of
Kadongo Kamu, Kafeero recounted the lamentation, horrors, and solitude associated with
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issues of illness and death. For his song, Kafeero won the Golden Boy of Africa Award in
1994, chosen out of 7,000 contestants in Africa.221 A culturally iconic country music
maestro, Kafeero died in 2007, but the song Walumbe Zaaya is still a very popular
household song, and a regular pick for HIV-awareness conference in Uganda.
But even before some individual Ugandans took extraordinary courage to take the
lead in creating HIV/AIDS awareness, in 1986 the government of Uganda had already
embarked on a “decentralized planning and implementation for behavior change
communication.”222 An aggressive public media campaign was launched by the National
AIDS Control Program (ACP). The effort involved “print materials, radio, billboards and
community mobilization for a grass-roots offensive against HIV.”223 The style of
“sustained interpersonal communication intervention” strongly influenced a change of
sexual behavior in the general public, and key targeted groups as high risk.224
Apart from communication and AIDS awareness, Ugandans actively got involved in
collaboration with public health agents for voluntary testing and counseling services.225
Partnership and collaboration are essential features of public health engagement with
communities and vulnerable populations.226 Noerine Kaleeba, co-founder of The AIDS
Support Organization (TASO), figured out in 1987 that the most effective way of fighting
stigma was collaboration and partnership between affected persons, communities, and
public health agents.227 TASO’s mission was to assist in “restoring hope and improving
the quality of life of persons and communities affected by HIV infection and AIDS
disease.”228
To combat stigma and discrimination, TASO pledged to promote “living positively
with AIDS and dying with dignity” through compassionate care, and mutual support229
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The organization started voluntary counseling and testing services as a way of
encouraging people to get treatment and the promotion of positive behavioral change.
Edward Green explains that by 1993, “studies in Uganda seemed to show that voluntary
counseling services led to safer behavior,” whether the persons tested and counseled were
found to be HIV positive, or negative.230 TASO eventually began training HIV/AIDS
counselors, and provide medical and social welfare services.231
The cooperation of faith-groups with public health agents, and the government, was a
significant factor in the reduction of HIV infection, and the de-stigmatization of
HIV/AIDS in the 1990s. Helen Epstein attested to the fact that, even before the 2003
PEPFAR initiative, “Catholic and Protestant Churches had been running exemplary
AIDS programs since the 1980s.”232 Green explains that the Ugandan government
strategically involved faith-based leaders and organizations (Catholics, Anglican, and
Muslim) from the beginning of the struggle against AIDS.”233
Catholics, Anglicans, and Muslims faith-based organizations were better suited to the
role of creating HIV/AIDS awareness than the mass media and other infrastructures that
had been rendered less operative by the brutal dictatorship and wars.234 Cooperation was
needed, since it was estimated that 92 percent of the population attended Anglican and
Catholic services regularly.235 Subsequently, HIV/AIDS awareness messages would
reach more people when effectively disseminated from pulpits.
Equally significant was the fact that a majority of the health facilities in Uganda were
owned by faith-based organizations. It is noteworthy that, even by 2003, sixty percent of
all health care facilities in Uganda were private, and majority of them operated under the
auspices faith-based organizations.236 According to Green, and based on a 2001 survey,
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44 percent of private health care facilities were owned by Catholics; 34 percent by
Protestants; 8 percent by Muslims; and 14 percent by other private entities.237 The
government deployed health experts from the government’s owned Makerere University
to train religious leaders to be HIV/AIDS educators.
The first slogans used to articulate HIV/AIDS awareness and behavioral changebased intervention were: “Love Carefully,” “Love Faithfully,” and “Zero Grazing.”238
The Zero Grazing language was phased out and replaced with “Abstain, be Faithful and
use a Condom (ABC).” However, the Catholic Church did not incorporate the condom
component that was part of the national awareness and prevention initiatives. On the part
of the Uganda AIDS Commission they did not adopt a non-confrontational policy, and
instead opted for inclusiveness with different social and religious groups.239
Although the Catholic bishops were opposed to condom use on grounds that condoms
were not hundred percent effective, their cooperation or noncooperation was not based on
a monolithic issue, but a fight against triplet threats – “poverty, ignorance, and disease
(AIDS).240 In 1987, the bishops argued for sexual behavioral change and partly attributed
the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS to the loosening of family (marriage) and moral values.
They explicitly expressed their stance that AIDS was not a punishment from God, and
society needed to respond in solidarity with “love, understanding, and compassion” rather
than with stigmatization.241
The bishops based their instructions on HIV intervention on biblical notions of love,
care, mercy, and compassion as in Mt.25: 35-36 and Lk.6: 36-37.242 On the practical
level, they proposed that the Church gets involved in activities such as counseling,
promote faith based-values, education, confronting risk-related traditional customs,
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utilizing communication tools, value formation of the youths, and, support for widows
and orphans.243 This engagement was understood in terms of “work, solidarity, interior
purification and personal salvation.”244
One of the most effective cooperation and collaborative HIV/AIDS initiatives by the
Catholic Church in Uganda was carried out by the Caritas organization. In 1989 Caritas
Internationalis Working Group on AIDS held a meeting in Uganda. This meeting
followed a 1987 meeting in Rome, when Caritas Internationalis took “a leadership role in
sensitizing Church leaders in the social-pastoral field to the needs presented by the
pandemic of HIV/AIDS.”245 Since then the Caritas Confederations has “coordinated a
program of both material and expert assistance to Church-related HIV/AIDS services in
developing countries.”246
Caritas saw its HIV/AIDS initiative as participating in the Church’s threefold
response to all human realities: to teach, serve, and gather people in worship.247 This
response provided for renewed reinforcement, in love and mercy, of the Church’s
traditional moral teachings and values, “especially with regards to sexual behavior and
marital relationships.”248 The service mandate meant that Caritas got involved in
HIV/AIDS projects, such as expansion of medical services, social service facilities, and
the supply of food, medicine, and HIV-antibody testing equipment.249 The worship
component entails the responsibility to help those faced with the reality of AIDS to
deepen their faith as they “confront the final realities of life.”250
The justification of the role of Caritas’ in HIV/AIDS intervention comes from its
name which is derived from the Latin word caritas, meaning charity, or “dearness”
(virtue). The scope of Caritas’ work is laid out in its mission statement, namely, to reflect
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the social mission of the Church and the core values of dignity, justice, solidarity, and
stewardship.251 It is in the same spirit that the Catholic Church in Uganda was compelled
to provide leadership, through its institution, in HIV/AIDS education and prevention. One
concrete example of the Church’s effort was the “designing of mobile home care and
special programs for AIDS widows and orphans” by Catholic mission hospitals.252
Partnership and collaboration is also evidenced by contribution made by the Anglican
Church to the early HIV prevention initiatives. In 1992, the Anglican Church in Uganda
embarked on an HIV education program funded by USAID. The CHUSA program
targeted the education of clergy and laity in HIV prevention. In less than two years 863
leaders and 5,702 community-health educators, had been trained.253 The campaign
involved pastoral home visitations, peer education, distribution of sample sermons and
other HIV/AIDS awareness materials, and the distribution of condoms. The 1995
evaluation of the campaign established that significant behavioral change had resulted.
Multiple sexual partners dropped from 86 percent to 29 percent for men and from 75
percent to 7 percent for women. There was also an increase in the use of condoms, from 9
percent to 12 percent.254
A significant change occurred in 2003 when several faith-based abstinence
organizations emerged in Uganda, boosted by the availability of a $1 billion PEPFAR
fund earmarked for abstinence-only HIV prevention initiatives. Among these
organizations were the Campus Alliance to Wipe Out AIDS (CAWA), Glory of Virginity
Movement (GLOVIM), and Family Life Network (FLN).255 These organizations, and
others, received assistance from several U.S.-based faith associated groups such as True
Love Waits and Family Life Network.256 In 2004 Human Rights Watch expressed
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frustration that a Virginia based organization, Children’s AIDS Fund (CAF), with ties to
Uganda’s Youth Forum, received a PEPFAR grant. Human Rights Watch was unhappy
that Youth Forum was “developing abstinence material to be distributed nationally.”257
According to Pastor Martin Ssempa, the new faith-based movement in Uganda
(mostly Evangelicals) appears to have been driven by an overriding desire to fight off, the
“attack from an agenda driven by homosexuals and Western experts who are out of touch
with how the AIDS epidemic is driven in Africa.”258 To counteract this movement,
international organizations, such as Human Rights International, invoked rights-based
arguments and sought punitive measures against the rights-violators in Uganda. This
confrontation initiated a new phase in HIV/AIDS discourse that subordinated altruistic
ethics-talk, and hyped the ideology polemics of HIV/AIDS.259
(ii) Specification of Common Good
Common good is a principle that is generally associated with Catholic Social
teaching. When HIV/AIDS intervention is approached as promoting the common good,
the assumption is that it is a social justice issue. For Lisa Sowle Cahill, this is an
important identification since the attention shifts from overemphasis on individual
behavior, such as drug abuse or condoms, to social conditions (relationships), such as
power and vulnerability that strongly influence the spread of HIV. For instance,
according to Cahill, poverty reduces peoples’ social access to preventive measures, and to
the basic means of subsistence which in turn leads to a decline of their physical wellbeing.260
Benedict Ashley and Kevin O’Rourke define the common good as “the sum total of
those conditions of social living whereby citizens are enabled more fully and more
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readily to achieve their own perfection.”261 Pope John Paul II explained the common
good as “the good of all and each individual, because we are really responsible for all.”262
In the Catholic tradition, this principles is seen as deriving from biblical foundation such
as in the Beatitudes (Luke 6:20-22; Mt 5:3-11). More explicitly, the principle of common
good was applied in its practical terms in the early Church that required “from each
according to his (or her) ability, to each according to his (or her) needs (Act 32:35).”263
This notion of the common good is also related to subsidiarity.
Ashley and O’Rourke elucidated that subsidiarity is an aspect of the common good
that “calls upon each person or lower social unit to be given the opportunity to exercise
the responsibility to achieve the goals proper to it.”264 Accordingly, “subsidiarity implies
that the first responsibility to meet human needs rests with the free and competent
individual, then with the local community.”265 Subsidiarity enables the sharing of
decision-making power among the functional societal bodies that an individual person
relates to for basic needs. The role of government is not to deprive, but “to coordinate and
encourage the full development of these different organs of society.”266
If the common good is understood in this sense, then it was implicitly applied in HIV
intervention in the 1990s in Uganda. The government of Uganda took seriously its role of
coordination and collaboration in the fight against HIV/AIDS. In the spirit of supporting
all-inclusive and participatory policy, the government created the multi-sectoral Uganda
AIDS Commission in 1992. The role of UAC was to coordinate and monitor the national
AIDS multi-sector strategy that was adopted in 1990.267 By 2001, at least 700
governmental and non-governmental agencies were engaged in HIV/AIDS issues
nationwide, under the Commission’s role as coordinator.268 The partnership included
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central and local governments, local and international non-governmental organizations,
faith-based organizations, youth organizations, private sector components, media, experts
in science, and researchers.
In addition to subsidiarity, Ashley and O’Rourke specify the common good as
constitutive of love, mercy, and mutual concern and responsibility.269 These values are
indicative of the person’s, or community’s concern for the wellbeing of others. One
outstanding example from Uganda was the level of willingness by Ugandan HIV negative
women to advance scientific endeavors by participating in non-therapeutic global
microbicides clinical trials between 2005 and 2009, even with the awareness of the likely
danger of infection.270
Ugandan women participated in the micobicides PRO 2000 (0.5 and 0.2), and the
cellulose sulfate (CS) clinical trials.271 As it turned out, HIV negative women who
participated in the phase III of the cellulose sulfate clinical trial were exposed to
increased risks for HIV infection.272 The investigators clarified that they ensured the
clinical trial was approved by an Institutional Review Board, underwent the Phase II
safety and tolerance trial, and sought the informed consent.273 But, there are other
standards, such as ensuring reasonable risk that must come prior to even subject selection
and informed consent.274
Before individuals collaborate and cooperate in research to promote the wellbeing of
the human family, U.S. federal research policy for the protection of human subjects
ensures that Institutional Review Boards (IRB) are tasked with oversight to minimize
risk, and that “the risks to the subjects are reasonable compared to the benefits.”275 The
requirement for “reasonable” is important, for as established in MIEM, it is not enough to
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adhere to a principle, such as the common good, and then solicit cooperation and
collaboration, without committing to the relevant limiting procedural standard, such as
reasonableness, which facilitates balance between the common good and disproportionate
risk to the individual.

C. Application of Procedural Standards
(i) Illustrative Procedural Standard of Reasonableness
Uganda’s national HIV/AIDS strategic plan, for the years 2011/12-2014/15,
acknowledged the importance of deploying the human rights approach in the fight against
HIV/AIDS and the promotion of wellbeing.276 The five years’ plan adopted a
“combination HIV prevention” which involves “implementing multiple (biomedical,
behavioral and structural) prevention interventions.”277 But the document does not
explain how the strategic plan will disambiguate the HIV prevention program already
imbued with conflicting interpretations of the meaning, scope, and application of human
rights between Western agencies and proponents of Uganda’s socio-cultural beliefs and
values.
The UDBHR, article 12, calls for the recognition and respect of cultural diversity and
pluralism. But the Declaration also explicitly states that cultural diversity cannot be
invoked to infringe “upon human dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms.”278
Peter Jones’ philosophical explication of the relationship between human rights and
cultural diversity can offer helpful insights for navigating this complex relation.279 Jones
explains that diversity of belief and value should be considered as an essential feature of
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the human condition. Subsequently, a theory of human rights must accommodate, and
provide for, the diversity of belief and value.280
According to Jones, acceptable diversity can also be described as reasonable
disagreement, which means disagreement among reasonable persons.281 In this sense,
“what persuades us to describe as reasonable the larger range of very different doctrines
that we find in the world is the reasonableness of the people who hold them.”282 For
Jones, it is not only important that a human rights theory accommodates diversity of
beliefs and values, but also provide for a way for people with diversity of beliefs and
values (doctrinal disagreements) to relate to one another. The reconciliation of human
rights with human diversity therefore requires a discontinuous and not a continuous
strategy.283
A theory of human rights is understood to be discontinuous with doctrinal
disagreements, if it places itself on the second-level “outside and above the arena of
doctrinal disagreement.”284 Individuals caught up at the first-level of disagreement need a
theory of human rights that is independent of the disagreement and discontinuous with
those other doctrines that regulate the relationship with one another.285 A theory of
human rights is a theory about the equal rights and equal status of human persons. Since
it ascribes the same fundamental rights to human persons, it must therefore ascribe the
same moral standing to persons.286
John’s insights are of significant relevance to Uganda’s human rights-based
HIV/AIDS policy development because of diversity of beliefs and values. A theory of
human rights is not about competing in these doctrinal disagreements but about the status
of a human person. A human person is owed these fundamental rights merely by virtue of
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being human, and not because he or she is male or female, or heterosexual or gay. For
instance, gender based roles in Uganda ought to abide by the principle of nondiscrimination since all are equal, and have the same dignity by virtue of being human.
The arbiter principle, such as non-discrimination and non-stigmatization, derives
from universally recognized inherent dignity, and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family.287 No one should be discriminated against, or stigmatized,
because of their race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation; for they are human persons.
Dr. Zainab Akol, coordinator of the national AIDS Control Program in Uganda, was
alluding to this basic truth when she said, “We in the health ministry do not want to know
your sexual orientation …. We treat everyone so long as that person is sick.”288
But the effective management of the conflicting doctrinal disagreements will require
that the engagement of the principle of non-discrimination and non-stigmatization be
mediated within the procedural values of communication, collaboration, coordination,
and cooperation. Moreover, this will further entail the consideration, by all involved
parties, of procedural standards, such as reasonableness.
(ii) Ethics Committees and Reasonable Risks in HIV/AIDS Intervention
One of the biomedical HIV prevention strategies since the late 1990s is the
development of microbicides. Uganda’s active participation in microbicides clinical trials
is a testimony to the commitment to advance science for the good of humanity. But,
Uganda, as well as the global research community, acknowledges the need for an
appropriate balance of the relevant moral concerns that arise in the process of advancing
the good of society, and the safety of the individuals participating in research. These
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concerns have, at times, been referred to as the balance between protectionist concerns
and respect for autonomy.289
Research ethics is well regulated in international ethics bodies to offer the prospects
of advancing science while also protecting the individual participants from
disproportionate risks. One strategy, as stipulated in the Common Rule of the U.S. federal
regulation of human research, is the assessment of the reasonableness of risks in clinical
research. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) is required to make this assessment
before enrollment of participants can proceed.290 As Alex London states, “the Common
Rule Approach holds that risks are reasonable when they are offset or outweighed by the
anticipated benefit of the research.”291
But according to London, the Common Rule lacks, “conceptual and operational
clarity” of the substantive guide regarding:
how to (a) distinguish the relative value of the various interests of research
participants that may be at stake in a particular trial, (b) distinguish the relative
value of the information or understanding that might be generated by the trials
that study different questions and employ different methods and (c) distinguish
permissible from impermissible trade-offs between these variables.292
The likely outcome, then, is for those entrusted with decision making to rely on their
common sense and good judgment. Uncertainty regarding what counts as unreasonable
risks occurs due to the absence of, “shared set of criteria or standards that deliberators can
use to demarcate reasonable from unreasonable risks.”293
In an attempt to address the question of criteria and standard for reasonable risks,
Alex London defines reasonable risks as:
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Risks to individual research participants are reasonable just in case they (1)
require the least amount of intrusion into the interests of participants that is
necessary in order to facilitate sound scientific inquiry and (2) are consistent with
an equal regard for the basic interests of study participants and the members of the
larger community whose interests that research is intended to serve.294
The criterion and standard set by this definition prioritizes scientific rigor, and the
reduction of risks, to what is necessary to address the research question in a manner
consistent with the “current state of scientific inquiry.”295 The second aspect is the
permissibility to ask individual community members “to sacrifice some of their personal
interests as part of an effort to advance or secure the interest of others.”296 The
participation must not pose risks to the basic interests of participants that are inconsistent
with the same degree of concern that is shown for the basic interests of other community
members.”297
The phase III cellulose sulfate clinical trial met the criteria of a prior independent
ethics review committee, and informed consent, as required by the United States, and all
major international bodies regulating human research. However, the question of whether
the Phase III cellulose sulfate microbicides trial met the criteria of scientific rigor, and
subsequently reasonable risks is unresolved. Had the already existing scientific data on
the stimulatory effect of low concentrations of cellulose been accessed by the
investigators and, had the independent ethics review committee raised more safety related
questions, the issues of reasonable risks would have been assessed differently.298
Another related question concerns how much the issue of urgency for the
development of microbicides, and for that matter the intervention of HIV, weighed on the
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minds of the researchers. By 2005, fifty five non-government organizations worked as
active campaign partners in the global campaign for microbicides. This number was part
of the two hundred non-governmental organizations worldwide that had endorsed the
campaign.299 With a $24 million grant for the phase III cellulose sulfate clinical trial, and
a global campaign eager for results, the pressure was on the investigators and research
institutions to find the right balance between urgency and rigorous scientific and ethical
standards. This was a task which the Global Campaign for Microbicides resolved to take
seriously.300
Guideline 3 of the Council for International Organizations of Medical Science
(CIOMS), concerning externally sponsored research, requires that the investigator
submits the research protocol to the sponsoring country and host country for ethical and
scientific review.301 The local ethical review committee reviews the research protocol “to
ensure that the means of obtaining informed consent are appropriate to local customs and
traditions, as well as to assess the competence of the research team and the suitability of
the proposed research site in the host country.”302 In relation to this guideline Uganda
needs to develop mechanisms for effective local ethical and scientific review committees.
Particularly, there is a need for building capacity for the effective assessment of
reasonable risks, a task that may require networking with external experts.

D. Summary
Policy makers and health providers in Uganda’s HIV/AIDS initiative attest to the
stabilization, and a recent slight increase, of the HIV prevalence rate. This development
undermines the remarkable success achieved, through the behavioral change approach,
259

under the acronym of ABC in the 1990s when the HIV prevalence rate dramatically
dropped. But, surprisingly, a paradigm shift occurred beginning 2003 when more funds
for HIV/AIDS intervention became available, including President George W Bush’s
generous PEPFAR initiative.
The grant opened new possibilities for surges in HIV treatment, testing, counseling,
and prevention of mother-to-child infection, thereby improving the lives of many people.
But at the same time, the PEPFAR initiative generated a divisive and obstructive ABC
debate that involved local and global participants in a manner that appears to have
endangered the effort to reduce the heterosexual transmission of HIV. Parties strategized
to advance policies that favored their exclusive preferences, be it condoms, abstinence,
individual rights, or minority rights.
Recent developments that link human rights with public health, and transnational
participants can enhance the prospects for provision of better population health while
safeguarding individual and human rights. The Mixed Interests Ethics Model (MIEM) is
a contribution that innovatively engages the UNESCO’s principles-based approach,
suggested in the UDBHR document to effectively manage HIV/AIDS intervention. This
chapter applied the illustrative principle of non-discrimination and non-stigmatization,
and the principle of the common good to demonstrate an effective way forwards for the
improvement of the population health and human rights in Uganda.
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6. Chapter Six
Conclusion

(i) The New Era of Public Health, Human Rights, and Biopolitics
Ever since HIV/AIDS epidemics, bioterrorism, and the threat of an influenza
pandemic topped the list of public health emergencies at the onset of the 21st Century, the
question of how to balance between individual and population interests has been
intensely discussed. Conflicting interests range from individual liberty versus societal
good, injustice in allocation of resources, and disrespect for individual and human rights.
Yet, no single ethical theory such as libertarianism, utilitarianism, or communitarian,
solely and sufficiently resolves the conflicts between individual and population interests
in influenza pandemic and HIV/AIDS epidemic intervention.
This dissertation has established that influenza pandemic preparedness plans were
characterized mostly by concerns for justice in distribution of health goods (resources),
and the protection of individual liberties and freedoms. The protection of the individual
interests in liberty and freedoms was articulated in the substantive principle of individual
autonomy, and strictly guarded in libertarian ethical theory. When population interest in
health and safety was the priority, substantive principles such as solidarity and common
good, were articulated and strictly guarded in utilitarian, egalitarian, and communitarian
ethical traditions.
This dissertation contributes the Mixed Interests Ethics Model (MIEM) as a criterion
for negotiating balance between individual and population health interests for the
effectively management of pandemics and epidemics. As demonstrated, MIEM entails
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engaging related principles and standards. The principles address substantive issues. For
instance, the use of the “least restrictive means” ensures respect for autonomous
individuals even when those individuals are subordinated to intrusive measures, such as
mandatory vaccination, to protect the population’s health and safety. Standards address
procedural issues to ensure that moral commitment is retained. For instance, the
procedural standard of necessity guarantees that the state police power is not arbitrarily
exercised. The public health agent has a moral responsibility to satisfy the justificatory
conditions, minimize the infringement of the general moral considerations, and
demonstrate transparency.1
On the issue of HIV/AIDS epidemic intervention, the prevention of the heterosexual
transmission of HIV mostly featured conflicts that were related to the distribution of
diverse socio-cultural beliefs and values, and how these choices related to civil liberties,
individual rights, and human rights. In the experience of Uganda, the application of civil
liberties, behavioral change, and human rights (reductionism) to guide policy in the
heterosexual transmission of HIV lacked an effective criterion for disambiguating and
balancing tension that arises from engaging socio-cultural diversity.
The new field of public health and human rights has dramatically expanded to include
biopolitical competencies, as evidenced in transnational civil society advocacy – tasked
with the global spread of democracy, human rights and health. Liberal cosmopolitanism
features cross-border, post-territorial global communities empowered with “free-floating
rights of global advocacy.”2 Probably no other global public health ethics issue in recent
times has generated so much passion for transnational advocacy and global engagement
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in health, human rights and biopolitics than the combination of PEPFAR and Uganda’s
HIV/AID behavioral change approach.
In the PEPFAR controversy, Uganda’s ABC framework for HIV prevention was
perceived as not broad enough to accommodate strategies for addressing the rights of
individuals and the legal and human rights of minorities.3 In another related initiative, the
candidate microbicides 6% cellulose sulfate gel clinical trial in Uganda, and other
countries, demonstrated the urgency of scaling up global biomedical intervention in HIV,
but also exposed the limitation of biopolitical advocacy in driving scientific endeavors.4
To effectively manage the heterosexual spread of HIV, Uganda’s strictly guarded
behavioral change strategy needed to undergo a paradigm shift so as to engage
transnational networked biomedical, biopolitical, and bio-socio-cultural drivers of public
health, human rights, and democratic principles. The principles-based approach, as
proposed by the UNESCO’s Universal Declaration for Bioethics and Human Rights
(UDBHR), and as made practical by the Mixed Interests Ethics Model, offers an effective
variable for balancing the individual and population interests in pandemics and
epidemics.
(ii) UNESCO’s Bioethics Principles and MIEM
The development of the principles-based approach to mediate conflict in population
health has been a gradual process. For instance, a Canadian group of bioethicists
proposed substantive and procedural values to negotiate the tension arising from
individual and population preferences in the influenza pandemic intervention. These
ethicists identified substantive values, such as solidarity and procedural values such as
transparence, to aid the process of ethical decision making.5 But the proposal tended to
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slightly favor the overriding goal of population health, and offered little significant
discourse on engaging individual rights and human rights.
At the beginning of the 20th Century, the United States judiciary had implicitly made
a significant contribution toward the later principles-approach discourse when the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905), rejected absolute maxims in public
health intervention. Regarding individual liberty (autonomy), the court ruled that the
Constitution of the United States does not “import an absolute right in each person to be,
at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.”6 Yet again, government
coercive powers were also understood as subject to constitutional restraints “to protect
individual interests in autonomy, privacy, liberty, and property.”7
On the issues of the common good, the United States judiciary understood the state as
possessing broad police power to justify the pursuance of the societal goals of health and
safety. Accordingly, of paramount necessity, the community has a right to self-defense,
against an epidemic disease.8 The court acknowledged the “communal value of health
and safety,” but also established four constitutional standards to limit coercive public
health in the name of ensuring public health. The standards were public health necessity,
reasonable means, proportionality, and harm avoidance.9 The Supreme Court’s ruling
was of significant importance to public health ethics, since it undercut individualism, and
diminished unnecessary paternalism, or arbitrariness.
The practicability and the heuristic aspect of the mid-level biomedical principles to
overlap different ethical theories, and facilitate the delineation and resolving of ethical
dilemmas in individual-oriented clinical medicine and research, has been successfully
argued by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, in their treatise on biomedical
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principles. These scholars adopted Rawls’ reflective equilibrium as a method of choice
for negotiating specification and justification of our considered moral judgments.10
Childress and colleagues’ exploration of the use of the principles approach in public
health sought to emphasize the notions of specification to delineate the meaning and
scope, the justification, and the balancing of competing principles so as to determine their
respective weight and strength.11 This ethical analysis exercise was considered important
for purposes of balancing between conflicting principles, since they were understood to
be comprised of areas that increase conflict and those that decrease conflict
respectively.12
The global endorsement of bioethics principles occurred when UNESCO’s Universal
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR) provided a set of foundational
bioethics principles as a universal normative standard to guide scientific progress, and to
protect human dignity and freedom.13 Based on a human rights framework, the
International Bioethics Committee identified and acknowledged common values that are
accommodative of cultural diversity with pluralistic moral view points, and yet are
consistent with the dignity, and fundamental rights and freedoms, of human persons.14
The Committee provided more clarity to the bioethics principles approach when it
identified between fundamental principles, derived principles, and procedural
principles.15 Fundamental principles were defined as “principles that cannot be justified
by another principle.”16 Derived principles meant those principles that “can only be
justified by one or more fundamental principles.” 17The UDBHR document
acknowledged and established a requirement for limiting the application of a principle,
for instance, for the protection of public health, or the rights and freedom of others. The
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interpretation of this requirement was meant to be in accordance with domestic and
international law, and in conformity with human rights law.18
The interpretation and practicability of UNESCO’s bioethics principles in population
health is considered as a work in progress. As commented by on Ten Have and Jean:
The UNESCO Declaration is the first step: it provides a framework of general
principles that is open to various interpretations and applications in the context of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, leaving many specific issues and controversies open for
further debate.19
But this further debate, as acknowledged by these ethicists, must remain committed to
seeking balance, as was guided by the UDHBR, between individualistic and
communitarian moral perspectives. For instance, the principle of autonomy and personal
responsibility was established along with the principle of solidarity and cooperation.20
The UNESCO’s UDBHR principles framework constitutes a set of universal,
minimum normative standards to arbiter conflicting ethical interests. The Mixed Interests
Ethics Model (MIEM) renders the UDBHR principles practical by facilitating the
identification of conflicting principles to deal with the related substantive issues, and the
procedural standards to address procedures. MIEM requires a normative analysis of the
competing substantive principles by way of specification, justification, as well as
application of procedural standards to balance between conflicting principles in
population health intervention. Subsequently, MIEM contributes to the effective
management of pandemics and epidemics, and facilitates UNESCO’s global initiative to
ameliorate health and human rights.
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The UNESCO bioethics principles approach, and as applied in MIEM, are well suited
to the goal of facilitating balance between conflicting principles in Uganda’s prevention
of the heterosexual transmission of HIV/AIDS. The major obstacle to the success of the
ABC and PEPFAR initiative appears to have been rights-based conceptual frameworks
that were either exclusively focused on promoting individual rights, or civil liberties, or
minority rights (group rights). The danger with distributing human rights between
individual and minority rights is the immoderate focus on one set of interests, rather than
a cross pollination between individual and population interests.
In the Uganda context, proponents of individual rights gravitated toward
overemphasis on scientific tools for purposes of enhancing individual decisional
autonomy, and limiting society’s ability to influence the behavior of individuals.21 The
pro-minority rights tended to advocate for legal mechanisms and political instruments,
such as granting or withholding foreign aid, as preferred strategies for advancing civil
liberties.22 In one approach, a theory of human rights is synonymous with individual
rights and, in the other, with collective rights. While each of these rights perspectives
accounts for an essential feature of the human rights theory, none provides an
overarching, definitive standard for accommodating diversity and reconciling competing
individualistic and communitarian interests.
Pandemics and epidemics are better managed by adherence to a criterion that
incorporates respect for the dignity of the individual person and furthers the flourishing
of the human family. Such a criterion ought to foster, for instance, the principle of
solidarity, which constitutes the values of communication, collaboration, cooperation,
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and coordination across diversity. Likewise, the societal good of health and safety entails
the protection and promotion of autonomy and individual responsibility.
The UNESCO’s bioethics principles approach provides Uganda with an effective
strategy for reconciling competing individualistic and communitarian moral dilemmas, so
as to combat the heterosexual transmission of HIV. The approach accommodates both
individual and communitarian ethical interests, and when applied in MIEM, provides
balance. For instance, the bioethics principles approach could provide effective guidance
to balancing between societal commitment to distributing socio-cultural roles, and
women’s disapproval of gender-based roles that subordinate the individual woman’s
interests.
The unjust distribution of gender roles renders women powerless in matters of
autonomous sexual choices and enhances the spread of HIV/AIDS. As explained by
ethicists, women’s economic dependence and lack of decisional power gives men undue
advantage on issues such as property rights, co-habitation, wife inheritance, early girl
marriages, dowry, domestic violence, and sex choices.23 Socio-cultural practices violate
human rights when they perpetuate inequality, inequity, and injustice. Moreover such
practices often enhance women’s social susceptibility to HIV.24
The human rights framework, such as stipulated in the UDBHR document,
accommodates diverse cultural values systems and beliefs, in so far as they do not
infringe upon human dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms.25 Human rights
are regarded as superior to cultural expressions since they are inalienable rights based on
the inherent dignity, and equality, of fundamental freedoms and rights of all human
beings. Yet, human rights are also understood as guarantors of cultural diversity and
268

pluralism, for they entail a claim to non-discrimination due to differences such as of race,
color, sex, languages, gender, and religion.26
The UNESCO’s human rights-based bioethics principles ought to be differentiated
from the reductionist application of the simplified conceptual human rights frameworks,
based on legal rights (as in legal positivism), or simple beneficiary theories. Human
rights reductionism has emerged as a problem that may attenuate the relation of public
health and human rights. Increasingly, as attested to in the Uganda experience,
transnational HIV/AIDS advocates get caught up in the “pendulum theory of individual,
communal and minority rights.”27
Human rights reductionism in the Uganda debate developed as a slippery slope of
linking health to human rights in the global fight against HIV/AIDS. Once the social
justice argument was advanced to foster the global HIV/AIDS intervention, transnational,
networked civil society and international human rights organizations, such as Human
Rights Watch, made the initiative to harmonize civil and political rights with social,
economic, and cultural rights. Likewise, humanitarian organizations incorporated rightsbased approaches to their strategies of fostering development in poor resource countries,
thereby engaging in a debate regarding diversity of beliefs and values.28
While many Western -based transnational advocates are well acquainted with
democratic mechanisms, such as the Bill of Rights in United States that enables the
exercise of natural rights and accommodates diverse beliefs and values in their countries,
the complex pluralistic social-cultural system of sub-Saharan Africa is probably an
unfamiliar domain. But a theory of human rights, such as advanced in the UNECSO’s
bioethics principles, provides commonality for its accommodation of diversity. As
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explained by Peter Jones, a theory of human rights necessarily accommodates, and
provides for, diversity by its adherence to a discontinuous strategy with doctrinal
disagreement. By being a theory about the equal rights and equal status of the human
persons, a theory of human rights positions itself “outside and above the arena of
doctrinal disagreement.”29
In this sense, the UNESCO’s bioethics principles are a set of universally accepted,
minimum normative standards that arbiter doctrinal disagreements. For instance,
managing the conflict regarding women’s experience with subordinate gender roles, as
well as concerns regarding homosexuality in Uganda’s HIV/AIDS intervention, requires
a consideration of the principle of non-discrimination and non-stigmatization as stipulates
in article 11 of the UDBHR document.30 The principle affirms the non-violation of
human dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, since all people are born free
and equal in dignity and human rights. In the context of the Uganda HIV/AIDS debate,
non-discrimination ought to be considered in relation to other principles such as
autonomy and individual responsibility, and the principle of respect for cultural diversity
and pluralism.31
This approach is different, for instance, from a strategy that focuses on the diminution
of the marriage institution as a means of enhancing women’s decisional autonomy, and
the advancement the freedom of choice regarding sex.32 The UDBHR principles approach
as made practical by MIEM, commits to rigorous scrutiny and analysis of meaning,
scope, justification, and balancing of competing principles. Since the balancing between
conflicting principles entails limiting the application of these principles in certain
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circumstances, the MIEM requires engaging the processes by deploying procedural
standards such as reasonableness or necessity.
Taking into account Ugandan’s willingness to embrace the “behavior change
initiative” of the 1990s, it not unreasonable to assume that Uganda’s mainly patrilineal
society is not indifferent to reforming unjust gender based socio-cultural roles. When
President Yoweri Museveni sought to counter the high HIV prevalence with behavior
change programs, he took advantage of Uganda’s robust social cohesion. More telling are
the people who revealed their HIV positive status to the community, and abstained from
sex because they cared deeply about the wellbeing of other human beings. It fact, it could
be argued that the community mobilization success proved that respect for the dignity of
individuals, the common good, and solidarity are basic features of Uganda’s social
cohesion.
(iii) Recommending Bioethics Committees and Education for Uganda
Lessons learned from the Nazi experimentations, eugenics programs, and the
Tuskegee syphilis study, among others, helped refocus the trajectory of public health
interventions away from coercive and manipulative models towards decisions and
practices that enhance human dignity and the wellbeing of the human family. HIV/AIDS
policies that are modeled on universally accepted bioethics principles and procedural
standards necessarily infer the promotion of a spirit of “professionalism, honesty,
integrity and transparency in decision-making.”33
The UDBHR document recommends that addressing and reviewing bioethics issues
must proceed in a manner that engages professionals and society in dialogue, “for
informed pluralistic public debate,” and commits to the “best available scientific
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knowledge and methodology.”34 As applied in the MIEM criteria, dialogue and
persuasion require that the influencing agents demonstrate not only substantive
justification, but also commitment to a process that is in accordance to procedural
standards, such as reasonableness, necessity, and proportionality.
Article 19 of the UDBHR requires the encouragement of states to establish
independent, multidisciplinary, and pluralistic ethics committees which could “foster
debate, education and public awareness, and, engagement in bioethics discourse.35 In the
last four decades, ethics committees have proved to be very effective tools for enhancing
dialogue, understanding, and persuasion in clinical medicine and research, as well as in
non-academic, health related enterprises. UNESCO advised that bioethics committees
could be established at three levels of government, namely, national, regional, and
local.36
Because of the multi-disciplinary composition and diversity of competencies such as
science, law, ethics, political theory, humanities, and social-cultural community
representation, ethics committees are appropriate mechanisms for disambiguating
Uganda’s HIV/AIDS complex moral dilemmas and fostering the improvement of health
and human rights.37 In the management of the HIV/AIDS moral quandaries, Uganda’s
National Bioethics Committee can be significantly enriched by UNESCO’s knowledge,
and experience, with different forms and functions of ethics committees.
UNESCO enumerates four forms and functions of ethics committees. The policymaking and/advisory committees (PMAs), on the national level, establish “sound
scientific and health policies” for the citizen.38 Health Professional Association
Committees (HPAs) “establishes sound professional practices for patient care
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(physicians’ associations, nurses’ associations).”39 Health care/Hospital Ethics
Committees (HECs) “improve patient-centered care (hospitals, out-patient clinics, longterm care institutions, hospices).”40 Research Ethics Committees (RECs) “protect human
research participants while acquiring generalized biological, biomedical, behavioral and
epidemiological knowledge (pharmaceuticals, vaccines, devices).”41
As envisaged by UNESCO, a national bioethics committee refers to a government
body, with usually authoritative power, or a non-governmental body, established for
instance, by professional organizations, a policy-advisory body, or NGOs. The National
Commission for UNESCO may also steer the creation of a national bioethics committee
in certain circumstances.42 Uganda could also benefit from local bioethics committees
that are usually associated with community and religious-affiliated health care
institutions.43
The purpose of the PMAs is to advise the government, and governmental bodies, “on
bioethics problems and issues raised by progress in health care, biology, the biomedical
science and biotechnology.”44 Moreover, PMAs need to “influence policy-making and
increase public awareness and participation” through the publication of recommendations
on bioethics issues.45 Additionally, PMAs “provide a forum for discussion at the national
level of a plethora of bioethics problems, issues and particular cases,” that attract much
public attention through, for instance, extensive press or social media coverage.46
PMAs accomplish a number of functions that include formal self-education,
fundamental inquiry into scientific innovations and deliberation on appropriate use, and
familiarity with regulations regarding protection of participants in human research. 47
Other functions entail the exploration and management of the relation between scientific
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innovations and moral, as well as cultural, implications. PMAs are also tasked with
facilitating greater understanding, and awareness, of bioethics problems and dilemmas
among various health professionals, members of the scientific community, media
professionals, and the lay public.48
To underline the importance of policy-making or advisory bioethics committees for
Uganda’s population health intervention, one only needs to look, for instance, at the
proposed HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Bill 2008 that was still shelved in parliament
by 2012. The proposed bill “provides for mandatory testing for HIV/AIDS and forced
disclosure of HIV status.”49 According to Dr. Alex Ario, a Uganda Ministry of Health
Official, the “Know Your Status” policy ought to make HIV testing routine when a
person seeks treatment or a check-up at a health facility.50 In response, the civil society,
Center for Health and Human Rights and Development, petitioned the United Nations for
intervention against the compulsory measure.
In 2011, the Uganda Law Reform Commission recommended that national legislation
should protect the patient’s informed consent in HIV testing, and only make it mandatory
for specific cases, and for pregnant mothers to avoid mother-to-child transmission.51 A
pluralistic policy-making, or advisory bioethics committee, knowledgeable on the
UDBHR ethics competencies could be an appropriate platform for handling cases such as
Uganda’s “Know Your (HIV) Status” dilemma.
The International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO acknowledged that, in matters of
public health, “medical intervention may be justified without consent in specific cases in
order to protect individuals.”52 But, the consideration has to be weighed carefully against
the individual’s right of autonomy as specified in the derived principle of informed
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consent, and in relation to the overall societal well being, such as expressed in the
principle of solidarity and cooperation.53
In this case of the proposed compulsory HIV testing policy in Uganda, the task of a
bioethics committee, as recommended by UNESCO ought to be the assessment, advice,
and formulation of recommendations regarding the relevant ethical, legal, and social
problems.54 By focusing effort on principles, norms, and values, the committee members
provide sophisticated ethical scrutiny, and formal oversight, necessary for the
improvement of health and human rights.55
A competent bioethics committee provides informed advice and eliminates the need
to petition the United Nations body for intervention, as did the Center for Health and
Human Rights for Development.56 More important, however, is that bioethics advisory
committees tend to look beyond the effectiveness of a public health measure to a
consideration of the ethical justificatory conditions, and adherence to, procedural
standards. The normative ethical analysis involves balancing, for instance in this case,
between the conflicting principles of autonomy (and the derived principle of informed
consent) and solidarity to advance the population good of health and safety.
One other notable conflict that emerged during the 2012 Ebola outbreak and
intervention in Uganda further demonstrates the importance of policy-making, or
advisory bioethics committees. Mourners reportedly snatched the body of a suspected
Ebola victim from public health officials who had been dispatched to handle the burial.
The Muslim mourners, who were “armed with clubs, sticks and stones,” accused the
health officials of violating Muslim burial rites by “wrapping the body in a bag.”57 The
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mourners also demanded that they wash the body before burial, in accordance to Muslim
practice.
Epidemiologists explain that the Ebola virus spreads from person to person mainly
through contact with the bodily fluid of the infected person. But, as evidenced in this
case, solely epidemiological factors do not suffice for purposes of containing a public
health disaster. Contagious disease outbreaks occur among populations of diverse social,
cultural, and religious beliefs and values. For this reason, pluralistic, multidisciplinary,
and independent bioethics committees are essential in Uganda for the mobilization and
sensitization of the public to create awareness, and to render diversity of belief and value
compatible with health goals and human rights.58
The bioethics committee provides a platform for working together on ethical
dilemmas from a diversity of competencies, such as epidemiologists, public health
officials, health administrators, community representation, and faith-based representation.
During the successful years of the behavioral change strategy in Uganda in the 1990s,
Muslim leaders and other faith based agents demonstrated a spirit of mutual cooperation,
and engagement, in the efforts to prevent the rise of HIV prevalence. Between 1992 and
1997, the Islamic Medical Association of Uganda (IMAU) engaged Muslim leaders in
education about HIV/AIDS and mobilized their support in combating the HIV/AIDS
epidemic.59
However, while the communitarian approach that informed the behavioral change
strategy of the 1990s in Uganda necessarily entails commitment to principles of solidarity
and cooperation, the UNESCO’s bioethics principles approach requires cogent and
systematic moral inquiry. The exercise of bioethics inquiry presupposes that members of
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the bioethics committee have engaged the bioethics self-education. While some of the
self-education is formal, such as seminars, workshops, and study of the ethics literature,
usually much of the self-education occurs informally through consulting knowledgeable
persons, or canvassing existing bioethics literature.
The behavioral change approach of the 1990s aside, much of the bioethics
competencies Uganda has mastered, at least in the last ten years or so, appears to be in
the purview of human research ethics associated with HIV/AIDS. The Uganda National
Council for Science and Technology (UNCST), established by the 1990 Act, Cap 209 of
Uganda law, is “mandated to facilitate and coordinate the development of policies and
strategies for integrating science and technology into the national development
progress.”60 UNCST is a government agency under the Ministry of Finance, Planning and
Economic Development.
Research ethics oversight in Uganda is carried out on the national level by the
National HIV/AIDS Research Committee of the UNCST, and at the institutional level by
Institutional Review Committees. Some of the accredited Institutional Review Boards
include those of the Uganda Virus Research Institute, the Joint Clinical Research Center,
School of Public Health, School of Medicine, and Mengo Hospital.61 To aid the process
of ethical research oversight, the UNCST issued the National Guidelines for Research
Involving Humans as Research Participants.62
But, as explained by UNESCO, research ethics committees are only part of the much
broader bioethics oversight strategy that includes policy-making and /or advisory
committees (PMAs), and health care/hospital ethics committees (HECs). Uganda could
expand on the bioethics competencies by adopting UNESCO’s bioethics core curriculum
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developed to introduce university students globally to the Universal Declaration on
Bioethics and Human Rights principles. The proposed study materials were based on the
principles adopted by UNESCO.63
The curriculum was justified on the basis that it “articulates ethical principles that are
shared by scientific experts, policy-makers and health professionals from various
countries with different cultural, historical and religious background.”64 Subsequently,
the UDBHR principles approach enables student to think beyond individualistic
approaches to ethics, and reflect as well on the social and community ethical dimensions
and human rights considerations of medicine, health care and science.65
A combination of bioethics education and the development of ethics committees will
provide Uganda with sound bioethics-principles competencies essential for balancing
between individual and population interests to effectively manage pandemics and
epidemics, while safeguarding individual and human rights. That engagement will require
the deployment of the Mixed Interests Ethics Model (MIEM) to negotiate balance
between conflicting substantive principles, and procedural standards to delineate scope.
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